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Abstract
Cryptographic schemes using one-dimensional, three-neighbor cellular
automata as a primitive have been put forth since at least 1985. Early
results showed good statistical pseudorandomness, and the simplicity of
their construction made them a natural candidate for use in cryptographic
applications. Since those early days of cellular automata, research in the
field of cryptography has developed a set of tools which allow designers to
prove a particular scheme to be as hard as solving an instance of a well-
studied problem, suggesting a level of security for the scheme. However,
little or no literature is available on whether these cellular automata can
be proved secure under even generous assumptions. In fact, much of the
literature falls short of providing complete, testable schemes to allow such
an analysis.
In this thesis, we first examine the suitability of cellular automata as a
primitive for building cryptographic primitives. In this effort, we focus on
pseudorandom bit generation and noninvertibility, the behavioral heart of
cryptography. In particular, we focus on cyclic linear and non-linear au-
tomata in some of the common configurations to be found in the literature.
We examine known attacks against these constructions and, in some cases,
improve the results.
Finding little evidence of provable security, we then examine whether
the desirable properties of cellular automata (i.e. highly parallel, simple
construction) can be maintained as the automata are enhanced to provide a
foundation for such proofs. This investigation leads us to a new construction
of a finite state cellular automaton (FSCA) which is NP-Hard to invert.
Finally, we introduce the Chasm pseudorandom generator family built on
this construction and provide some initial experimental results using the
NIST test suite.
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1 Introduction
”Any one who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is,
of course, in a state of sin.”–John von Neumann.
The modern world increasingly hinges on communication. Business is ruled more
and more by e-Commerce. Our computers run largely on downloaded open-source
software. Students turn in their distance-learning homework through e-mail and
websites. Nations attack each other’s domestic infrastructure over the internet. Notice
that at least one party in each of these scenarios has an interest in ensuring the secrecy
and/or the authenticity of the communication. In an age where information itself
becomes a prime mover, protecting that information becomes more important. So
it is seems fair to say that secure communication is increasingly critical in our daily
life. And though security requires an array of solutions to many challenging problems,
certainly good cryptography is one cornerstone.
The foundation of much of modern security and cryptography is good random
number generation. Pseudorandom generators (PRGs) are used for exchanging session
keys, creating public/private key pairs, creating symmetric keys from user input, and
generating nonces and initialization vectors for various modes of encryption. Good
PRGs are also at the heart of many cryptographic primitives such as stream ciphers,
block ciphers, and hash functions. PRGs used in this setting must be carefully designed
lest they compromise the entire cryptosystem. Even the best crypto primitives become
useless when operated with poorly generated pseudorandom data. We mention the
cases of Netscape [15], Kerberos [30], the GSM wireless network [6], and the Sony
PlayStation 3 [13] as evidence. These were all failures in seeding PRGs or generating
random values. While block ciphers and the like get much of the attention, these
deterministic components are almost boring when not fed sufficiently random data.
Randomness is crucial to many activities besides cryptography. Monte Carlo
simulations allow mathematical modeling of systems and functions that are too
complicated or expensive to solve directly. Such a simulation gives us a statistically
qualified numerical value by evaluating the system or function at a number of randomly
chosen inputs. This random selection is often done with a pseudorandom generator
for reasons of cost and speed. Monte Carlo methods are a mainstay in fields as varied
as computational physics, financial modeling, numerical optimization, and a number
of engineering disciplines.
In fact, it was the application of Monte Carlo methods to integrated circuit
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(IC) testing in the 1980’s that drove a body of research to find better and cheaper
pseudorandom bits [4, 10, 14, 16, 18, 36, 41]. Because of the combinatoric nature of
the possible failures in an IC, most problems in this kind of testing are NP-Complete.
Monte Carlo methods offered a path to high-confidence test results without the need
to wrestle with these combinatoric problems. The common solution was to add some
circuitry to accept static test vectors from a test fixture and produce some sort of
pass/fail check inside the IC. In addition, a separate mode was supported where a
short seed sent to the IC would generate a much longer yet deterministic sequence
of pseudorandom test vectors. These would be run and the same pass/fail check
performed. This cut down transmitted data to the IC and greatly increased the speed
of the test.
Since this circuitry was on the IC itself but was not directly valuable to the customer,
there was pressure to reduce the resources it consumed–transistors, connection lengths,
CMOS area, etc. The PRG used had traditionally been a linear feedback shift
register (LFSR), but in the late 1980’s researchers began to compare LFSRs with
one-dimensional cellular automata (CA). After understanding some behavioral basics
such as how to achieve a maximal period, experiments showed that CA gave better
test coverage with lower cost in ICs than LFSRs [14, 18]. Their abilities as PRGs were
established.
It was natural then to investigate CA as primitives for cryptographic schemes,
and through the 1990’s and 2000’s, many such schemes were put forward. As is often
the case with cryptographic schemes, many have been broken and none have really
garnered widespread attention. This may be due in part to the lack of specifics in
many of these schemes about key scheduling and initialization that would facilitate
implementation and focused cryptanalysis.
If so, it would be somewhat ironic since this same period has seen the opening
and continued growth of standards-based algorithm selection (for AES, SHA-1, 2, &
3, and eStream), governing body standardization, and the increasing popularity of
provable security in cryptographic theory. This last area began in the early 1980’s as
the application of the techniques from complexity theory to problems in cryptography,
even in concrete situations of constant size. Proofs concerning cryptographic primitives
and protocols are given in relation to mathematically precise definitions and (hopefully)
minimal assumptions about hardness. Proofs of protocol security are often provided
as reductions from breaking the primitive they employ. This allows assumptions to be
minimal and explicit so that effort spent on cryptanalysis can be focused and re-used
for these primitives.
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In this thesis, we will attempt to bring a provable security approach to cryptography
based on CA. Specifically, we will consider the ability of CA constructions presented
in the literature to act as cryptographic PRGs since PRGs are fundamental to all of
cryptography. As we will see, this ability depends almost entirely on the noninvertibility
of CA. The remainder of this section gives the necessary definitions and criteria for
this evaluation. In Section 2 we present an overview of CA and related terminology
then review some important schemes and seminal breaks of CA constructions from
the literature. Section 3 presents new analysis of CA using non-linear rules, including
a new algorithm to invert certain non-linear rules in two-state, three-neighbor cyclic
CA as well as a proposed algorithm to derandomize cryptanalysis of non-linear CA
when an output sequence over time from a single cell is known. Unconvinced of
the suitability of simple CA for use as primitives in secure cryptographic systems,
we then examine how they may be enhanced to allow for proofs of hardness and,
eventually, security. A new construction called finite state cellular automaton which
adds a minimal amount of complexity to cells is shown to be provably hard to invert
in Section 5. We then use this theoretical construction to build the Chasm family of
concrete PRGs and give some experimental results in Section 6.
1.1 Definitions of Security
Let us first make clear the context in which we consider PRGs and exactly what we
mean by that term. Randomness in modern cryptography begins with Shannon’s
information theory [42], where randomness is something of a measure of the lack of
information. Kolmogorov (and Chaitin) added the notion of descriptive complexity
[21], which classifies a string to be no more random than the program required to
generate it. Both of these notions allow us to quantify randomness, but when we do
so we find “perfect” randomness only at extreme, theoretical limits. These concepts
do not help us create or assess practical randomness.
A third notion defines randomness relative to an observer. A string is “random” to
an observer if it cannot be distinguished from a truly random string within the bounds
of that observer’s computational resources. This in a sense defines randomness as the
extent to which the observer is unable to compute any meaningful information from a
string. Since this is a different concept from truly random, we instead use the term
pseudorandom. The observers we are concerned with are algorithms whose running
time are bounded in some way.
Pseudorandom generators were the first primitives to be defined using this notion
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of pseudorandomness. The original contemporaneous definitions are due to Yao [52]
and also Blum and Micali [8]. We give a more common, modern definition.
Definition 1.1. A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`(n)
is a pseudorandom generator with stretching function ` : N→ N such that `(n) > n if
for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, for any positive polynomial p:
∣∣Pr [A(G(Un)) = 1]− Pr [A(U`(n)) = 1]∣∣ < 1
p(n)
for all sufficiently large n where Uk is a k-bit string drawn uniformly at random from
{0, 1}k and the probabilities are taken over the respective Uk and over the coins of A.
Use of the term pseudorandom in this thesis should be assumed to imply this
notion of computational indistinguishability. Pseudorandomness subject to a fixed set
of statistical tests will be referred to as statistical pseudorandomness.
Using this definition, we can see that a statistical test against the output of a
generator G is simply a special kind of distinguishing algorithm A. While we can run
a battery of statistical tests, we still cannot truly satisfy this definition without some
assumption on the hardness of inverting G. If G were easy for A to invert, A could:
• Assume its input IA is the output of G, and invert G for that output, to arrive
at an assumed input IG.
• Run G(IG) and compare the result to IA. If they are the same, A outputs a 1.
This algorithm would let A distinguish the outputs of G quite easily and so G would
not be a pseudorandom generator as defined. Thus, some notion of noninvertibility or
one-wayness of G is essential. We define this notion as follows:
Definition 1.2. A function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is said to be one-way if f is
polynomial-time computable and for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A,
for any positive polynomial p:
Pr
x∈{0,1}n
[f(A(f(x))) = f(x)] <
1
p(n)
for all sufficiently large n where the probability is taken uniformly over the choices of
x and the coins of A.
It turns out that this notion is the key to PRGs. Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby
prove in [19] that the existence of one-way functions is a necessary and sufficient
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condition for the existence of PRGs. Note that f must be generally hard to invert as
the probabilities are taken over all x. This is juxtaposed with NP-Complete problems,
where having occasional strings which cannot be decided in polynomial-time is sufficient
to consider the whole language “hard.” Note also that by this definition, A need not
compute x exactly, just any pre-image of f(x). If this pre-image is not unique the
function is noninvertible by some definitions of that term. To be clear, we will use
noninvertible to mean one-way and inversion to mean finding any pre-image of f(x).
Other properties of PRGs are very useful in practice, especially in scenarios where
the internal state of the generator (especially software-based generators) may become
known to an attacker. In this scenario, the attacker may be able to predict future
pseudorandom outputs and/or recreate past outputs. If the generator is shared among
users (as is /dev/random on Linux systems), and if those outputs are used in another
user’s cryptosystem (as a key or initialization vector), that system can easily be
compromised. Security against this scenario is captured by the following properties:
Backward-Secure: Future outputs are secure against a compromise of the internal
state of the generator which occurred in the past. Equivalently, given the current
internal state of the generator, an attacker is unable to predict future outputs
with non-negligible success. As PRGs are deterministic algorithms, this property
is difficult for a generator to display intrinsically, and is usually achieved only
be external re-seeding of the generator.
Forward-Secure: Previous outputs are secure against a compromise of the internal
state of the generator which may occur in the future. Given the current internal
state, an attacker is unable to guess past outputs with non-negligible success.
This implies the PRG’s function is effectively one-way.
The notion of forward security was first formalized by Bellare and Yee [5], and is also
applied to symmetric encryption schemes regarding key compromise. As seen in our
example of shared /dev/random, this property is very powerful, and is to be expected
in modern PRGs.
We can see that we need noninvertibility to guarantee pseudorandom behavior
going forward, and we also need it to protect previous outputs. Thus noninvertibility
is a must-have property of any primitive used as a cryptographic PRG.
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2 Cellular Automata
A Cellular Automaton is a discrete time and space dynamical system consisting of an
array of cells, each of which implements a (usually simple) automaton. These cells can
be arranged over one or two dimensions and connected to their neighbors in various
configurations. The cells use the state of their neighbors and their own state to decide
a next state to transition to. In some cases, very simple configurations of cells using
very simple rules display surprisingly complex behavior.
Cellular Automata were first proposed by John von Neumann while working at Los
Alamos on the problem of building self-replicating systems1. His 1953 construction
had 200,000 cells over two-dimensions where each cell used 29 states to model various
operations of the robot. Stanislaw Ulam picked up this concept again in the 1960’s
with work on recursively-defined geometrical objects. He noted that in two-state
two-dimensional CA with simple rules, a single non-conforming cell generated complex
patterns which may model biologic interactions. John Conway experimented further
with connected cells using simple rules and developed “The Game of Life,” which
popularized two-state two-dimensional CA. Many other constructions of one and two
dimensions are useful for a host of applications too numerous to mention.
Pseudorandom generators and cryptography using CA flow from work by Stephen
Wolfram in the 1980s and the response to it. This is the trail we will follow.
2.1 Definitions
Formally, a CA is a vector F = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fn〉 of functions fi : {0, 1}N 7→ {0, 1}
for some N ∈ N. Each fi is evaluated at some discrete time t to produce a vector
S(t) = 〈s(t)1 , s(t)2 , . . . , s(t)n 〉 of values s(t)i . The values si are also known as the state (in
the sense of stored value) of cell i, and so S is sometimes called the state vector.
When each value s
(t)
i ∈ {0, 1}, the CA is referred to as a two-state CA. Each fi is
traditionally called the transition function of the cell (as in Finite State Automata).
The N inputs to cell i normally come from its own output at the previous time step as
well as (N − 1)/2 of its immediate neighbors on either side. Thus, in an N-neighbor
CA, the value of cell i at time t+ 1 is defined by
s
(t+1)
i = fi(s
(t)
i−(N−1)/2, . . . , s
(t)
i , . . . , s
(t)
i+(N−1)/2)
1See [51] and [38] for a more complete history.
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For convenience, we will denote a neighborhood of values at time t from cell i to cell j
inclusive with S
(t)
i:j , and likewise for neighborhoods of functions.
To determine what happens at the outer-most cells, a CA must specify an input for
the missing neighbor. A null-boundary CA provides a constant 0 for these neighbors,
while a cyclic-boundary CA provides the value from the outer-most cell from the
opposite end of the array. We will be concerned only with cyclic-boundary CA.
Two-state, 3-neighbor, cyclic-boundary CA are of particular interest in the litera-
ture. This is the simplest configuration shown to have complex behavior, depending on
F . Most authors refer to the transition function of the CA as the “rule,” following the
numbering convention of Wolfram[50]. Rules are numbered by considering the output
bits for each of the 2N possible inputs as a binary number, then interpreting that
number in decimal. For example, a function that, on input strings of 111, 110, . . . , 000,
produces output bits 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 respectively is called rule 30. Using this scheme,
the vector F will be referred to as the rule set or the rule vector.
We will often work in standard Boolean algebra to describe these rules, using
· or concatenation to indicate AND, + for OR, and ⊕ for XOR. Rules using only
XOR giving f the form f(x1, x2, x3) = a0 ⊕ a1x1 ⊕ a2x2 ⊕ a3x3 we define as affine in
GF(2). Affine rules having a0 = 0 are called linear. For a linear rule, complementing
one of the inputs is equivalent to setting a0 = 1, and so affine rules are linear rules
with an additive offset (as in other domains). This leads to the occasional use of the
term additive as a synonym for affine. Rules that are not linear are called nonlinear.
Though all rules have three arguments by definition in a 3-neighbor CA, not all rules
make use of all inputs. We will describe those rules that make use of only two inputs
as binary and those that use all three as ternary. The rules that have attracted the
most attention are:
rule 30: s
(t+1)
i = s
(t)
i−1 ⊕ (s(t)i + s(t)i+1)
rule 150: s
(t+1)
i = s
(t)
i−1 ⊕ s(t)i ⊕ s(t)i+1
rule 90: s
(t+1)
i = s
(t)
i−1 ⊕ s(t)i+1
rule 105: s
(t+1)
i = 1⊕ s(t)i−1 ⊕ s(t)i ⊕ s(t)i+1
rule 165: s
(t+1)
i = 1⊕ s(t)i−1 ⊕ s(t)i+1
These and some slight variations will be the focus of our analysis.
Even such a small set of rules still allows a variety of options in constructing CAs.
A uniform CA is one where each cell applies the same rule at each time step. In such
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cases, the rule vector may be denoted Fr to indicate that Wolfram rule r is used for
each cell. Alternatively, a hybrid CA may assign different rules to different cells. A
hybrid CA where the rules are symmetric about a center cell will be referred to as
symmetric; those hybrid CA without this property are called asymmetric. Uniform
and hybrid CAs keep the assigned rules constant across time steps. CAs which vary a
given cell’s rule over time according to some scheme are called programmable. A CA
(uniform or hybrid) which uses only linear rules is known as a linear CA, and likewise
for nonlinear rules.
The use of XOR on just a single input can be of critical importance. A rule f is
said to be left-toggle if the following property holds for all S ∈ {0, 1}3:
1⊕ s(t+1)i = f(1⊕ s(t)i−1, s(t)i , s(t)i+1)
A rule is right-toggle if instead
1⊕ s(t+1)i = f(s(t)i−1, s(t)i , 1⊕ s(t)i+1)
holds. Rules combining the left or right bits with XOR will be left- or right-toggle,
respectively. It will be important in the analysis of toggle rules to have the following
lemma.
Proposition 2.1. Let S ∈ {0, 1}n be the state vector of an n-cell CA, f : {0, 1}3 →
{0, 1} be a left-toggle rule, and g : {0, 1}3 → {0, 1} be a right-toggle rule. After
applying f to cell i at time t, s
(t)
i−1 = f(s
(t+1)
i , s
(t)
i , s
(t)
i+1). Similarly, after applying g to
cell i at time t, s
(t)
i+1 = f(s
(t)
i−1, s
(t)
i , s
(t+1)
i ).
Proof. We first address the case of a left-toggle rule, and consider
(s
(t+1)
i ⊕ s(t)i−1)⊕ s(t+1)i = f((s(t+1)i ⊕ s(t)i−1)⊕ s(t)i−1, s(t)i , s(t)i+1). (1)
Either s
(t+1)
i = s
(t)
i−1 or s
(t+1)
i 6= s(t)i−1. In the first case, we have
0⊕ s(t+1)i = f(0⊕ s(t)i−1, s(t)i , s(t)i+1)
which is just the definition of f . But since s
(t+1)
i = s
(t)
i−1, we can exchange these values
and write (1) as
s
(t)
i−1 = f(s
(t+1)
i , s
(t)
i , s
(t)
i+1)
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which is the identity we seek. In the second case, we have
1⊕ s(t+1)i = f(1⊕ s(t)i−1, s(t)i , s(t)i+1).
Since s
(t+1)
i 6= s(t)i−1, 1⊕ s(t+1)i = s(t)i−1 and 1⊕ s(t)i−1 = s(t+1)i . Substituting these identities
gives us
s
(t)
i−1 = f(s
(t+1)
i , s
(t)
i , s
(t)
i+1)
This proves the Lemma for all f . The proof for right-toggle rules is similar. 
Thus, a left-toggle rule allows us to substitute the rule output for the left neighbor
in order to solve for that left neighbor. The reflected observation holds for right-toggle
rules as well.
A temporal sequence is a sequence of the output values of a single cell taken over
multiple time steps. We say a CA produces a temporal sequence (or just sequence) σi
at cell i if the values si over time match the elements of σi. Of particular interest in the
literature is the central temporal sequence, used as a pseudorandom stream in many
CA-based constructs. Unless otherwise noted, we assume n is odd to make clear which
is the central temporal sequence. The right-adjacent sequence of a temporal sequence
is the temporal sequence one position to its right, and similarly for the left-adjacent
sequence.
Finally, it bears mentioning that cellular automata can do some funny things. We
refer to the state vector at time step t = 0 as the initial state and also the seed, a term
frequently used for the initial input to random generators. Some CA are not capable
of generating their initial state at a later time step. Such a state vector is known as a
garden of Eden state as it can only exist in the beginning. Some CA evolve into a
single, fixed state (usually all 0s), which is known as a dead-end state for that CA.
2.2 A Brief Overview of Research on Pseudorandom Gener-
ation with CA
CA entered the cryptography and random number generation domains with Stephen
Wolfram’s claims about rule 30. In [50], he proposed a uniform n-cell cyclic arrangement
using rule 30 with the temporal sequence of the center cell used as a random stream.
The periods of sequences produced depend on the number of cells, but also on the
initial seed. The maximal period was estimated to be 20.61(n+1). This generator was
shown to pass a suite of 7 statistical tests, performing best when the sequence was
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much shorter than the period of the CA. The CA performed better than an LFSR of
the same size, but not as well as a linear congruential generator or the bytes of
√
2, e,
or pi.
Hortensius, et. al. [18] compared this rule 30-based generator with a hybrid config-
uration using rules 90 and 150, based on work in [36], and also with traditional Linear
Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs). The focus of these experiments was generation
of test vectors in VLSI manufacturing where layout concerns are important. They
showed that both kinds of CA performed better than LFSRs in statistical tests. The
null boundary hybrid CA had on average longer periods than cyclic boundary uniform
rule 30 CAs. They also catalog the configuration of rule sets which produce maximal
periods in the hybrid configurations, along with periods for other configurations tested.
These results were arrived at through exhaustive search.
Serra, et. al. took up the question of how to synthesize a null-boundary linear CA
given a primitive polynomial in [41]. Given a linear CA, each new state vector can be
described as a linear system, and so can be represented as a matrix operation over
GF(2). This matrix is called the transition matrix of the automaton. The authors
first establish an isomorphism between the transition matrix of an LFSR with that
of a CA by showing they are similar (i.e. have the same characteristic polynomial)
and so describe the same linear transform under different bases. They then give an
algorithm to produce the transition matrix for a null-boundary linear CA using only
rules 90 and 150 (from which the rule set is clear) given a characteristic polynomial.
While this algorithm is based on searching a space of 2bn/2c vectors, later algorithms
in [10] and [11] improve these results. The first solves a quadratic congruence on
subpolynomials using Euclid’s algorithm in a finite field, the second uses a revised
Lanczos tridiagonalization method in GF(2) to find one of two possible CA for the
given polynomial.
These results are only for null-boundary linear CA. Bardell in [4] shows that the
outputs of linear CA and LFSRs are identical when a phase shift between output bit
sequences is accounted for. Bardell also conjectures that no cyclic-boundary linear CA
has maximal period. This conjecture is proved by Nandi in [32], who reported that the
characteristic polynomial of any transition matrix using cyclic boundary conditions is
factorizable, and so cannot be primitive. Nandi also claims that periodic boundary
linear CA provide better statistical randomness than null boundary, due to the fixed
0s at the ends. This claim is supported by [43].
Nandi, et. al. examine the group behavior of hybrid CAs over rules 51, 153, and
195 with null boundary conditions in [33] and show these rules lead to CA which
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are even permutations. By combining several rule sets in a programmable CA, they
create transformations which generate an alternating group of even permutations.
These transformations then become primitives on which they base block and stream
ciphers.These cryptosystems were broken in [7], which showed that the groups formed
are actually a subset of the affine group, not the alternating group, of degree n and
therefore are easily recreated with sufficient plaintext/ciphertext pairs. This was
improved in [29] using ciphertext only.
In the same year, Sipper and Tomassini gave a genetic algorithm approach to
evolving a single “good” CA by using an entropy metric and introducing mutations of
rule changes randomly. They looked at 3-neighbor, two-state, cyclic hybrid CA with
n = 50 over 300 random initial states run for 4096 steps. The entropy of each cell is
computed over time, and with probability 0.001, cells would mix rules with a neighbor
by swapping the neighbor rule’s output value assigned to certain input combinations.
Two resulting CA (a mixture of rules 165, 90, and 150 in one case and rules 165 and
225 in the other) were compared to a uniform rule 30 CA and a hybrid 150/90 CA
over 4 statistical tests, showing favorable results.
The approach of evolving CA gave rise to a series of papers. See [17, 40, 45, 46].
Most of these end up focusing on the main 4 linear rules, 150, 105, 90, and 165.
In [49], Wolfram proposed a cryptosystem based on his rule 30 temporal sequence
random generator from [50] as a key stream with which the plaintext could be XORed.
This scheme was broken by Meier and Staffelbach in [28] . The authors first showed
that the temporal sequence is not hard to recover in the case of known plaintext
attacks. Then, given this temporal sequence, they showed that the left half of the
CA’s computational history was uniquely determined if the right-adjacent sequence
could be guessed due to the left-toggle property of rule 30. Further, the right-adjacent
sequence could be determined by guessing the right half of the seed and running the
CA forward for n/2 time steps. They also showed that not all right halves of the
seed are equiprobable, so far fewer than n/2 guesses are required. For n = 300, for
instance, a probabilistic algorithm requires 18.1 bits of entropy to recover the seed
with a probability of 0.5. This algorithm remains a seminal one in cryptanalysis of
CA cryptosystems, and one which we will seek to improve.
In [20], Koc¸ and Apohan investigate a claim made by Wolfram that recovering
a seed value given a sequence of states over an n-cell automaton using rule 30 was
NP-Complete. Koc¸ and Apohan present an inversion algorithm which finds the best
affine approximation of the transition function and then solves an n-variable Boolean
linear equation to get a good approximation S∗of S(t−1). It then checks the affine
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approximation by using S∗ to re-compute S(t). If there are errors, the algorithm
resorts to a search for combinations that correct them. Using this algorithm, Koc¸ and
Apohan shows that rule 30 can be inverted in time O(n) for some seeds and O(2n/2)
worst case. We will improve this result.
Sen et. al. [39] present a (rare) fairly complete description of an entire cryptosystem
based on CAs. The algorithm is multistage, with some key management and both
linear and non-linear rules applied to the plaintext. The system was broken by Bao in
[2] using only hundreds of chosen plaintexts and very little computation. Bao presents
an equivalent transform and searches a small space of one of the parameters of the
cryptosystem to decrypt any ciphertext with probability 0.5.
A series of papers propose using programmable CAs, wherein the rule vector F
applied at each time step can be controlled by external circuitry. These schemes
usually focus on 2 or 4 of the linear rules (150, 105, 90, 165). This seems to do very
well in statistical testing, but makes little or no claims about use in cryptography. See
[16].
Shin et. al. [43] analyzed the conditional probability distributions of different
combinations of binary operations and showed that only XOR produces “cryptographic”
PRGs, since all other combinations are skewed. They show that 64-cell hybrid CA
based on rules having uniformly distributed outputs pass almost all tests from the
Diehard [23] statistical test battery.
3 Analysis of Non-Linear CA
When viewed from a computational complexity perspective, it’s not clear that a 2
state, 3 neighbor CA is capable of hardness at all. Any resolution to this question
would certainly depend on the rule set of the CA. Many rules simply do not generate
any complex output patterns, and some degenerate to very small cycles or constant
patterns very quickly. The authors of [22] conclude that no CA using only uniform
rules is suitable for use in cryptographic applications by demonstrating the following:
Of all uniform CA subjected to frequency, serial, poker, gap, and auto-correlation
statistical randomness tests using the evolution of the center cell as a random stream,
only 22 rules passed. These rules were then subjected to a linear complexity test.
The linear complexity of a sequence is defined as the length of the shortest LFSR
that produces the sequence. We know via the Berlekamp/Massey algorithm [24] that
an LFSR of length no more than `/2 can be synthesized for any sequence of length
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`. The linear complexity test showed that only the following rules generate `-bit
sequences whose linear complexity approaches `/2 (the ideal): 30, 45, 75, 86, 89, 101,
106, 120, 135, 149, 169, 225. The authors then observe that all of these rules are left-
or right-toggle rules, and adapt the Meier-Staffelbach algorithm to work on either side
and recover the initial state of the CA with no more than 2bn/2c trials.
These results and the algorithms of Koc¸/Apohan [20] and Meier/Staffelbach [28]
for attacking rule 30 all seem to imply that 2n/2 bits are the most one would have
to guess to know everything about the CA’s history one wanted. While this is still
an exponential bound, we’d like to know for certain that the security of the PRG is
related to the full seed length. Further, both algorithms often do much better than
worst case. This apparent weakness invites further investigation into whether 2n/2 is
the tightest upper bound that can be achieved. We will focus our efforts on rule 30 due
to the large body of literature for this rule. The other rules listed above are in most
cases simple variations using negation of a term or reflection of the inputs, and we
would expect results against rule 30 to also apply there as well. Unless otherwise noted,
we are concerned with cyclic CA as they are most commonly used in the literature.
We therefore examine the common structures using rule 30 in search of techniques
to improve the worst case bounds. Specifically, we examine the case of a known state
vector over n cells for a given time step (the problem addressed by Koc¸/Apohan) and
the case of a known temporal sequence from one of n cell over for n/2 time steps
(addressed by Meier/Staffelbach). In both cases we investigate techniques to recover
the initial state.
3.1 Improvements to Koc¸ and Apohan
The algorithm presented in [20] selects the best affine approximation of the rule used
in a CA and applies the inverse affine transform to estimate the previous state. The
success of this technique depends primarily on the rule(s) used in the CA. Those CAs
using affine rules can be represented by a linear system in GF(2). In this case, the
system can be solved for the state vector at time t − 1 if the entire state vector is
known at time t. This solution requires only O(N2n) operations for an N -neighbor
CA with n cells using Gaussian elimination. To recover the state t time steps ago, this
process must be repeated t times. However, for affine rules, the inverse transform can
also be represented as a linear recurrence S(t−1) = MS(t) + b in GF(2), where M is an
n× n Boolean matrix and the 1× n offset vector b models any negation operations in
the rule of each cell. Given some S(t), this recurrence can be composed t times and
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3-neighbor state Possible 5-neighbor predecessors # of prior states
with 1 in each
position
000 (00000) (11101) (11110) (11111) [3, 3, 3, 2, 2]
001 (00001) (11010) (11011) (11100) [3, 3, 1, 2, 2]
010 (10101) (10110) (10111) (11000) [4, 1, 3, 2, 2]
011 (00010) (00011) (10100) (11001) [2, 1, 1, 2, 2]
100 (01101) (01110) (01111) (10000) [1, 3, 3, 2, 2]
101 (01010) (01011) (01100) (10001) [1, 3, 1, 2, 2]
110 (00101) (00110) (00111) (01000) [0, 1, 3, 2, 2]
111 (00100) (01001) (10010) (10011) [2, 1, 1, 2, 2]
Table 1: Prior states of 3 neighbors in uniform rule 30 CA
solved to recover s(0) directly. The run time of inverting uniform CA using known
affine rules then is clearly polynomially bounded.
The affine approximation does, however, have difficulty with non-linear rules.
Applying the inverse of an affine approximation to S(t) gives an estimate S∗ which
can differ from the true S(t−1). If so, S∗ may not be a valid predecessor of S(t) under
the non-linear rule. The algorithm of Koc¸/Apohan resolves this by searching through
templates of these mismatches in the context of the neighborhood in which they occur
to find possible modifications to the estimate vector S∗ which resolves the differences.
It is this search that pushes the bound on the running time up to O(2n/2).
We observe that not all prior state vectors are equiprobable under non-linear rules.
Prior probabilities for 3-neighbor cells are given in Table 1. Note that any sequence of
length 3 has only 4 possible prior states of length 5 under rule 30. Experimentation
shows this holds for other sequence lengths as well. Since rule 30 is left-toggle, choosing
s
(t)
i and s
(t)
i+1 uniquely determine s
(t)
i−1 when s
(t+1)
i is fixed by Proposition 2.1. But
then s
(t)
i−1 and s
(t)
i are known, so s
(t)
i−2 is determined if s
(t+1)
i−1 is known, and so on.
Therefore, the two right bits are sufficient to determine the k + 2 predecessor bits of
any sequence of length k. This information can be used to optimize the search for
erroneous predecessor bits in the templates. For instance, if the center value s
(t)
i of a
3-cell neighborhood is 1, there is a 3/4 chance that s
(t−1)
i−1 is 0. If the affine approximation
does not immediately yield a unique prior state, using such probabilities may inform
the template search and reduce the average-case search space of the algorithm.
More noteworthy is that rule 30 has certain patterns that always have fixed bits
in the prior state. Notice the patterns 010 and 110 centered on cell s
(t)
i have a fixed
value in cell s
(t−1)
i−2 for all possible prior 5-neighbor states. The following proposition
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shows why this must always be true.
Proposition 3.1. Let (abcde) ∈ {0, 1}5 be the values in a 5-cell neighborhood
at time t in a uniform rule 30 CA of n ≥ 5 cells. Let (xyz) ∈ {0, 1}3 be the
vales of the 3-cell neighborhood resulting from evaluating the rule 30 function f
as f(a, b, c), f(b, c, d) f(c, d, e) respectively. Then (xyz = 010) implies a = 1 and
(xyz = 110) implies a = 0.
Proof. First we show (xyz = 010) =⇒ (a = 1). In rule 30, note the following
identities:
x = 0 = a⊕ (b+ c) =⇒ a = b+ c (2)
y = 1 = b⊕ (c+ d) =⇒ b = c+ d (3)
z = 0 = c⊕ (d+ e) =⇒ c = d+ e (4)
Then, by substituting (4) into (2), we have
a = b+ d+ e (5)
Thus a can only take the value 0 when b = d = e = 0. But substituting (4) into (3),
we get
b = d+ e+ d
= d+ e
So when d = e = 0, b cannot be 0. Therefore, a can never be 0 and must always be 1.
To see that (xyz = 110) =⇒ (a = 0),
x = 1 = a⊕ (b+ c) =⇒ a = b+ c (6)
y = 1 = b⊕ (c+ d) =⇒ b = c+ d (7)
z = 0 = c⊕ (d+ e) =⇒ c = d+ e (8)
In particular, we note that (6) is just the complement of (2). For completeness, we
can see
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a = b+ d+ e
by substituting for c in (6). But by (7) and (8), b 6= d+ e, so a can never be 1. 
This information can be used to invert the entire state vector in rule 30 anytime
the pattern 010 occurs by using the left-toggle property of the rule. We capture this
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let S(t) ∈ {0, 1}n be the known state vector in a cyclic boundary
n-cell uniform rule 30 CA at time t. Suppose S
(t)
i−1:i+1 = 010 for some 0 ≤ i < n.
Then S(t−1) is uniquely determined.
Proof. First, note that
s
(t−1)
i−3 = s
(t)
i−2 ⊕ (s(t−1)i−2 + s(t−1)i−1 )
and that s
(t−1)
i−2 = 1 by Proposition 3.1. Then s
(t−1)
i−2 + s
(t−1)
i−1 = 1 and so
s
(t−1)
i−3 = s
(t)
i−2 ⊕ 1 = s(t)i−2
Since s
(t−1)
i−2 and s
(t−1)
i−3 are known, we can then evaluate
s
(t−1)
i−4 = s
(t)
i−3 ⊕ (s(t−1)i−3 + s(t−1)i−2 )
and likewise for i− k where k = 1, . . . , n− i where i− i− 1 evaluates to n because of
the cyclic boundary. This allows the calculation of all s
(t−1)
i for 0 ≤ i < n. 
Note that this technique does not work for the 110 pattern, since knowing the middle
bit s
(t−1)
i in a 3-neighborhood when its value is 0 does not determine s
(t−1)
i + s
(t−1)
i+1 .
However, if we examine longer predecessor patterns we may be able to guess two
adjacent bits in the predecessor with high probability. Then we can evaluate
s
(t−1)
i−1 = s
(t)
i ⊕ (s(t−1)i + s(t−1)i+1 )
and so on until we complete the previous state vector. Looking at the 32 possible 5-
neighbor blocks under rule 30, 11 have a fixed 1 position in their 7-neighbor predecessors,
and another 16 reveal two adjacent positions with probability 3/4. Only 5 of the
possible values leave the probability of guessing two adjacent predecessor bits at 1/2.
We observe that the analog of Proposition 3.1 also holds for all left- or right-toggle
rules, and so each such rule can be inverted using the techniques discussed above.
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Table 2 shows the patterns of interest for each of the rules identified. These results
suggest some general weakness in toggle rules that can be used to find predecessors
for any given state vector.
Rule 30 is known to have some garden of Eden state vectors and is not strictly
injective [1, 26, 47]. In practice, those S ∈ {0, 1}n for which F−130 (S) is not defined
appear only as initial conditions, so a partial inversion is sufficient to recover a seed.
Various authors [9, 35] have addressed a means to realize a partial inversion once a
rule 30 CA is run past time step 1, but none give a specific algorithm to find any
possible predecessor in a uniform cyclic rule 30 CA. The observation that toggle rules
require only two bits to make the full preceding state vector known leads to such a
partial inversion algorithm that runs in time Θ(n). While the general mechanism may
be known, there seemed to still be some question as recently as 2011 (see chapter 10
by Wolfram in [53]). We give a formal statement and proof of the algorithm here for
completeness.
Proposition 3.3. Let S ∈ {0, 1}n and let fi be a function either of the form
fi(Si−1:i+1) = Si−1 ⊕ g(Si, Si+1) or fi(Si−1:i+1) = g(Si−1, Si) ⊕ Si+1 for some g :
{0, 1}2 → {0, 1}. Let r be the rule number of fi and let Fr be the rule vector of a
cyclic boundary n-cell CA having state vector S(t) = S at time t. Then all valid S(t−1)
if any exist are computable in time Θ(n).
Proof. We first consider the case of the left-toggle function fi(Si−1:i+1) = Si−1 ⊕
g(Si, Si+1). For S
(t−1) to exist, it must satisfy S(t)i = S
(t−1)
i−1 ⊕ g(S(t−1)i , S(t−1)i+1 ) for
2 ≤ i < n and S(t)1 = S(t−1)n ⊕ g(S(t−1)1 , S(t−1)2 ) as well as S(t)n = S(t−1)n−1 ⊕ g(S(t−1)n , S(t−1)1 )
due to boundary conditions. Consider Algorithm 3.1, InvertToggleRule.
Algorithm 3.1 InvertToggleRule
Input: S
Output: P = {P ∈ {0, 1}n | Fr(P ) = S}
1: P ← ∅
2: R← 0n+2
3: for η ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} do
4: Rn+1,n+2 ← η
5: for i = n downto 1 do
6: Ri ← Si ⊕ g(Ri+1, Ri+2)
7: if R1 = Rn+1 ∧ g(R1, R2) = g(Rn+1, Rn+2) then
8: P ← P ∪R2:n+1
9: return P
InvertToggleRule runs in time Θ(n), as controlled by line 6 which executes n
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Rule 3-neighbor
state
Possible 5-neighbor
predecessors
# of prior states with
1 in each position
30
010 10101 10110 10111 11000 [4, 1, 3, 2, 2]
110 00101 00110 00111 01000 [0, 1, 3, 2, 2]
45
000 11001 11100 11110 11111 [4, 4, 3, 2, 2]
001 10010 10011 11000 11101 [4, 2, 1, 2, 2]
100 01001 01100 01110 01111 [0, 4, 3, 2, 2]
101 00010 00011 01000 01101 [0, 2, 1, 2, 2]
75
001 01000 01001 01011 11110 [1, 4, 1, 2, 2]
010 10010 10111 11100 11101 [4, 2, 3, 2, 2]
011 10000 10001 10011 10110 [4, 0, 1, 2, 2]
101 01110 11000 11001 11011 [3, 4, 1, 2, 2]
110 00010 00111 01100 01101 [0, 2, 3, 2, 2]
111 00000 00001 00011 00110 [0, 0, 1, 2, 2]
86
010 00011 01101 10101 11101 [2, 2, 3, 1, 4]
011 00010 01100 10100 11100 [2, 2, 3, 1, 0]
89
010 00111 01001 10111 11101 [2, 2, 3, 2, 4]
011 00110 01000 10110 11100 [2, 2, 3, 2, 0]
110 00001 01101 10001 11001 [2, 2, 1, 0, 4]
111 00000 01100 10000 11000 [2, 2, 1, 0, 0]
101
000 00111 01111 10011 11111 [2, 2, 3, 4, 4]
001 00110 01110 10010 11110 [2, 2, 3, 4, 0]
010 00100 01100 10001 11100 [2, 2, 3, 0, 1]
011 00101 01101 10000 11101 [2, 2, 3, 0, 3]
100 00011 01001 10111 11001 [2, 2, 1, 2, 4]
101 00010 01000 10110 11000 [2, 2, 1, 2, 0]
106
010 00010 01010 10010 11100 [2, 2, 1, 3, 0]
011 00011 01011 10011 11101 [2, 2, 1, 3, 4]
120
010 00111 01000 01001 01010 [0, 3, 1, 2, 2]
110 10111 11000 11001 11010 [4, 3, 1, 2, 2]
135
001 10111 11000 11001 11010 [4, 3, 1, 2, 2]
101 00111 01000 01001 01010 [0, 3, 1, 2, 2]
149
100 00011 01011 10011 11101 [2, 2, 1, 3, 4]
101 00010 01010 10010 11100 [2, 2, 1, 3, 0]
169
100 00010 01100 10100 11100 [2, 2, 3, 1, 0]
101 00011 01101 10101 11101 [2, 2, 3, 1, 4]
225
001 00101 00110 00111 01000 [0, 1, 3, 2, 2]
101 10101 10110 10111 11000 [4, 1, 3, 2, 2]
Table 2: Fixed position patterns in toggle rules
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times for each of 4 possible values of η. We must show that P is exactly the set of
possible prior state vectors leading to S under Fr.
Suppose P 6= ∅ and let P ∈ P. Notice that P is the inner n bits of the full
R computed by line 6, and so P1 = R2 and Pn = Rn+1. We show that for all P ,
Fr(P ) = S. It is clear that for any P ∈ P , Si = Pi−1 ⊕ g(Pi, Pi+1) holds for 2 ≤ i < n
since Ri = Pi−1 is assigned to be Si ⊕ g(Pi, Pi+1) based on the left-toggle property of
f . That leaves us to verify just the boundaries. Since P ∈ P , the condition on line 7
must hold, and so we know that Rn+1 = R1. From line 6, we have R1 = S1⊕g(R2, R3),
so Rn+1 = S1 ⊕ g(R2, R3), and therefore Pn = S1 ⊕ g(R2, R3). XORing g(R2, R3)
to both sides gives S1 = Pn ⊕ g(P1, P2), which is the definition of f1 with cyclic
boundaries. Also from line 6, we have Rn = Sn ⊕ g(Rn+1, Rn+2). By line 6 we know
Rn = Sn ⊕ g(R1, R2) and by line 7, this becomes Pn−1 = Sn ⊕ g(Pn, P1) (i.e. the left
toggle of fn) since R1 = Rn+1 = Pn. Therefore, Sn = Pn−1 ⊕ g(Pn, P1), the definition
of fn. This proves Si = Pi−1 ⊕ g(Pi, Pi+1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so S = Fr(P ) for any P ∈ P .
Suppose that there exists Q ∈ {0, 1}n such that Fr(Q) = S. We can construct Q′ =
QnQ1Q2 . . . QnQ1 in which Q
′
1 = Q
′
n+1 and Q
′
2 = Q
′
n+2 so g(Q
′
1, Q
′
2) = g(Q
′
n+1, Q
′
n+2).
Notice that, by the definition of fi, Qi−1 = Si ⊕ g(Qi, Qi+1) for 2 ≤ i < n and also
that Qn = S1 ⊕ g(Q1, Q2) and Qn−1 = Sn ⊕ g(Qn, Q1). Then by our construction,
Q′i = Si ⊕ (Q′i+1 +Q′i+2) must hold for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus Q′ has exactly the form
of some R generated on line 6 since any such Q′ must end in one of the possible η
considered on line 3. Further, Q′ meets the criteria on line 7 of the algorithm and
therefore Q must be in P .
It is easy to see that reversing the direction of the algorithm proves the case of a
right-toggle fi(Si−1:i+1) = g(Si−1, Si)⊕ Si+1. 
Algorithm 3.1 inverts all rules in Table 2 except rule 101 with only rules 135
and 149 requiring a slight modification to handle negation of the toggle input. The
algorithm is successful whenever a given state vector has at least one predecessor.
This would seem to be the majority of state vectors: under rule 30 for n = 6, there
are 12 state vectors with no predecessor, 41 states with exactly 1, 10 with 2, and 1
with 3. For n = 9, these numbers are 57 with no predecessor, 393 with 1, 61 with 2,
and 1 with 3.
Another implication of this algorithm is that a state vector with no predecessor
discovered mid-stream in a pseudorandom generator must be the result of re-seeding the
generator or updating its entropy. Leaking this information may be more damaging
than knowledge of the internal state itself: if entropy timing and values can be
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t c-3 c-2 c-1 c c+1 c+2 c+3
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 0
2 1 0 0
3 1
Table 3: Example of applying the Meier-Staffelbach algorithm in rule 30. Step 1: The
seed values on the right half (in green) are guessed. Step 2: The right triangle (in blue) is
computed. Step 3: The left triangle (in magenta) is solved to complete the left half of the
seed (in red).
discerned, they may become controllable.
Finally, this algorithm improves the running time to invert a rule 30 CA given by
Koc¸/Apohan from O(2n/2) to Θ(n). We are not aware of any previous bound on the
running time to invert other toggle rules as presented above.
3.2 Improvements to Meier and Staffelbach
The Meier/Staffelbach algorithm can be used to recover the CA state S(0) given a
temporal sequence of at least dn/2e time steps starting at time t = 0 for the central
cell sc where c = dn/2e. The algorithm can be summarized as:
• Guess bn/2c bits for cells S(0)c+1:n for time t = 0.
• Evaluate the cells S(t)c+1:n−t for 1 ≤ t < c time steps. Each time step, one fewer
cell on the right end can be computed since the boundary neighbor value is not
known. This leaves only the central cell known at time dn/2e. Plotted as a
two-dimensional chart over time, the computed cells now form a triangle between
the central cell’s values and the right half of the initial state.
• Using the computed right-adjacent sequence S(0)c+1, . . . , S
(bn/2c)
c+1 , solve the left
triangle from t = bn/2c backward up to t = 0 to complete the seed.
This algorithm is illustrated in Table 3. Meier and Staffelbach show for n = 300,
the center temporal sequence of a uniform rule 30 CA requires about 18 bits of entropy
to guess a compatible seed. We would like to see if taking advantage of the observations
made above allows us to improve this result.
Meier and Staffelbach note in [28] that where the temporal sequence is a sequence
of 0s, the right-adjacent sequence must match 0∗1∗. We make a related observation
on the left-adjacent sequence.
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t i -4 i -3 i -2 i -1 i
0 0
1 1 1
2 0 0
3 1 1 0 1
4 0 0 1
5 1 1
6 0
7 0
8 1
Table 4: Example of solved neighbors in rule 30
Proposition 3.4. Any occurrence of 10 in the temporal sequence starting at time t
in a uniform rule 30 CA must have a left-adjacent value of 1 at t; any occurrence of
11 must have a left-adjacent value of 0 at t.
Proof. Let i be the index of the cell for which the temporal sequence is known. By
the definition of rule 30,
s
(t)
i−1 = s
(t+1)
i ⊕ (s(t)i + s(t)i+1)
and we know that s
(t)
i = 1. Then s
(t)
i + s
(t)
i+1 = 1 and so
s
(t)
i−1 = s
(t+1)
i ⊕ 1 = s(t+1)i .
When 10 occurs in the temporal sequence at cell i, s
(t+1)
i = 0 and so the left-adjacent
s
(t)
i−1 must be 1. When 11 occurs, s
(t)
i−1 must be 0. 
Further, if two such occurrences are temporally adjacent (as must always be the
case when 11 appears since the third bit is either 1 or 0) starting at time t for a
sequence in cell i, then two left-adjacent cells are known and can be solved backwards
to produce the value of s
(t)
i−2. Table 4 gives an example temporal sequence at cell i
and the solved values in red. In addition, the known predecessor patterns can also be
used to solve even more of the CA history. By using the prior states from Table 1,
cells in green have been filled in as well.
There are a couple of applications of these observations to improving the Meier/Staffelbach
algorithm. First, let σ be the temporal sequence of length n from cell i in a rule 30 CA
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beginning at t = 0 and let j be the number of 1s in σ. Then no more than n− j − 1
random bits, or coins, would be necessary to chose those unknown left neighbors
that would allow us to solve the entire left triangle back to t = 0 and thus recover
the entire seed. If σ is evenly distributed, then we would expect to need n/2 coins.
This is comparable to the Meier-Staffelbach algorithm. If, however, we spend those
coins to fill in missing values of si−1 from the bottom up, we may reach a point were
examining predecessors of varying widths in different positions fills in prior time steps
deterministically. This leads us to the following algorithm:
1. Rotate the CA cells to the right, placing the known temporal sequence on the
right edge, leaving only a left triangle of size n to solve.
2. Repeat until a full state vector is known or no changes are possible:
(a) Recursively apply Proposition 3.4 to fill in left-adjacent cells where σi = 1.
(b) Recursively apply Proposition 3.2 to fill in fixed predecessor values.
(c) Run the CA forward to fill in any cell for which all three inputs are known.
(d) For any s
(t)
i−1 = 1 and s
(t+1)
i = 1, set s
(t)
i = s
(t)
i+1 = 0, accounting for
boundaries.
3. If the full state vector is known:
(a) Run the CA forward to fill in unknown cells. Check all known cells for
correctness.
(b) If discrepancies arise:
i. Backtrack to revisit random bits chosen in step 4 and flip them.
(c) Otherwise, use Algorithm 3.1 to invert the CA back to t = 0.
4. Otherwise, if no changes are possible, choose a random bit for the bottom-most
empty cell adjacent to the left edge of known cell values.
5. Return to step 2.
Pencil and paper experimentation show this algorithm to hold promise, but a more
complete effort is required to determine limits on the number of random bit selections
needed.
Table 5 illustrates the use of coins (in blue) and predecessor information to complete
the previous example. Once the state contains a 010 string, all predecessors to the left
22
t i -8 i -7 i -6 i -5 i -4 i -3 i -2 i -1 i i -8
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
2 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
3 1 1 1 1 0 1
4 0 0 0 0 1
5 0 1 1 1
6 1 1 0
7 0 0
8 1
Table 5: Example of solved neighbors in rule 30. In this example, the sequence 111101
in s(3) with 0 at s
(2)
i doesn’t quite determine that s
(2) so spending a coin on s
(2)
i−1 is still
required. In other cases, a 010 may appear in s(2), saving the coin. All of s(1) is determined
at the right edge and by s(2).) Since s(1) begins with 110, s
(0)
i−8 = 0. Suppose n = 9; then
s
(0)
i is determined and so on to the left.
of that string are known for as long and the successor is known to the left. This means
that coins are only required where the temporal sequence cannot fill in those positions
to the right until the boundary conditions are known. Past that point, these holes can
also be filled in by solving forward with knowledge of the right-adjacent values. Cells
colored in magenta show cells which can be determined once the boundary conditions
are known.
4 Analysis of Linear and Affine CAs
Over and again, the literature shows interesting results around rules 90, 105, 150,
and 165 [16–18, 33, 40, 44–46]. A cryptanalyst with a firm command of constructions
based on these rules stands to gain good advantage over the majority of random
number generators and cryptosystems based on these CAs. Therefore, we would like
to understand the extent to which we can apply the same techniques to the case of
linear and affine CAs based on these four rules.
There are some obvious challenges to using linear CA for cryptography. As
previously mentioned, knowledge of the complete state vector in a linear CA makes its
entire history solvable—simply solve the linear equations backwards for the number
of time steps desired. If the rule vector is known, using the full state vector seems
unwise. Using only a temporal sequence would keep knowledge of the full state vector
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secret, but in linear CA, Meier/Staffelbach approach seems only to get easier as we
now have full linearity in both directions.
We will focus on the approach taken by Tomassini and Perrenoud [45] to deal with
these problems. Their scheme is as follows: Select via the key one of these four rules
(details of how to do this are not given) as well as the initial state for each of n cells
in a cyclic boundary CA. Use the central temporal sequence as a random stream and
XOR it with the plaintext. The key space would be 4n × 2n = 23n making the key 3n
bits with suggested values of n around 100 (for 2001 compute power). It is claimed
that 2(5n−9)/2 guesses over rules and values would be necessary to solve the sequence
backwards to find a single, unique rule set and seed that produces that sequence. This
is one bound we seek to improve.
4.1 Analysis of CAs with Symmetric Rule Sets
Much of the key space proposed in [45] will result in CA whose rule sets are symmetric
about a center cell. Recall that a CA is symmetric if rule fi = fn−i+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Experiments performed on these configurations show very low periods, making them
very inefficient. We capture this observation in the following conjecture.
Conjecture 4.1. Let n be an odd number and Σ be an n-cell symmetric hybrid linear
CA over rules R = 90, 105, 150, 165 with cyclic boundaries. There are at most 2bn/2c
initial states of Σ that give the same temporal sequence of length ` ≥ dn/2e at cell
dn/2e.
Evidence for this conjecture begins with the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. There are 2bn/2c initial states of Σ that give the same temporal
sequence of length dn/2e at cell dn/2e.
Proof. Let k = dn/2e and let σ = s(0)k , . . . , s(k)k be the first k bits of the center temporal
sequence at cell k. Choose any ρ ∈ {0, 1}k−1 as the right-adjacent sequence of cell
k beginning at t = 0. Since each transition function in Σ is affine, both the right
and left triangles of Σ are easily solved for, resulting in a full initial state. This state
necessarily produces σ, regardless of the choice of ρ. 
This shows that the bound on the number of initial states holds at ` = dn/2e,
giving a sort of base case for the argument.
Further evidence for Conjecture 4.1 can be seen in the experimental results in
Table 6, and suggest that the period of any linear CA (symmetric or asymmetric) is
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n Max Period 2dn/2e
5 8 8
7 14 16
9 30 32
11 62 64
51 67108860 67108864
Table 6: Maximum periods of linear cyclic CA. The value for n = 51 is based on a single
observation of F = 〈{150}12, 90, {150}25, 90, {150}12〉 with s(0) = 562964991182857. A
few other rule sets have been tried with only a few other seeds, all having far lower periods.
This is a symmetric CA, and larger periods may be possible for asymmetric CA. Lower
values for n are the results from exhaustive computation.
no more than 2dn/2e. If this is true and some period p can be derived from the rule set,
then a proof need only deal with values of k < ` < p. For t ≥ p, the sequence must be
fixed.
A likely approach to proving Conjecture 4.1 uses a linear system in GF(2) to model
the evolution of the CA. Since all rules in R are affine, we can represent Σ’s transition
function across all cells as
w1,2 w1,3 0 0 w1,1
w2,1 w2,2 w2,3 0 0
0 w3,1 w3,2 w3,3 0
0 0 w4,1 w4,2 · · · 0
...
. . .
0 0 0 wn−1,1 wn−1,2 wn−1,3
wn,3 0 0 0 wn,1 wn,2


s
(t)
1
s
(t)
2
...
s
(t)
n

+

b1
b2
...
bn

=

s
(t+1)
1
s
(t+1)
2
...
s
(t+1)
n

(9)
where wi,j is the weight for cell i on input j in the cells transition function
fi(x1, x2, x3) and bi is an offset for each cell to affect a complement rule. If M is the
matrix of wi,j, then the recurrence S
(t+1) = MS(t) + b models the evolution of Σ. If
this recurrence is periodic, so is Σ.
The matrix M has a few interesting properties in the cases of interest. First,
for all rules in R, wi,1 = wi,3 = 1. Therefore, M is symmetric. The values on the
diagonal are determined by whether fi ∈ {90, 165}(where wi,2 = 0) or fi ∈ {150, 105}
(wi,2 = 1). Second, since Σ is symmetric, M is symmetric relative to both diagonals,
i.e. wi,2 = wn−i+1,2 for i < n/2. Lastly, M is a band matrix2.
2The strict definition of band matrix precludes the non-zero values at (1, n) and (n, 1), but some
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If the recurrence is periodic, then applying the recurrence some number of times
must yield the starting value. That is
M(M(. . . (M(MS(t) + b) + b) . . .) + b) + b = MS(t) + b.
Showing that repeating the recurrence leads to an earlier result of the recurrence
rather than just the original S(t) allows for proper handling of garden of Eden state
vectors. Collecting terms over p applications of the recurrence, we see that the period
is p when
Mp+1S(t) +Mpb+ . . .+Mb+ b = MS(t) + b
This may be further broken down to showing that raising a matrix with these properties
to the power p is idempotent, i.e. Mp+1 = M , followed by showing that Mpb+ . . .+
Mb = 0. This last part can be re-written as(
p∑
i=1
M i
)
b = 0. (10)
In fact, the condition in (10) also implies Mp+1 = M . Suppose Q(x) is the
characteristic polynomial of M so that Q(M) = 0. So also M · Q(M) = 0 and
M2 · Q(M) + M · Q(M) = 0. Since Q is over GF(2), the coefficients of Q can be
written as a binary vector c of length n. Multiplying M ·Q(M), as each iteration of
the recurrence does, gives a polynomial with coefficients c 1 which also evaluates to
0 at M . Here,  denotes the left-shift operator. We can likewise sum any number of
shifts of c and arrive at a polynomial which evaluates to 0.
Now suppose that through this process, we create a polynomial with a coefficient
vector c′ = 1p. We conjecture it is always possible to create such a polynomial if Q(x)
has terms 1x1 + 0x0. If Q(x) contains the term 1x0, we simply start from c 1. We
know the polynomial represented by c′ evaluates to 0 at M . Therefore, this polynomial
satisfies 10. To check whether Mp+1 = M , we can see
authors refer to matrices of this form as band matrices in the literature. To avoid this technicality, we can
simply duplicate s1 and sn on either side, append 0’s to b, and increase the matrix dimension to match.
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p∑
i=1
M i = 0
(M + I)
p∑
i=1
M i = 0
p+1∑
i=2
M i +
p∑
i=1
M i = 0
Mp+1 = M
The reverse implication also holds as long as M + I is invertible. An algorithm to
build such a c′ exists (by repeatedly shifting the lowest order 1-bit up to the lowest
order 0-bit in the running sum over GF(2)), but there is no proof of a bound on the
resulting p. Recall that Nandi, et. al. prove the characteristic polynomial for a cyclic
linear CA must have x or (x+ 1) as a factor, but it is not clear how this leads to a
bound of 2n/2.
As an example, we illustrate the case for a 5-cell uniform rule 90 CA, which has
the following transition matrix:
M90 =

0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0

with successive powers
M290 =

0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
 , M
3
90 =

0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0
 , M
4
90 =

0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
 = M90.
Notice in this case that
3∑
i=1
M i90 = 0
so even if b were not 0, the period would still be 3. Thus any 5-cell hybrid CA over
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Figure 1: Symmetric CA viewed as having right- and left-side blocks
rules in {90, 165} has period 3 for any starting seed.
Remark 4.1. There are 2n symmetric CAs. To see this, we choose n/2 bits for the
diagonal of M to select between binary ternary rules at each cell, then reflect them to
the other half. We then choose n/2 bits for the vector b to select between normal and
complementary rules and reflect those bits as well. These n bits cover the range of all
possible values of M and b for symmetric CAs.
Another possible approach to proving Conjecture 4.1 is to think of a symmetric CA
as a left block of k − 1 cells, a center cell, and a right block of k − 1 cells. We notice
the left and right blocks are equivalent in construction: they have inner and outer
neighbors that apply the same function, and they deliver their outputs to inner and
outer neighbors after applying the same function as inputs move from one side to the
other. (See Figure 1.) Their only difference is their initial state and the order in which
the initial state vector s(0) is acted upon. This model may explain the reflection seen
in cell values over several steps. Further, notice that at t = k, each cell is a function of
all cells’ initial state. In particular, each block is a function of its initial state, the first
k − 1 bits of σ, and the output of the opposite block. With the functions so similar,
the intuition is that the period must be small (certainly no more than (k− 1)2), but a
proof is not known.
Other considerations may further reduce the period. Spatially symmetric seeds can
generate periods of no greater than 2bn/2c since both blocks will be exactly the same.
It may also be of interest to know what the spacial period is in the case of symmetric
seeds; some combinations dead-end at 0, some have very low periods. McIntosh covers
the effects of spatially periodic seeds in depth in [25].
Remark 4.2. Assuming Conjecture 4.1, some sequences of length ` > dn/2e are not
possible in a given symmetric CA. This is supported by a pigeon-hole argument: If
each sequence is produced by 2bn/2cseeds then all seeds lead to one of 2dn/2e sequences,
leaving 2bn/2c sequences with no possible seeds. This is born out by experimentation.
See Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.3.
Remark 4.3. Assuming Conjecture 4.1, sequences which are not eventually periodic
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with eventual period ≤ 2dn/2e cannot be produced by a symmetric CA. If such a CA
were used as a key stream, a single known plaintext of more than 2dn/2e bits would
quickly be distinguishable from random.
In summary, using a symmetric CA does not seem advisable. Suppose n is large
enough to provide for an adequate period. There are still many seeds that would allow
an attacker to compute past and future bits, defeating the whole system. Excluding
symmetric CAs (both in arity and complementarity) reduces the rule vector space by
2n. To guess the rule vector and initial state for only asymmetric CAs given a temporal
sequence of length n/2, we would first need to choose from 22n − 2n = 2n(2n − 1) rule
vectors. Then we would need to choose one bit per time step for (n− 1)/2 time steps
to allow solving the state vectors backwards once the rule set is fixed. Multiplying
these gives us a bound of 2(3n−1)/2(2n − 1) guesses for the whole key space, reducing
the bound in [45] by 2(3n−1)/2 trials.
4.2 Analysis of CAs with Asymmetric Rule Sets
Asymmetric CAs prove more difficult to recover a seed from. Many seem to have unique
seeds for each temporal sequence and periods generally seem longer in asymmetric CA,
though these statements are not true in all cases. Deriving any identities concerning
periods, number of distinct sequences, relation to other rule sets, etc. has proved very
difficult.
To explore these constructs further, we instead examine data on particular qualities.
As documented in Table 6, exhaustive computation gives us the maximum eventual
period for all n-cell CAs for n ≤ 11. Taking a 128-ruleset sample from the data
from n = 9, we can chart the number of CA having a certain maximum period
which generate a certain number of distinct sequences. The rule sets were chosen
by looking at all possible rule sets over rules 90 and 150. This seems justified since
the complementing of terms in rules 105 and 165 has been shown to add little if any
value at all in most experiments3. Fixing the two left rules at 150 gives 128 possible
rule sets to examine. For each of these, its maximum period and the total number of
distinct sequences it generates over all possible seeds were computed. The results are
shown in the bubble chart in Figure 2 and raw data for the table is in Appendix B.6.
Some interesting observations are possible looking at this data. First, 41% of the
rule sets sampled generate a distinct central temporal sequence for every possible seed.
3But not none. There are cases where simply complementing certain rules can increase a rule set’s
period
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Figure 2: Number (indicated by bubble area, maximum of 12) of Asymmetric CA rule
sets having a given period and generating a number of distinct sequences
Next, 29/128 have a period greater than or equal to 24. And finally, 19/128 have both
of these properties. These numbers represent the maximums for the rule sets; many
seeds under a given rule set may do worse than the maximum.
This suggests that at least roughly 85% of the key space over R×{0, 1}n has some
considerable weakness.
4.3 Open Problems
The following sections record open investigations that may hold some promise for
improving cryptanalysis in various CA. The ideas are rather unpolished, and a time-
constrained reader may certainly skip this section.
4.3.1 Solving an Arbitrary Temporal Sequence in an Arbitrary Symmet-
ric CA
Conjecture 4.1 suggests the workings for an algorithm analogous to that of Meier-
Staffelbach to recover a seed given a central temporal sequence generated in a symmetric
CA. What’s missing is a method to select rules under which to solve the triangles of
the CA backward (or run forward, for that matter.) Such a method is not obvious
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since different symmetric CA have different periods. It may be possible to solve a
part of a sequence under a chosen rule set, then map to another rule set with a longer
period. This new rule set can then be run forward to check for a match. Mapping
between rule sets seems to be possible, as suggested by experiments in Appendix B.2.
4.3.2 Mapping Seeds from Symmetric to Asymmetric CA
Let A be an asymmetric CA that generates a temporal sequence α from seed s
(0)
A .
Suppose α is also generated by a symmetric CA B (which can be tested using the
algorithm stated above) using seed s
(0)
B . We would like to know if there a mapping
from the seed s
(0)
B to s
(0)
A or, short of a mapping, if there is an efficient algorithm for
finding s
(0)
A given s
(0)
B . Such an algorithm would reduce the problem of recovering
a seed in an asymmetric CA to recovering a seed in a symmetric CA, which we’ve
already solved.
Experiments in Appendix B.4 show that each of the 2bn/2cpossible s(0)B has a unique
difference from s
(0)
A . Further, their difference is the same for α, which may reduce the
search space by half. Of course, α may not be a possible temporal sequence of B,
which may also be useful information.
4.3.3 Mapping Sequences from Symmetric to Asymmetric CA
We approach the problem orthogonally to Section 4.3.2: for all seeds s
(0)
B that generate
each sequence σ in symmetric CA B, examine the sequence α generated by A using
the same seed s
(0)
B . The difference between σ and α may provide information about
the rule set FA. Experiments in Appendix B.5 show example difference patterns. In
the specific case shown, these differences only occur after the first dn/2e time steps,
which indicates that the asymmetry only affects the temporal sequence in positions
where contributing seed bits have been used as input to cells symmetric about the
sequence, i.e. after wrapping around the boundary. This suggests that the asymmetry
is one sided. If we think of the information from the initial state as “flowing” through
the cells on any of their connection paths towards the central temporal sequence, we
notice conditions that might change the information that arrives in the central cell
compared to a uniform or symmetric CA. For all temporal sequence positions before
t = dn/2e, an asymmetric seed could correct for rule differences on just one side.
But after passing through both symmetric cells, the effect of asymmetry changes the
information contribution to the central cell when it arrives there. Other pairs of rule
sets in this same experiment show differences earlier than t = dn/2e, and indeed, have
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rule changes on both sides and closer to the central cell. This supports the general
idea, though the actual mechanics are not fully understood.
If an efficient algorithm could be found to identify the actual values of the asym-
metry in the rule set, then recovering the original seed is reduced to solving a known
sequence under known hybrid affine rules, which can be done with the Meier/Staffelbach
algorithm. Recovering the rule values will likely require comparing the sequences from
an unknown, asymmetric CA to those of uniform rule 90, 105, 150, and 165 CAs.
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5 A New Cellular Construction
Given the observations made previously and the body of literature showing weakness
in 3-neighbor, fixed-rule cellular automata (CA), we may begin to wonder if any CA
construction is capable of exhibiting provably NP-hard behavior. The 3-neighbor
uniform CA using rule 110 has been proven to be universal (i.e. capable of simulating
an arbitrary Turing machine) [12]. Unfortunately, this rule does not seem capable
of passing basic statistical tests by itself since it is highly non-linear and therefore
biased in its output. It seems all 3-neighbor fixed-rule set CAs, uniform or hybrid, are
unsuitable for cryptographic applications.
Yet the highly parallel nature and simple operation of CA are still appealing.
Whereas block ciphers and other cryptographic primitives must be specifically designed
for a predetermined block width, a strong CA construction can allow scalability simply
by adding more cells. Since cells are identical, they can be packaged in ASICs or
programmable logic blocks and configured at a width just adequate for the job at
hand. For software implementations, the ubiquity of vector register operations on most
CPUs and the advent of GPUs give CA constructions an easy path to performance
improvements. Most block ciphers, in contrast, do not naturally decompose into
parallel tasks in an obvious way. Lastly, many cryptographic primitives have no
proofs of security properties or only derive provable security properties through
reduction to other primitives which have no such proofs (see e.g. [3]). The simple,
regular operations of CA, on the other hand, seem more likely to lend themselves to
proving certain properties than ad-hoc combinations of shifts and XORs. If so, and
if the implementation is efficient and scalable, such a construct would have natural
advantages for cryptographic application designers.
Therefore it seems worth understanding what might be required to produce hard-to-
invert CA. We might first ascribe the observed failings to the 3-neighbor construct after
noting that any two neighbors share 2 of their 3 predecessors in common. This construct
leaks information about a cell’s value to its three descendants. With knowledge of
the function applied at each cell, an attacker can build a system of equations, even if
its non-linear in some cells. One way to plug this leak is to protect the knowledge
of the function applied at each cell. Suppose we fix the neighborhood of cells at 3
but allow the rule applied at each step to be selected uniformly at random from all
possible 3-neighbor rules and we seed the CA with n bits, also sampled uniformly at
random. It is clear that knowing the full state of the CA at time t+ 1 would provide
no information about the state at time t. Each iteration of such a CA would realize
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Shannon’s notion of perfect secrecy [42].
Unfortunately, requiring truly random rule selection leaves us no better off than
where we started–in need of good random bits. We might consider using pseudorandom
functions to preserve some notion of semantic security, that is, perfect secrecy under
computational bounds. Even so, that would leave us requiring one pseudorandom
primitive to produce another. We may then wonder: Can a 1-D CA with enhanced
cells which modulate their rule by a simple process (e.g. a weak random number
generator or a fixed permutation) be provably NP-hard to invert and still produce
cryptographic-strength pseudorandom bits?
5.1 Finite State Transducers
To understand the capabilities of cellular constructs, we must first formalize a computa-
tional model to evaluate. There are a few factors that guide the selection of our model.
First, we’d like to find the simplest model possible which is still capable of the required
computation. This is a general principle but also a practical concern since simple
models are easiest to reason about. Second, we’d like physical implementations to be
able to match the computational model closely. This allows any provable properties
which exist in theory to also be claimed by the implementations (up to differences
required of the mapping to the physical world.)
The simplest computational model in theory is the finite state machine (FSM),
which is ostensibly the model for each cell. We consider FSMs with greater than two
states and the capabilities of the overall automaton when we place various restrictions
on the construction of the FSMs in the cells.
Historically, the output of a two-state cell has been referred to as its state since
the output directly reflects the current state of the automaton. This terminology
becomes confusing when we consider many-state machines which still produce only
two outputs. We will therefore adopt the notion of a cell producing an output as
distinct from its current state. This notion is captured nicely in the model known as
finite state transducers (FSTs), which originated with Mealy [27] and Moore [31] after
whom the popular variants are named. Using these models provides the advantage of
having well known ways to map such transducers into combinatorial logic, making
practical applications more straightforward.
Conceptually, an FST comprises two tapes, an input tape and an output tape, and
computes a function that maps strings on the input tape to strings on the output tape.
For a cellular FST operating repeatedly in discrete time steps with instantaneous
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communication of outputs to neighbors, the concept of tapes does not seem a natural
fit. Some awkward constructions would be needed to copy outputs from neighbors’
tapes to each cell’s input tape or for them to be shared some how.
To address this difficulty, we will provide our cellular FSTs with N direct, discrete
inputs and a single output. These inputs and outputs can be routed and connected
together to allow various constructions just as if they were wires, similar to traditional
CA. More formally, we define a finite state cell (FSC) as a quadruple (Q,Σ, qs, δ),
where:
• Q is a finite set of states,
• Σ is the alphabet (input and output) of the cell,
• qs ∈ Q is the start state,
• δ : Q× ΣN → Q× Σ is the transition function.
Again, we limit our discussion to N = 3. For convenience, we name the 3 input values
read each time step λ, ω, and ρ, where ω is the output of the cell routed back as an
input. An FSC requires an initial value ωs ∈ Σ to begin operation. Once received, the
cell outputs ωs and enters qs. At each time step, the cell computes a function from Σ
3
to Σ depending on the current state and then changes to the next state, all according
to δ. The ordered string λωρ defines the input to this function, and its result becomes
the next value of ω. FSCs have no final states, and simply operate continuously after
initialization.
It is easy to see the analogy to traditional CA. FSCs, however, are not fixed in the
function they compute at each time step. Instead, these cells may have an arbitrary
but finite number of states, the transitions between each of which compute different
functions. The path through the states may be dependent on the inputs received or
may be fixed.
We will be concerned only with the case of Σ = {0, 1}, though it is easy to imagine
FSCs with a larger Σ. We could also consider larger values of N . These variations
will not be necessary for our present purposes and so will not be considered.
5.2 Cellular Automata based on FSCs
We can now consider a cellular automaton which aggregates n such cells. We define a
finite state cellular automaton, or FSCA, A = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 as an array of n finite
state cells as defined above. The left neighbor input λi = ωi−1 and the right neighbor
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Figure 3: FSC diagram for an elementary rule 30 cell.
input ρi = ωi+1 for i = 2, . . . , n− 1. A cyclic-boundary FSCA connects the end inputs
to the opposite end’s output, so that λ1 = ωn and ρn = ω1. We say that A has a value
s ∈ {0, 1}n when s = ω1|ω2| . . . |ωn and more specifically we denote the value of A at
time step t by s(t).
It is useful to have a notion of the current configuration of the entire FSCA which
describes the current output values and state for each cell. Let Qi be the set of
states for ai, and Q = Q1 × Q2 × . . . × Qn. We say an FSCA A has configuration
C(t) = (q(t), s(t)) at time step t for q(t) ∈ Q if q(t)i is the current state of ai at time
t for i ≤ n, and s(t) is the value of A at time t. We say C(t) yields C(t+1), written
C(t) A` C
(t+1) if operating A with current configuration C(t) for one time step produces
configuration C(t+1). For short hand, we may also write C(t) `kA C(t+k) to show the
operation of A for k time steps.
We can represent elementary CA as a special kind of FSCA where each cell has
only a single state. We simply define 8 self-transitions that map all possible λωρ
inputs to a new output ω′. This collection of transitions then defines a function from
3 bits to 1 bit, which is the rule of the cell over all time steps. An example FSC for
an elementary rule 30 cell is shown in Figure 3.
5.3 Variations on FSCA
We have seen that single-state cells create FSCA which are equivalent to traditional
elementary CA and it seems clear that two states can mimic alternating between two
such rules (as proposed in [16]). We now explore the computational complexity of
an n-cell FSCA with cells having for example 256 or n or n2 states. Specifically, we
would like to know at what number of cells does an FSCA become computationally
non-invertible. We may also wonder about the effects of other limiting properties,
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such as the effect of a limited branching factor on the transition paths through the
states.
To capture these limiting notions, we use a function B : N 7→ N to provide an
upper bound on the number of states any cell in an FSCA can have as a function of
the number of cells in the FSCA, so that |Qi| ≤ B(n) for i ≤ n.
We define an elementary cell as one which obeys B(n) = 1 having only one
state, qs. With only one state, an elementary cell can have only one transition type:
δ(qs, λωρ) = (qs, f(λωρ)) where f : Σ
3 → Σ is the function defined by the set of self
transitions of qs. Therefore, the output of the cell at each time step is the result
of a single, fixed function. Thus an FSCA with elementary cells is equivalent to an
elementary CA.
We say δ is simple if there is a δ′ : Q → Q and an f : Σ3 → Σ such that for
all q ∈ Q, δ(q, λωρ) = (δ′(q), f(λωρ)). Intuitively, this means that if there is any
transition from q to another state r, then all input combinations take an FSC a from
q to r. The inputs have no effect on selecting the next state and only the output bit
on these transitions may vary. Under a simple δ, every state has exactly one successor
state with f as the time step function computed at that time step. We say a cell is
simple if its δ is simple, and an FSCA is simple if all cells are simple.
This notion of simple cells turns out to be quite an interesting one. If we construct
special purpose cells to affect a specific function at each time step, we can have two
neighboring cells swap their values at a certain time step, or compute the sum (XOR)
and a carry (AND) of their two values for example. If an FSCA has only simple cells,
it will perform the same computation without regard to the value of the cells at any
time step. This begins to have the feel of a machine capable of universal computation.
It will be convenient to have a shorthand notation defining transitions which
compute a given function for all combinations of Q× Σ3. We define a transition set
Tf(q, r) from a state q to a state r with respect to a time step function f as the set
{((q, λωρ), (r, f(λωρ)))}. Where the implicit definition of f is simple, we will use its
expression in the notation, e.g. Tω(q, r) denotes the use of the complement as the
time step function. Such transition sets can be combined to define δ as a function.
Defining some commonly used transition sets illustrates the concept and will also be
useful in our discussion of FSC capabilities to follow.
Tλ(q, r): {((q, λωρ), (r, λ))}.
Tρ(q, r): {((q, λωρ), (r, ρ))}.
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(a) The Tλ transition set (b) The Tρ transition set
(c) The Tω transition set (d) The Tω transition set
(e) The Tλ+ω+ρ transition set
Figure 4: Transition sets for useful functions in FSCs. Input combinations separated by a
comma in the diagrams is short-hand for distinct inputs which share the same resulting
output which appears after a semi-colon.
Tω(q, r): {((q, λωρ), (r, ω))}.
Tω(q, r): {((q, λωρ), (r, ω))}.
Tλ+ω+ρ(q, r): {((q, λωρ), (r, λ+ ω + ρ))} where + denotes Boolean OR.
Tα(q, r): {((q, λωρ), (r, α)) | α ∈ Σ}.
These transition sets are shown in Figure 4 in diagrammatic form.
5.4 Evaluating 3-CNF formulas with FSCA
Given these functions, it’s not hard to imagine building a simple FSCA capable
of performing basic computational tasks, such as evaluating a Boolean formula for
instance. Variable assignments are input as initial values in certain cells. Cells route
these assignments to positions in each clause of the formula using the transition sets
Tλ, Tρ, and Tω, all to arrive at some fixed time step. Literals that are complements of
their variables would require the transition set Tω. When all variables are positioned
correctly and complemented according to the formula, the evaluation of the clauses
begins. If the clauses have only three literals (i.e. the formula is in 3-CNF), this can
be accomplished in one time step with the transition set Tλ+ω+ρ defined above. Those
cells which do not compute the disjunction of a clause can simply use a transition set
Tα with α = 0. The conjunction of clauses then follows, with each clause value being
routed again down to a single cell which holds the final formula value.
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cell
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0 α1 0 α2 0 0 α3 0 α4 0 0 α5 0
1 α1 α1 α2 α2 α3 α3 α3 α4 α4 α5 α5 α5
2 α1 α2 α1 α3 α2 α3 α3 α4 α4 α5 α5 α5
3 α1 α2 α3 α1 α3 α2 α4 α3 α5 α4 α5 α5
4 α1 α2 α3 α1 α3 α2 α4 α5 α3 α5 α4 α5
5 α1 α2 α3 α1 α3 α2 α5 α4 α5 α3 α4 α5
6 α1 α2 α3 α1 α3 α5 α2 α4 α5 α3 α4 α5
7 α1 α2 α3 α1 α3 α5 α2 α4 α5 α3 α4 α5
8 0 c1 0 0 c2 0 0 c3 0 0 c4 0
Table 7: Computational history of A for formula φ with assignments α1, . . . , α5. c1, . . . , c4
give the values of each clause in φ for these assignments.
We illustrate this concept with an example. Suppose we have a 3-CNF formula
over 5 variables in 4 clauses given by:
φ = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x5) ∧ (x2 ∨ x4 ∨ x5) ∧ (x3 ∨ x4 ∨ x5).
An FSCA A might use twelve cells to evaluate φ, one for each literal. At time step 0,
five specially selected cells would be provided the assignments to x1, . . . , x5 while other
cells get 0. We will label the actual assignment values as α1, . . . , α5. A computational
history of A, showing the cell values at each time step, might look like Table 7. Here,
evaluation is carried out only up to clause evaluation, at which point satisfiability is
clear. Notice that at time step 1, all the dummy 0 values are gone, and each assignment
value appears as many times as its variable appears in φ. From this point, routing is
just a matter of permuting the contents of the cells. At time step 6, all cells contain
the correct assignments ignoring negation. This is accounted for in step 7. Finally,
step 8 performs the ORing of clauses. Cells not evaluating a clause get a fixed 0 value.
To formalize this example, we give the following theorem and constructive proof in
which we consider 3-CNF formulas where no clause uses the same variable twice and
no clause appears more than once (as these are easily reducible.) The theorem will
only cover evaluation of the clauses of the formula. We adopt the following conventions
in all pseudocode:
• [ ] denotes array/table indexing
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• for a 3-CNF formula φ, 〈φ〉 denotes an encoding of φ as an array of literals such
that 〈φ〉[i] ∨ 〈φ〉[i+ 1] ∨ 〈φ〉[i+ 2] is a clause in φ if i ≡ 1 mod 3. Each literal `
in φ is encoded as a pair 〈j, c〉 where xj is a variable in φ and c = 1 if ` = xj or
c = 0 if ` = xj . 〈φ〉[8][1] is then the encoded variable of the second literal in the
third clause of φ.
• Variables will appear as single symbols or as “V ariable.”
• Sub-algorithms and procedures will appear as “SubAlgorithm.”
Theorem 5.1. Let φ be a 3-CNF formula with c unique clauses and v variables
x1, x2, . . . , xv such that no variable appears twice in the same clause. There ex-
ists a simple FSCA A that evaluates the clauses of φ for any encoded assignments
α1, α2, . . . , αv.
Proof. The proof is by construction. We wish to show we can create a machine whose
computation will correctly evaluate φ. To do so, we will perform the computation in
the abstract and construct the machine to mirror each step. The construction will
follow the same steps as the example above:
1. Create an array of cells over which to perform the computation. Every group of
3 cells will correspond to a clause.
2. Determine the cells which will accept the assignments as initial values.
3. Duplicate the assignment values so there is one copy for each literal that needs
it.
4. Distribute those values to their positions in the clauses.
5. Account for negation in the literals where necessary
6. OR the literals in the same clause together.
Consider Algorithm 5.1, 3-SatToFsca, on page 42 and its sub-algorithms GrowS-
pans (Algorithm 5.2 on page 43), FindDestinations (Algorithm 5.3 on page 44),
and OrderAssignments (Algorithm 5.4 on page 45) which we now sketch. 3-
SatToFsca takes as input a formula φ and constructs a machine which takes as input
3c Boolean values, v of which are the assignments to variables. As we cannot know
what assignments will be provided, the algorithm simply identifies the locations which
will contain an assignment αj by storing the value j. The algorithm first constructs
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the FSCA cells and computes the indices of cells whose initial values will be the
assignments to evaluate. These indices are determined by the number of times each
assignment is needed, and that number is stored in the array Count. If, for example,
some αj is used five times in the formula, it will be assigned a starting position p[j] that
is in the middle of a span of five cells, and the span for αj+1 will immediately follow.
The array V will store the contents of each cell—either an index j of the indeterminate
assignment value, or 0. The values in V at each stage of the construction indicate the
value of the FSCA at the corresponding stage of its computational history.
GrowSpans replicates the initial assignment values for each cell in that assign-
ment’s span so that there are as many cells with an assignment αj as there are
appearances of its variable xj in φ. As it does so, it adds states and transitions to
the cells of the constructed FSCA A which perform the same copy operation. When
complete, all cells will contain the assignment for the span to which they are assigned.
FindDestinations examines where in φ each assignment copy in V is needed and
assigns that position as a destination. These destinations are stored in the array D
which is one-to-one with V . If each assignment in V were moved to its corresponding
destination in D, it would be in the same position as its variable in φ.
Creating the machinery to actually move these elements is the responsibility of
OrderAssignments. This algorithm uses an Odd-Even sort on the destinations in
D to re-order the contents in V . While doing so, it creates states and transitions in
the cells of A to perform the same reordering. The result is the list of assignments
which exactly mirrors the variables in φ.
Finally, 3-SatToFsca adds states and transitions to account for complementing
literals that require it, and then for evaluating clauses.
These algorithms are in turn aided by SplitLeft (Procedure 5.1 on page 50),
SplitRight (Procedure 5.2 on page 50), SplitLeftRight (Procedure 5.3 on
page 50), Swap (Procedure 5.4 on page 50), and Remain (Procedure 5.5 on page 50).
These procedures perform the moving of elements in V paired with creating states and
transitions to perform the same moving of values in the corresponding cells of A. This
helps to ensure the computational history of A will mirror what has happened in V .
We will develop the proof through a series of lemmata which establish some
necessary properties.
Lemma 5.1. 3-SatToFsca computes an evolution of V from an initial condition,
having a single element for each encoded assignment and 0s otherwise, to a final
condition at the return of OrderAssignments in which V contains the variables of
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Algorithm 5.1 3-SatToFsca
Input: 〈φ〉, an encoding of a 3-CNF Boolean formula over the v variables x1, x2, . . . , xv.
Output: FSCA A, and k ∈ N
1: n = 3|〈φ〉|
2: for j = 1, . . . , v do Count[i]← 0
3: for i = 1, . . . , n do {initialize data structures used to create A}
4: Count[〈φ〉[i][1]]← Count[〈φ〉[i][1]] + 1
5: V [i]← 0
6: Create an initial state qi,0
7: Qi ← {qi,0}
8: Create a finite state cell ai with output ωi, Q = Qi,Σ = {0, 1}, qs = qi,0, δ = ∅
9: Last[i]← qi,0
10: i← 1
11: for j = 1, . . . , |Count| do {determine initial positions for variables}
12: p[j]← i+ b(Count[j]− 1)/2c
13: V [p[j]]← j
14: i← i+ Count[j]
15: λ1 ← ωn; ρ1 ← ω2 {connect all cells using cyclic boundaries}
16: ρn ← ω1; λn ← ωn−1
17: for i = 2, . . . , n− 1 do
18: λi ← ωi−1
19: ρi ← ωi+1
20: A← 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉
21: t←GrowSpans(A, V, p, Count, Last)
22: D ←FindDestinations(〈φ〉, v)
23: t←OrderAssignments(A, V,D, t, Last)
24: for i = 1, . . . , n do {account for complementation, evaluate all clauses}
25: create states qi,t+1, qi,t+2
26: Qi ← Qi ∪ {qi,t+1, qi,t+2}
27: if 〈φ〉[i][2] = 1 then
28: δi ← δi ∪ Tω(Last[i], qi,t+1)
29: else
30: δi ← δi ∪ Tω(Last[i], qi,t+1)
31: if i ≡ 2 mod 3 then
32: δi ← δi ∪ Tλ+ω+ρ(qi,t+1, qi,t+2)
33: else
34: δi ← δi ∪ T0(qi,t+1, qi,t+2)
35: δi ← δi∪Tω(qi,t+2, qi,t+2) {self-transition forever with same value}
36: return (A, t+ 2)
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Algorithm 5.2 GrowSpans
Input: A, V, p, Count, Last where:
A is the array of cells,
V is the array of variables held in each cell,
p is the starting cell index of each variable,
Count is the number of occurrences of each variable,
Last is the last state created in each ai ∈ A.
Output: t, the number of time steps used
1: for j = 1, . . . , |Count| do
2: Need[j]← Count[j]− 1
3: Span[j]← 〈p[j], p[j]〉
4: t← 0
5: while
∑
N∈NeedN > 0 do
6: t← t+ 1
7: i← 1
8: for j = 1, . . . , |Need| do
9: if Need[j] = 0 then {skip to next span}
10: next j
11: else if Need[j] ≥ 2 then
12: for k = i, . . . , Span[j][1]− 2 do {visit all elements since last split up to
next split}
13: Remain(A, k, t, Last)
14: if Span[j][1] = Span[j][2] then {for first split, grow in both directions}
15: SplitLeftRight(A, V, Span[j][1], t, Last)
16: Span[j] ← 〈Span[j][1]− 1, Span[j][2] + 1〉 {adjust both ends of span}
17: Need[j]← Need[j]− 2
18: i ← Span[j][2] + 1 {next element to consider is just right of the new
span end}
19: next j {begin work on the next span}
20: else
21: SplitLeft(A, V, Span[j][1], t, Last) {Grow the left side}
22: Span[j] ← 〈Span[j][1] − 1, Span[j][2]〉 {adjust the left span end}
23: Need[j]← Need[j]− 1
24: i← Span[j][1] + 2
25: {Need[j] > 0 implies the right end needs to grow, whether or not left end
grows}
26: for k = i, . . . , Span[v][2]− 1 do
27: Remain(A, k, t, Last) {keep current values up to end of span}
28: SplitRight(A, V, Span[j][2], t, Last) {Grow right}
29: Span[j]← 〈Span[j][1], Span[j][2]+1〉 {adjust the right span end}
30: Need[j]← Need[j]− 1
31: i← Span[j][2] + 1
32: for k = i, . . . , |V | do
33: Remain(A, k, t, Last) {keep current values to end of array}
34: return t
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Algorithm 5.3 FindDestinations
Input: 〈φ〉, v where:
〈φ〉 is the 3-CNF formula, encoded as an array of literals, whose variables are targets
for each cell,
v is the number of variables in φ.
Output: D, an array of destinations for each cell.
1: for j = 1, . . . , v do Dest[j]← [ ]
2: for i = 1, . . . , |〈φ〉| do
3: Dest[〈φ〉[i][1]]← Dest[〈φ〉[i][1]] || [i] {append destinations for each variable to
its own list}
4: i← 0
5: for all d ∈ Dest do {concatenate the destinations}
6: for j = i, . . . , |d| do
7: D[i+ j]← d[j]
8: i← i+ |d|
9: return D
φ matching in order of appearance without regard to negation. That is, 3-SatToFsca
evolves V to the value 〈〈φ〉[1][1], 〈φ〉[2][1], . . . , 〈φ〉[n][1]〉.
Proof. Let the function #(j) be defined as the number of occurrences of xj in φ and
so must have value greater than 0 for all j. This is also the number of occurrences of
αj which will be needed to evaluate φ. We first show that V ’s initialization consists
only of 0s and a single encoded element for each αj. It is clear that Count[j] ≡ #(j)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ v since Count[j] is initialized to 0 in line 2 and is increased on line 4 of
3-SatToFsca by 1 for every occurrence of j (the encoding of xj) in 〈φ〉. We can
also see that lines 10-14 create a span in V of length #(j) having the contents
0b 12 (#(j)−1)cj0d 12 (#(j)−1)e
since: V is initialized to all 0s on line 5; j ranges over every variable which was counted
in 〈φ〉; p[j] is initialized to the position i + b(#(j)− 1)/2c on line 12, and V [p[j]]
is assigned j on line 13. These spans begin at index 1 in V by line 10, and are all
adjacent since each time through the loop, i is assigned i+Count[j]. Therefore, V on
completing initialization has the form〈
0b 12 (#(j)−1)cj0d 12 (#(j)−1)e
〉v
j=1
(11)
so that each assignment appears exactly once. This satisfies the initial condition of
the theorem.
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Algorithm 5.4 OrderAssignments
Input: A, V,D, t, Last where:
A is the array of cells,
V is the array of variables held in each cell,
D is the array of destinations for each variable in V ,
t is the time step at which distributing variables begins.
Last is the array of last states created in each ai ∈ A.
Output: t, the time step at which all variables are at their destinations.
1: Sorted← false
2: while not Sorted do
3: Sorted← true
4: t← t+ 1
5: for i = 1 to |V | − 1 in steps of 2 do
6: if D[i] > D[i+ 1] then
7: Swap(A, V,D, i, t, Last)
8: Sorted← false
9: else
10: Remain(A, i, t, Last)
11: Remain(A, i+ 1, t, Last)
12: if |V | ≡ 0 mod 2 then
13: Remain(A, |V |, t, Last)
14: if Sorted then
15: break
16: Sorted← true
17: t← t+ 1
18: Remain(A, 1, t, Last)
19: for i = 2 to |V | − 1 in steps of 2 do
20: if D[i] > D[i+ 1] then
21: Swap(A, V,D, i, t, Last)
22: Sorted← false
23: else
24: Remain(A, i, t, Last)
25: Remain(A, i+ 1, t, Last)
26: if |V | ≡ 1 mod 2 then
27: Remain(A, |V |, t, Last)
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We next show that on return fromGrowSpans, V has the value 〈1#(1), 2#(2), . . . , v#(v)〉
where 1, . . . , v encode α1, . . . , αv and b
k denotes k sequential occurrences of b for k > 0
and the empty string otherwise. In GrowSpans, clearly Need[j] is initialized to
#(j)− 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ v by line 2. Since each span around the assignments in V has
exactly one non-zero element, Need[j] counts the number of 0s in each assignment’s
span. Notice that if #(j) is odd, #(j)−1 is even and so evenly divisible by 2, meaning
there are an equal number of 0s on either side of an assignment j. Conversely, If #(j)
is even, there is one more 0 on the right side of the assignment j. It is also clear that
Span[j] is initialized with a pair of indices of the first and last occurrence of j in V .
Let ∆(〈x, y〉) = y−x+1 be a function which computes the number of elements in a
span. We can see by induction that #(j) = ∆(Span[j])+Need[j] for all j at each pass
through the while loop. For the base case of #(j) = 1, we have Span[j] = 〈p[j], p[j]〉
so ∆(Span[j]) = 1 and Need[j] = 0 for all j by line 2. Assume the relation holds at
an arbitrary pass through the loop. On the next pass, there are three possibilities:
• Need[j] ≥ 2, for which their are two possibilities: ∆(Span[j]) = 1 and so
SplitLeftRight is called, or ∆(Span[j]) > 1 and SplitLeft then SplitRight
is called. For the first of these, a 0 is replaced with j on both ends of the span,
∆(Span[j]) is increased by 2, and Need[j] is decreased by 2. No further action
is taken for this case since the loop is abbreviated on line 19. For the second
possibility, the loop first replaces a single 0 on the left end of the span by calling
SplitLeft and then increases ∆(Span[j]) by one and decreases Need[j] by
one. The loop then continues until it calls SplitRight, replacing a single 0 on
the right end of the span, and then increases ∆(Span[j]) by one and decreases
Need[j] by one. In either possibility, ∆(Span[j]) is increased by the same amount
as Need[j] is decreased, so their sum is unchanged and the relation holds. Note
also that if there were one 0 more on the right side of the span, that will still be
the case after the pass through the loop since growth in this case is symmetric.
• Need[j] = 1, in which case there must be a single 0 on the right end of the span.
The algorithm calls SplitRight, ∆(Span[j]) is increased by one on the right
end, and Need[j] is decreased by one. Since Span[j] is increased by the same
amount Need[j] is decreased, their sum is unchanged and the relation holds.
• Need[j] = 0, in which case no changes are made to Span[j] or Need[j] and so
the relation still holds.
The for loop on line 8 repeats this process for all j ≤ v. Since the inductive step holds,
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the relation is true for every iteration of the while loop.
It is clear that each Span[j] grows by replacing 0s with j each pass through the
loop until ∆(Span[j]) = #(j) and Need[j] = 0. Recall that Need[j] began as the
number of 0s in span j. Therefore when Need[j] = 0, the span must contain j#(j),
and so V must contain 〈1#(1), 2#(2), . . . , v#(v)〉 when ΣjNeed[j] = 0.
Next, we look at D returned by FindDestinations and show that V [i] = j if
and only if 〈φ〉[D[i]][1] = j. First, Assume V [i] = j and let i − k be the left-most
occurrence of j in V for some k. Then there must be j − 1 other assignment spans
that appear to the left of V [i− k]. By the construction of D, D[i] must be in Dest[j]
created on line 3 since D[1, . . . , i− k − 1] is the concatenation of the first j − 1 arrays
in Dest with the jth array to follow. But D[i] ∈ Dest[j] implies there was discovered
a literal in 〈φ〉 having variable j at position i by the construction of Dest[j] on line 3.
Now suppose instead that 〈φ〉[D[i]][1] = j. Then Dest[j] contains D[i], and so there
is exactly j − 1 assignment spans in V before index i. Being in the jth span of V , V [i]
must have the value j.
Lastly, we examine the result of OrderAssignments. Ignoring the calls to
Remain, which do not affect D or V , it is clear that OrderAssignments is exactly
Odd-Even Sort on the elements of D with every swap carried out by Swap. Considering
for the moment only the effect on D and V in Swap, it is clear that each change
to one is duplicated in the other so that if D[i] and D[i + 1] are swapped on any
given pass through the array, V [i] and V [i+ 1] are also swapped and not otherwise.
Since each D[i] contains the index of a literal in 〈φ〉 which requires the assignment
V [i], sorting the elements of D[i] so that the corresponding elements in V [i] are
moved in exactly the same way must result in D = 〈1, 2, . . . , n〉 and correspondingly
V = 〈〈φ〉[1][1], 〈φ〉[2][1], . . . , 〈φ〉[n][1]〉. This proves the lemma. 
Lemma 5.2. Let (A, k) be the result of 3-SatToFsca on input 〈φ〉. 3-SatToFsca
makes k − 2 passes through the array V and, for each pass, adds exactly one state to
each ai ∈ A.
Proof. To see this, it is first useful to note that states are only added in procedures
Remain, SplitLeftRight, SplitLeft, SplitRight, and Swap. Further, each of
these adds exactly one new state to the cells they affect: Remain affects only the
cell ai for the given parameter i, SplitLeftRight affects cells ai−1, ai, and ai+1,
SplitLeft affects cells ai−1 and ai, and SplitRight and Swap both affect cells
ai and ai+1. In all cases, a single new state qi,t is added to Qi, a transition set from
Last[i] to qi,t is defined for all possible inputs to the cell, and Last[i] is updated to
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refer to qi,t for all affected ai. Therefore it is sufficient to show that one and only one
of these procedures is called to affect, or cover, each cell on every pass through V . For
this, we need only to consider only GrowSpans and OrderAssignments as V is
not accessed elsewhere after initialization.
In GrowSpans, if ΣjNeed[j] = 0, then the number of passes equals the number
of time steps added to A since both are 0. Otherwise, for each iteration of the while
loop, there must be a next and, independently, a last changed span j in V . Assume
i is set to the index of the first position not yet covered by one of the state-adding
procedures. Suppose the next changed span j has Need[j] ≥ 2. Then all positions
from i to Span[j][1] − 2 remain unchanged in V , and Remain is called for each of
those positions in the loop on line 12. The element of V at position Span[j][1]− 1 is
then changed in one of two ways: either ∆(Span[j]) = 1 and so SplitLeftRight is
called, covering positions Span[j][1]− 1, . . . , Span[j][1] + 1 and i is set one passed the
new end of the span; or ∆(Span[j])) > 1, in which case SplitLeft is called to cover
positions Span[j][1] − 1 and Span[j][1] and i gets assigned Span[j][1] + 1. In this
second case, the algorithm will call Remain for every position up to Span[j][2]− 1,
then cover positions Span[j][2] and Span[j][2] + 1 with a call to SplitRight, and
finally set i to one passed the new end of the span. In either case, all positions from
the starting value of i up to the new end of the span are covered and i is set to the
first position not yet covered. This is the condition in which we began.
Suppose instead that the next changed span j has Need[j] = 1. Then all positions
from 1 to Span[j][2]− 1 remain unchanged in V , and Remain is called for each of
those positions in the loop on line 26. Positions Span[j][2] and Span[j][2] + 1 will be
covered with a call to SplitRight, and i will be set to one passed the new end of the
span. Again, we are in the starting condition.
Since it is clear for a base case where i = 1 and the next span to change has any
Need[j] > 0 that all positions are covered from the starting i up to the new right end
of the span, then by induction we see that all spans are so covered.
Now suppose the last changed span has been covered. Then i is set to the first
position not yet covered and no other spans with Need[j] > 0 remain. Then all
positions from i to |V | are covered by calls to Remain in the loop on line 32. Notice
that no position was covered more than once. Therefore, each pass through the while
loop adds exactly 1 state to each ai.
Since t is incremented each time through the while loop, and each pass through
the loop adds exactly one state to each cell, t counts the number of states added in
GrowSpans.
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In OrderAssignments, coverage is easier to see. Either positions i and i + 1
are swapped or they are both covered by a call to Remain in both the odd and even
phase of the sort. In the even phase, position 1 is covered explicitly on line 18, and in
both phases, any unpaired element at the end is covered conditionally in lines 13 and
27 with calls to Remain. Therefore, each pass of OrderAssignments adds exactly
1 state to each ai.
Since t is passed to OrderAssignments holding the number of states added in
GrowSpans, and t is incremented for each pass of the odd-even sort, and each pass
adds exactly one state to each cell, t counts the number of states added in GrowSpans
and OrderAssignments. Since k = t+ 2 for the states added to each cell by the
loop on line 24, GrowSpans and OrderAssignments make exactly k − 2 passes
through V . 
Corollary 5.1. A is simple.
Proof. Since only one state is added to each cell for each time step; each newly added
state becomes the last state; and only simple transitions are added from the last state
to any new state, it is easy to see by induction that A is simple for all t ≤ k−2. Finally,
it is clear that the last three transition sets added by lines 27-35 only take ai from
Last[i] to qi,t+1, from qi,t+1 to qi,t+2, and from qi,t+2 to qi,t+2 respectively. Therefore,
A is simple for all t. 
Lemma 5.3. Let α1, α2, . . . , αv be assignments to x1, x2, . . . , xv in φ and let (A, k)
be the result of 3-SatToFsca on input 〈φ〉. If A is provided the initial values in s
defined by
s =
〈
0b 12 (#(j)−1)cαj0d 12 (#(j)−1)e
〉v
j=1
(12)
and operated for k−2 time steps, the resulting value of A is 〈α〈φ〉[1][1], α〈φ〉[2][1], . . . , α〈φ〉[n][1], 〉.
Proof. We will denote the value in V [i] at pass t by V
(t)
i to make clear differences in
value of the same location in different passes. Similarly, we will use ω
(t)
i to note the
output of cell ai at time step t . We show by induction that V
(t)
i = j implies that
ω
(t)
i = αj for t ≤ k−2. For the base case of t = 0, the implication holds by comparison
of (11) and (12).
Assume the implication holds for arbitrary t < k − 2. To show the implication
holds for t + 1, we must consider two cases. Let tE be the value of t returned from
GrowSpans. First, suppose t < tE, in which case pass t + 1 will be made inside
GrowSpans. We know from Lemma 5.2 that every element in V is either explicitly
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Procedure 5.1 SplitLeft
Parameters: A, V, i, t, Last
1: V [i− 1]← V [i]
2: Create a state qi,t in ai
3: Qi ← Qi ∪ {qi,t}
4: δi ← δi ∪ Tω(Last[i], qi,t)
5: Last[i]← qi,t
6: Create a state qi−1,t in ai−1
7: Qi−1 ← Qi−1 ∪ {qi−1,t}
8: δi−1 ← δi−1 ∪ Tρ(Last[i − 1], qi−1,t)
9: Last[i− 1]← qi−1,t
Procedure 5.2 SplitRight
Parameters: A, V, i, t, Last
1: V [i+ 1]← V [i]
2: Create a state qi,t in ai
3: Qi ← Qi ∪ {qi,t}
4: δi ← δi ∪ Tω(Last[i], qi,t)
5: Last[i]← qi,t
6: Create a state qi+1,t in ai+1
7: Qi+1 ← Qi+1 ∪ {qi+1,t}
8: δi+1 ← δi+1 ∪ Tλ(Last[i + 1], qi+1,t)
9: Last[i+ 1]← qi+1,t
Procedure 5.3 SplitLeftRight
Parameters: A, V, i, t, Last
1: V [i − 1] ← V [i];V [i + 1] ← V [i]
2: Create a state qi,t in ai
3: Qi ← Qi ∪ {qi,t}
4: δi ← δi ∪ Tω(Last[i], qi,t)
5: Last[i]← qi,t
6: Create a state qi−1,t in ai−1
7: Qi−1 ← Qi−1 ∪ {qi−1,t}
8: δi−1 ← δi−1 ∪ Tρ(Last[i − 1], qi−1,t)
9: Last[i− 1]← qi−1,t
10: Create a state qi+1,t in ai+1
11: Qi+1 ← Qi+1 ∪ {qi+1,t}
12: δi+1 ← δi+1 ∪ Tλ(Last[i + 1], qi+1,t)
13: Last[i+ 1]← qi+1,t
Procedure 5.4 Swap
Parameters: A, V,D, i, t, Last
1: tmp← V [i]
2: V [i]← V [i+ 1]
3: V [i+ 1]← tmp
4: tmp← D[i]
5: D[i]← D[i+ 1]
6: D[i+ 1]← tmp
7: Create a state qi,t in ai
8: Qi ← Qi ∪ {qi,t}
9: δi ← δi ∪ Tρ(Last[i], qi,t)
10: Last[i]← qi,t
11: Create a state qi+1,t in ai+1
12: Qi+1 ← Qi+1 ∪ {qi+1,t}
13: δi+1 ← δi+1 ∪ Tλ(Last[i + 1], qi+1,t)
14: Last[i+ 1]← qi+1,t
Procedure 5.5 Remain
Parameters: A, i, t, Last
1: Create a state qi,t in ai
2: Qi ← Qi ∪ {qi,t}
3: δi ← δi ∪ Tω(Last[i], qi,t)
4: Last[i]← qi,t
changed or it is explicitly not changed as the index i ranges over the positions of V . If
an element is changed, the change must happen in a call to one of SplitLeftRight,
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SplitLeft, or SplitRight. If it is not changed, Remain is called for position i. We
examine each in turn.
In SplitLeftRight, notice that V
(t+1)
i−1 is assigned the value of the position to its
right, V
(t+1)
i+1 is assigned the value of the position to its left, and V
(t+1)
i keeps its previous
value. So V
(t+1)
i−1 = V
(t+1)
i+1 = V
(t+1)
i = V
(t)
i . Correspondingly, the new transition set in
ai−1, on any input, takes the value of its right neighbor so that ω
(t+1)
i−1 = ω
(t)
i . We know
by the inductive hypothesis that a time step t, ω
(t)
i = αV (t)i
, so then ω
(t+1)
i−1 = αV (t)i
. We
also know that V
(t+1)
i−1 = V
(t)
i , so it must be that ω
(t+1)
i−1 = αV (t+1)i−1
. Likewise, ai+1 gets a
new state and transition which takes its left neighbor’s value, so ω
(t+1)
i+1 = ω
(t)
i = αV (t)i
by hypothesis. But we also have V
(t+1)
i+1 = V
(t)
i , so ω
(t+1)
i+1 = αV (t+1)i+1
. Finally, ai gets a
new state and transition which keeps ωi constant, and so ω
(t+1)
i = ω
(t)
i which is by
hypothesis equal to α
V
(t)
i
. And since V
(t)
i = V
(t+1)
i , we have ω
(t+1)
i = αV (t+1)i
. The
implication holds for all cells affected by SplitLeftRight.
Similar arguments show that the implication also holds for SplitLeft, SplitRight,
and Remain. Thus the hypothesis is true for t < tE.
Now suppose t ≥ tE. Then pass t + 1 will be made in OrderAssignments.
As shown in Lemma 5.2, every element in V is either changed in Swap or it is left
unchanged, in which case Remain is called. We have already shown the implication
holds in Remain, so we have only Swap to contend with. The argument is very similar
to the one above. Clearly V
(t+1)
i = V
(t)
i+1 and V
(t+1)
i+1 = V
(t)
i . Since ai adds the the
transition set Tλ from Last[i] to qi,t+1, we know ω
(t+1)
i = ω
(t)
i+1. Likewise, for ai+1, we
know ω
(t+1)
i+1 = ω
(t)
i . By the induction hypothesis, we have ω
(t)
i = αV (t)i
and ω
(t)
i+1 = αV (t)i+1
.
Therefore, ω
(t+1)
i+1 = ω
(t)
i = αV (t)i
= α
V
(t+1)
i+1
and ω
(t+1)
i = ω
(t)
i+1 = αV (t)i+1
= α
V
(t+1)
i
, so the
implication holds for Swap as well, and by extension, for all tE ≤ t ≤ k − 2.
Since (V
(t)
i = j) =⇒ (ω(t)i = αj), then A at time k − 2 has the value
〈ω(k−2)1 , ω(k−2)2 , . . . , ω(k−2)n 〉 = 〈αV (k−2)1 , αV (k−2)2 , . . . , αV (k−2)n 〉. By Lemma 5.1, V =
〈〈φ〉[1][1], 〈φ〉[2][1], . . . , 〈φ〉[n][1]〉 after its last pass and by Lemma 5.2 there are k − 2
passes through V . Therefore, A at time k−2 has the value 〈α〈φ〉[1][1], α〈φ〉[2][1], . . . , α〈φ〉[n][1]〉.

We can now complete the proof of Theorem 5.1. Let (A, k) be the result of
3-SatToFsca on input 〈φ〉 and let αj = 1 encode a true assignment and αj = 0
encode a false assignment to xj. Define the initial values for A as
s =
〈
0b 12 (#(j)−1)cαj0d 12 (#(j)−1)e
〉v
j=1
.
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We claim (〈q0,0, q1,0, . . . , qn,0〉, s) `kA (〈q0,k, q1,k, . . . , qn,k〉, 〈(010)c〉) if and only iff φ is
satisfied by the assignments α1, . . . , αv.
First, assume the assignments encoded as α1, . . . , αv satisfy φ. By Lemma 5.3, we
know the k− 2nd value of A consists of the values α1, . . . , αv ordered as they appear in
φ. Lines 24 through 30 in 3-SatToFsca make it clear that each ai will complement
its value if and only if the corresponding literal in φ is complemented, and so will
have the opposite value at time k − 1. Therefore, the value of A at time k − 1 is
exactly the encoded literals of φ evaluated for the assignments α1, . . . , αv. Lines 31
through 34 show that every third cell starting with the second cell will compute the
OR function, and all other cells will compute the 0 function at time k. So then ωi
will take the value ωi−1 ∨ ωi ∨ ωi+1 for i ≡ 2 mod 3 and 0 otherwise. But these ORs
exactly evaluate the clauses of φ when considering it’s literals as an array of length
n = 3c. Since φ is satisfied by α1, . . . , αv, each such ORing of literals in this grouping
must result in true, and so the OR of their encoding must be 1. This implies the
value of ai will be 1 for i ≡ 2 mod 3 and 0 otherwise. Therefore, after k time steps, A
has the configuration (〈q0,k, q1,k, . . . , qn,k〉, 〈(010)c〉).
Conversely, suppose A with initial value s has the configuration (〈q0,k, q1,k, . . . , qn,k〉,
〈(010)c〉) after k time steps. We know by the construction of each cell on lines 31
through 34 that those cells ai for i ≡ 2 mod 3 with output value ωi = 1 are the
result of the OR of their three inputs from the previous time step, and so ω
(k)
i =
ω
(k−1)
i−1 ∨ ω(k−1)i ∨ ω(k−1)i+1 . We also know that ω(k−2)i = α〈φ〉[i][1] and that ω(k−1)i = ω(k−2)i
if and only if the ith literal in φ is complemented. Then the values of ai at time step
k − 1 are exactly the corresponding literals of φ when evaluated for the assignments
α1, . . . , αv. Since ω
(k−1)
i−1 ∨ ω(k−1)i ∨ ω(k−1)i+1 = 1, the clauses over those literals must also
evaluate to true, and so φ is satisfied.
Since ai has value 1 for i ≡ 2 mod 3 only when φ is satisfied, A correctly evaluates
the clauses of φ. 
5.5 Comparing Computational Ability
It can be difficult to get a sense of the computational efficiency of simple FSCA since
it is a parallel construction on one hand, but a construction of machines much less
powerful than Turing machines on the other. To facilitate a comparison, we will
consider the number of time steps required to perform certain computations relative to
other computational models. A Turing machine with alphabet Σ = {0, 1}, for instance,
would require roughly 5n/3 operations to evaluate the clauses of a 3-CNF formula
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having n literals: checking and inverting each literal (n operations), then performing
two OR operations for every three literals (2n/3 operations). This number would grow
at least by a factor of n if we considered individual head movements. Our FSCA as
constructed above, however, does somewhat better (without using the cyclic boundary
property.) We examine this formally in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2. Let (A, k) be as returned from 3-SatToFsca on input 〈φ〉 such that
A has n cells. k ≤ 3n/2 + 2.
Proof. Lemma 5.2 shows that there is one state in each ai for every pass through V ,
and that there are exactly k − 2 such passes. We simply bound k − 2 as a function of
n. This is complicated somewhat by having no fixed relationship between the number
of clauses and the number of variables. However, a coarse bound is still possible.
In GrowSpans, we note that each span can grow by two at every time step except
possibly its last (if its ultimate size is even.) At worst, there is only one variable that
needs to grow, and that variable is centered in its span by (11). Since the variable
occupies one element of V at initialization (by Lemma 5.1), GrowSpans can require
no more than d(n− 1)/2e ≤ n/2 passes to fill the entire array.
The remaining passes are made by OrderAssignments. Recall that this algo-
rithm functions exactly as Odd-Even sort. It is well known than Odd-Even sort can
sort n variables in n passes.
Finally, k is assigned the number of passes made in GrowSpans and OrderAs-
signments plus 2. Therefore, k ≤ n/2 + n + 2 = 3n/2 + 2, and so the bound
holds. 
It appears in the case of evaluating 3-CNF formulas, even simple FSCA are capable
of reasonably efficient operation.
Comparing simple FSCA to elementary FSCA, it is not clear an elementary FSCA
could be built to evaluate a 3-CNF efficiently. If a cell is constructed to perform the
OR of a clause, then it cannot also invert a literal or exchange a value with a neighbor
as each cell is allowed only one function. Any such solution would require a more
clever mixture of functions over neighborhoods of cells, and may end up relying on
the ability to simulate a Turing machine, as shown for rule 110. [12]
5.6 Invertibility of FSCA
Having formally defined FSCA and examined some of their computational capability,
we return to the issue of invertibility. We first need a formal definition of the problem,
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which we provide for the general case of FSCA. We define the k-INVERT decision
problem as follows:
k-INVERT = {(A,C(t), k)|A is an FSCA of n cells,∃C(t−k)(C(t−k) `kA C(t)) for k ∈ N}
We would like to know whether deciding k-INVERT is NP-Hard. If so, then an
FSCA could serve as a primitive on which to build a provably secure PRG provided
its construction and operation are efficient. The efficiency condition motivates us to
seek the simplest FSCA for which inversion is provably NP-Hard.
Elementary FSCAs do not inspire great confidence in this regard. Apart from the
attacks already shown, the difficulty in evaluating a simple Boolean formula suggests
a fundamental lack of ability to withstand analysis from an opponent armed with a
Turing machine.
Simple FSCA, however, seem to hold more promise. If running such a machine
forward from an assignment produces the evaluation of a formula, then running it
backwards (i.e. inverting its operation) from an evaluation must produce an assignment.
If the evaluation were a satisfying one, such an ability could be used to decide 3-SAT.
This might be a little surprising. Notice that the simple restriction reduces the k-
INVERT problem to just finding an appropriate s(t−k), since q(t−k) is easily deduced
from q(t): simply follow the transitions backwards from q(t) for k states. However, it
may be that the mixing behavior of the 3-neighbor construction over sufficiently many
time steps provides the hardness we need. Therefore, we will examine simple FSCAs
to determine if there is a B(n) for which they are NP-Hard to k-invert.
We now formalize this intuition in a reduction from 3-SAT to a k-INVERT variant
for simple FSCA.
Theorem 5.3. Let k-SIMPLE-INVERT, abbreviated kSI, be defined as
{(A,C(t), k) | A is a simple FSCA of n cells, ∃C(t−k)(C(t−k) `kA C(t)), k ∈ N}.
kSI is NP-Complete for k ≥ 3n/2 + 2.
Proof. We show that kSI ∈ NP and that 3-SAT is polynomial-time reducible to kSI.
Since 3-SAT is NP-Complete, this will prove kSI is NP-Complete.
The first condition is easy to see. Recall that q(t−k) is easy to deduce from q(t) and
A which are encoded in the input string. We can create a decider for kSI which, given
a certificate s(t−k), performs the following: run A with configuration (q(t−k), s(t−k)) for
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k time steps. If the result is C(t), accept. Otherwise, reject. Since this decider requires
only O(kn) steps, we can verify kSI in polynomial time, and so kSI is in NP.
Now we show 3-SAT ≤P kSI. Let φ be a 3-CNF formula having c unique clauses
over v variables such that no clause repeats. Let n = 3c. Consider Algorithm 5.5,
3-SatTokSi.
Algorithm 5.5 3-SatTokSi
Input: 〈φ〉, an encoding of φ.
Output: FSCA A, a configuration C, and κ ∈ N
1: (A, κ)←3-SatToFsca(〈φ〉)
2: C ← (q(κ), 〈(010)c〉)
3: return (A,C, κ)
First, note that 3-SatTokSi runs in timeO(n2) since, by Lemma 5.2, 3-SatToFsca
makes κ (which is O(n)) passes over an array of length n and C can be created in
time O(n).
Next, we show that the returned (A,C, κ) ∈ kSI ⇐⇒ φ ∈ 3-SAT. Suppose
(A,C, κ) ∈ kSI and that k = κ. Then there exists a C(0) such that C(0) `κA C. As
C has a value where each si = 1 for i ≡ 2 mod 3, and since by Theorem 5.1 A
evaluates φ, φ must be satisfiable and so φ ∈ 3-SAT. Now consider any k > κ. By the
construction of A, the value after time step κ never changes since all qi,κ transition
only to themselves, keeping the same value. If A has value 〈(010)c〉 at time step k, it
must have had the same value at time step κ, and so φ is satisfiable and in 3-SAT.
Suppose φ ∈ 3-SAT and k = κ. Then there is a satisfying assignment, α1, . . . , αv
for φ. Let
s =
〈
0b 12 (#(j)−1)cαj0d 12 (#(j)−1)e
〉v
j=1
Since by Theorem 5.1 A evaluates φ, then it must be that (q(0), s)) `κA (q(κ), 〈(010)c〉) =
C, and so (A,C, κ) ∈ kSI. Since C(κ) `∗A C(κ), (A,C, κ) ∈ kSI for all k > κ.
Finally, by Theorem 5.2, we know that κ ≤ 3n/2 + 2. 
We can generalize this a bit further using the technique of padding as often done
for other NP-Complete problems. Notice that 3-SatToFsca constructs a cyclic
boundary FSCA, but never makes use of the boundary connections. We can therefore
break the boundary connections, insert dummy cells, and connect those cyclically
without affecting the operation of the FSCA in the original n cells. This changes the
number of cells while leaving the number of time steps constant, allowing the ratio
between the two to be an arbitrary one. This gives us the following theorem.
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Theorem 5.4. kSI is NP-Complete for k ≥ n/σ for any arbitrary σ ∈ N.
Proof. We again reduce 3-SAT to kSI. Let φ be a 3-CNF formula having c clauses.
Our goal is to construct an FSCA of n cells which evaluates φ and a k ∈ N such that
n/σ ≤ k. Consider the following algorithm:
Algorithm 5.6 3-SatToσkSi
Input: 〈φ〉, an encoding of φ,
σ ∈ N.
Output: FSCA A, a configuration C, and k ∈ N
1: (A′, κ)←3-SatToFsca(〈φ〉)
2: n← (9cσ/2) + 2σ
3: for i = 1, . . . , n− 3c do {create n− 3c dummy cells}
4: Create a cell a3c+i
5: Add states q3c+i,0, . . . , q3c+i,κ with transition sets T0(q3c+i,t, q3c+i,t+1), 1 ≤ t < κ
6: Add transition set T0(q3c+i,κ, q3c+i,κ)
7: ρ3c+i−1 ← ω3c+i
8: λ3c+i ← ω3c+i−1
9: ρ1 ← ω3c+n
10: λ3c+n ← ω1
11: A← 〈a1, . . . , a3c, . . . , a3c+n〉
12: C ← (q(κ), 〈(010)c0n−3c〉)
13: return (A,C, κ)
3-SatToσkSi performs O (9σc)+O(3c) operations, and so runs in time polynomial
in c. Further, A clearly evaluates φ since A′ evaluates φ without any communication
from λ1 or ρ3c by Theorem 5.1. Thus A reaches the κ
th time step with a value of
(010)c0n−3c iff there is an assignment α1, . . . , αv to the v variables of φ which satisfy it.
Lastly, by Theorem 5.2, we know that κ ≤ 3(3c)/2 + 2. Since n = 9cσ/2 + 2σ = σκ,
and A has a total of 3c cells (from A′) plus n− 3c dummy cells, A has n = σκ cells.
Therefore, (A,C, κ) obeys κ ≥ n/σ. As A’s value never changes after time step κ, the
theorem holds for all k ≥ κ ≥ n/σ. 
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6 A PRG Based on FSCA
”One of the most singular characteristics of the art of deciphering is the
strong conviction possessed by every person, even moderately acquainted with
it, that he is able to construct a cipher which nobody else can
decipher.”–Charles Babbage.
6.1 Design of an FSCA-based PRG
Recall our thought experiment from Section 5, where the rule of each cell is selected
uniformly at random. Under this scheme, we cannot know anything about the previous
output values even one time step back, nor can we guess what functions will be used
next and so have no ability to guess the next output. We would like to approach this
ideal behavior to the extent possible in a PRG based on FSCA.
While our approximation of the ideal must be lacking in some aspects, uniform
distribution of each cell’s outputs is a required property. This suggests that the
functions applied by a cell over time must on the whole have a uniform distribution as
well. Suppose each cell generates an 8-bit value to specify the function at each time
step. Any single such function may be clearly biased, but if each cell cycles through
all possible 8-bit values, its output distribution is uniform in the aggregate. This is
because the number of ’1’ bits in any fixed bit position across all possible 8-bit strings
is 128, meaning there are 128 functions that yield a ’1’ on any fixed 3-bit input and
128 that yield a ’0’ for that same input. We can thus guarantee uniform distribution
by having each cell cycle through all possible 256 time step functions.
Another desired property from our thought experiment is that of independent,
randomly selected functions. While we do not aspire to truly random selection and
we are limited to cycling through the 256 possible functions, we can at a minimum
apply the functions in the order of some permutation which resists cryptanalysis. The
S-Boxes of cryptographic primitives provide such permutations, and are commonly
studied for resistance to linear and differential attacks. We choose the S-Box from
AES as a basis for selecting the time step functions [34].
Following such a permutation does not achieve independence, though. At some
point, the permutation will choose the 0 function. If all cells do so at the same time,
the value would be fixed at 0. We prevent this by having each cell cycle through the
permutation in a different order and from a different starting position. We assign to
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each cell an 8-bit offset value which is taken from the seed. This offset specifies the
starting index in the S-Box when expressed as a lookup table. The function for the
cell is then taken as the offset value XORed with the S-Box value at the cell’s current
index. XORing in a constant causes the time step function to use values from the
S-Box in an order unique to that constant.
One difficulty in requiring the time step function to cycle through the 256 possible
functions is the issue of biased functions at the end of the cycle. Suppose the last
function for a cell in the cycle is the 0 function. On restarting the cycle, that cell will
have its value stuck at 0. Even moderately biased functions at the end of the cycle
lead to stuck bits in the value for the next cycle. Early experiments showed that most
seeds became periodic after just 1 or 2 cycles. While the uniform distribution property
requires the PRG to operate in cycles of 256, there is no requirement that they be the
same cycle. We can change the cycle simply by changing the offsets. At the end of
each cycle, we generate new offsets by:
1. Saving away the current value.
2. Stepping the FSCA for 8 time steps, saving the value away at each one to
generate 8 bits for each cell.
3. XORing those 8 bits into the offsets for each cell.
4. Restoring the current value.
This process effectively changes the simple FSCA each 256 time steps, giving each cell
a new time step function for each of its 256 states.
There are practical concerns in generating output bits from this construction. First,
a cell’s path through its cycle of functions may have periods of extreme bias, affecting
the distribution of its output and that of its neighbors. If we simply return the FSCA’s
value during such a period, we may notice a bias in the resulting output. Further, we
would also be revealing a considerable portion of the stored state (i.e. the value) of
the PRG and so weaken its cryptographic strength.
Generating output by XORing FSCA values separated by a number of time steps
seems to solve these problems. XORing two FSCA values leaves a slight bias in
long sequences, but four seems to be sufficient in practice to remove bias. Different
trade-offs between security and efficiency can be made here. Outputting the XOR
of four FSCA values would also avoid directly revealing the internals of the PRG.
Since n-cell simple FSCA are only hard to k-invert for some k as a function of n, we
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would like to choose a number of time steps which is derived from n and also balances
efficiency and security. We note that at t = t0 + n/2, every cell is affected by every
value at t0, and so the value s
(t0) is fully diffused over the FSCA. Paranoia inspires us
to choose n rather than n/2 time steps as a minimum between generating outputs.
Combining this with the necessary conditions to avoid bias, we generate output bits
by XORing together four FSCA values, each separated by n/4 time steps.
Another practical consideration is allowing for regular or even constant (e.g. all
0) seeds. In this case, the offset is the same for all cells, resulting in a short period
for the FSCA. In a fit of irony, we ensure entropy and chaos in the offsets by first
XORing in the bytes of the most4 harmonious algebraic number, ϕ, the golden ratio.
This ensures each cell has some disordered offset from the S-Box values.
We name the resulting PRG “Chasm”, owing to the etymology of the Greek word
“chaos,” originally meaning “void” or “chasm.” We represent the current state of a
Chasm PRG as a 5-tuple (n, s,o, i, c) where:
• n ∈ N is the number of cells in the PRG
• s ∈ {0, 1}n is the current value of the underlying FSCA
• o ∈ {0, 1}8n is the vector of 8-bit offsets for each cell, indexed as 〈o1, . . . ,o8n〉
where each oi ∈ {0, 1}8
• i ∈ {0, 1}8n is the vector of 8-bit indexes of each cell in the S-Box permutation,
indexed as 〈i1, . . . , in〉 where each ii ∈ {0, 1}8
• c ∈ N is the cycle step counter
The algorithms ChasmInitialize (Algorithm 6.1), ChasmTimeStep (Procedure 6.1),
and ChasmNext (Algorithm 6.2) fully specify the Chasm PRG operation. We use
the notation s≪ k and s≫ k to denote the cyclic shifting (rotating) of s by k bits
to the left and right respectively. We use  as right shift, ⊕ as XOR, · as AND, and
+ as Boolean OR. These operations are done element-wise when the terms are vectors.
We will also use ϕ to mean the golden ratio (1 +
√
5)/2 and ϕi to mean the i
th bit of
ϕ when represented in binary. B[i] denotes the vector of values Bj stored in the AES
S-Box lookup table B for each index j ∈ i. See Table 10 for the table values.
Note that ChasmNext requires modification when n - 256 or when n > 256 to
ensure the cycle is restarted at the correct time step. This presentation is simplified
for clarity.
4Based on an incomplete survey.
59
Algorithm 6.1 ChasmInitialize
Input: σ ∈ {0, 1}9n, the seed.
Output: a Chasm PRG
1: s← 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 ⊕ 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉
2: o←
〈σn+1, . . . , σ9n〉 ⊕ 〈ϕn+1, . . . , ϕ9n〉
3: i← o
4: c← 0
5: return (n, s,o, i, c)
Procedure 6.1 ChasmTimeStep
Parameters: g = (n, s,o, i, c), a Chasm
PRG
1: x← ((s≫ 1) 〈2n〉) + (s
〈1n〉) + s≪ 1 {{Collect the neighbors
for each cell.}}
2: f ← B[i]⊕ o
3: s← (f  x) · 〈1n〉
4: for j = 1, . . . , n do
5: ij ← ij + 1
6: c← c+ 1
6.2 Security of Chasm
Recall that two things are required to meet the definition of a forward-secure PRG:
1. The next output is hard to predict given previous outputs, and
2. The previous output is hard to compute given the current (stored) state of the
generator.
Proof of either of these properties based on reasonable assumptions remains open.
We conjecture, however, that computing previous outputs given the current state is
closely related to the k-SIMPLE-INVERT problem.
6.3 Statistical Testing of Chasm
We have submitted Chasm to the Statistical Test Suite (STS) version 2.1.1 of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology [37]. STS takes a number of sequences
generated by the PRG in question and runs a battery of statistical tests. Each statistic
has a distribution of possible values assuming the null hypothesis that the sequence is
random is true. STS analyzes the observed distribution of statistics for each test and
uses that to draw a conclusion about the null hypothesis.
A significance level α is chosen to help in drawing this conclusion. STS determines a
p-value for each statistic run over a single test sequence. This p-value is the probability
that a perfect random generator would produce a seemingly less random (or “worse”)
sequence than the one tested. The more extreme the p-value, the further out in the
“tails” the test sequence is in the distribution of the possible statistic values when those
values are computed using truly random sequences. If the p-value is less than our
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Algorithm 6.2 ChasmNext
Input: g = (n, s,o, i, c), a Chasm PRG
Output: v ∈ {0, 1}n
1: v← 〈0n〉
2: for j = 1, . . . , 4 do
3: for k = 1, . . . , n/4 do
4: ChasmTimeStep(g) {update s}
5: v← v ⊕ s
6: if c ≥ 256 then {check end of cycle}
7: t← s
8: u← 〈〉
9: for j = 1, . . . , 8 do
10: ChasmTimeStep(g) {update s}
11: u← u||s
12: o← o⊕ u
13: s← t
14: c← 0
15: return v
significance level α, STS rejects the null hypothesis that the test sequence is random;
it is simply too unlikely that it came from a random source.
While a single test sequence may result in a statistic outside the expected natural
range, we must remember that randomness is a probabilistic property. A certain
amount of failing sequences should be expected from any truly random generator;
they should just happen according to the distribution of the statistic. For this
reason, STS runs a group of sequences through each test and looks for a proportion
of sequences passing a given statistic according to a confidence interval and also a
uniform distribution of p-values in the group for that statistic. These two metrics
provide for a high-level conclusion to be made on the PRG when tested with sufficient
seeds, test sequences, and sequence length.
The 15 tests employed by the STS are as follows:
1. The Frequency (Monobit) Test,
2. Frequency Test within a Block,
3. The Runs Test,
4. Tests for the Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block,
5. The Binary Matrix Rank Test,
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6. The Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test,
7. The Non-overlapping Template Matching Test,
8. The Overlapping Template Matching Test,
9. Maurer’s ”Universal Statistical” Test,
10. The Linear Complexity Test,
11. The Serial Test,
12. The Approximate Entropy Test,
13. The Cumulative Sums (Cusums) Test,
14. The Random Excursions Test, and
15. The Random Excursions Variant Test.
Several of these tests are run a number of times with slightly different parameters,
leading to a total of 188 individual tests. Each group comprises 100 sequences, each
1,000,000 bits in length, giving a total of 18,800 individual test results. STS reports
the proportion of sequences which pass each individual statistic and compares that
to the expected proportion computed at a chosen significance level. If the observed
proportion is less than expected, we say the group has a proportion failure. STS also
reports a χ2 test on the distribution of the p-values to check that each statistic is
uniformly distributed. If the resulting p-value of the distribution of p-values is less
than 0.0001, we say the group has a uniformity failure. All testing uses a significance
level α = 0.01.
We wish to examine the behavior of Chasm using a number of different seeds and
bit length configurations in order to build general confidence in the scheme. We chose
18 “structured” seeds having various regular patterns and 20 random seeds for Chasm
PRGs having bit lengths of n = 8, 16, and 128. Structured seed patterns are listed in
Table 8. Random seeds were obtained from the Hotbits radioactive decay generator
[48]. We generated 12.5 MB of data from each seed for each n and used that data for
the 100×1,000,000 bit test outlined above. Sequences were generated from a python
implementation using numpy. For each group of 100 sequences, we recorded the STS
uniformity p-value and the proportion of passed tests.
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Seed Pattern Seed Pattern Seed Pattern
1 0∗ 7 (1100)∗ 13 (071)∗
2 (01)∗ 8 0n/21n/2 14 (170)∗
3 (010)∗ 9 (1110)∗ 15 (107)∗
4 (101)∗ 10 (0001)∗ 16 (017)∗
5 1∗ 11 (1011)∗ 17 (1404)∗
6 (111000)∗ 12 (0100)∗ 18 (021402)∗
Table 8: Structured Seed patterns. These patterns are repeated as necessary to provide a
9n-bit seed for each test.
6.4 Test Results
We will examine the test results from a number of viewpoints. Overall, there were
2,025,992 individual test statistics computed over 11,400 sequences of 1,000,000 bits
each. Of these, 2,005,166 passed their individual test which is 141 less than the
2,005,307 we would expect at α = 0.01. In straight percentages, this is a 98.972%
passing rate. For comparison, we ran a 1,000-sequence test of 1,000,000 bits each on
the Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) generator, widely regarded as a strong PRG. This test
passed 98.996% of individual tests.
Figure 5 charts how each tested Chasm generator configuration performed. The
left bar in each category shows the number of observed failures of individual tests,
while the right bar shows the maximum number of failures expected at α = 0.01. Only
the 128-bit configuration using random seeds goes beyond the expected value, failing
5 tests more than allowed. Notice there is a slightly different number of tests in each
category. This is due to the variable nature of the Random Excursion tests, which use
sequences of different lengths and so can produce a variable number of sequences to
test. The lower numbers for structured configurations is simply due to testing only 18
structured seeds vs. 20 random seeds.
These sequences were tested in 21,432 groups of 100 sequences each. Of these, 20
groups had uniformity failures and 92 had proportion failures. Table 9 shows how
these failures were distributed among the test configurations. For a closer look at the
effect of various seed patterns, Figure 6 shows the number of each failure type for
each seed. Seed numbers 19 and above are random, and are different for each n. Seed
numbers 18 and below are of different lengths, but use the same pattern as described
in Table 8 for all n. No clear pattern seems to emerge from this data.
We made a few other observations of a 4-bit configuration of Chasm. We generated
3,750,000 bytes of data from this generator seeded with 0s and subjected it to STS on
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Figure 5: Individual test failures by Configuration
n seed type uniformity failures proportion failures % of groups
8
structured 11 27 0.13%
random 4 18 0.08%
16
structured 1 11 0.05%
random 1 8 0.04%
128
structured 3 12 0.06%
random 0 16 0.07%
Table 9: Group test results by category
64
Sheet1
Page 1
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Group Failures by Seed
Uniformity—8
Proportional—8
Uniformity—16
Proportional—16
Uniformity—128
Proportional—128
Seed
N
um
be
r o
f f
ai
lu
re
s 
Figure 6: Group failures by seed
30 sequences of 1,000,000 bits each. The output had an average 0.49% bias towards
’1’ bits, and so failed 13 out of 30 groups in the frequency test, 10 and 14 groups in
the two Cumulative Sums tests, and 8 groups in the Runs test. However, all other
tests passed with no proportion or uniformity errors. These are impressive results for
a 4-cell construction, especially considering the similar results of 18-cell constructions
in [16]. Further, another run was observed to generate over 50 megabytes of data
without exhibiting strictly periodic behavior. No statistical measurements were made
on the result.
Finally, we note the python implementation was able to generate 475 megabytes
in roughly 12 hours while the STS C implementation of the BBS generator took close
to 72 hours to generate 125 megabytes.
7 Conclusions
The results of Section 3 and Section 4 make it hard to have confidence in the ability of
one-dimensional two-state three-neighbor cyclic CA to provide secure cryptographic
primitives according to modern definitions. When the rule set is known and linear
and the entire state vector is known, inverting the CA is of course straight forward.
Algorithm 3.1 extends this condition to uniform CA whose rule is a non-linear toggle
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rule, the only kind shown to perform well in statistical testing. When a known
temporal sequence is produced by a known rule set, linear or not, the techniques
presented in Section 3.2 seem likely to provide a deterministic algorithm for recovering
the seed of that sequence, improving on the previously known probabilistic algorithm.
Only CA which choose their rules dynamically have no impending fatal cryptanalytic
attack. Section 4 shows these CA are at best very inefficient when the dynamic rules
are limited to linear rules. It may be that dynamically choosing from some set of
non-linear rules provides better efficiency.
Returning to cellular automaton’s historical roots by allowing multiple states per
cell, on the other hand, provides a computational model whose power is determined by
whether P=NP. Simple FSCA seem to offer a candidate one-way function for use in
cryptographic primitives. We may imagine secure PRGs, hash functions, block ciphers,
and stream ciphers based on carefully designed FSCA. These may also allow a security
parameter which lets designers choose a security level appropriate for the application.
The Chasm family of PRGs presented in Section 6 approaches one such primitive.
Chasm allows for a security parameter whereas block-based primitives, such as AES-
or SHA-1-based PRGs require fixed sizes. An application can use Chasm at 3 bits
and up. If the quality of data produced by low-n implementations can be shored up,
this may be an attractive option for resource-constrained applications such as VLSI
testing, Bluetooth/wireless applications, RFID readers, Key fobs, etc. The hardware
requirements are a 256-byte lookup table, n-byte offset table (for the bytes of ϕ), n
8-to-1 MUXes, and an XOR accumulator. While demonstration that Chasm satisfies
the definition of a forward-secure PRG assuming the one-wayness of FSCA remains
open, it does not seem too far off. If shown, Chasm would offer a nicely parallel PRG
suitable for hardware, GPU, and vector register implementations. Its performance
even in single threaded interpreted languages seems far superior to the BBS generator,
so a parallel implementation of Chasm with security proofs would be a very attractive
primitive. Setting these proofs aside, our
test results suggest that Chasm is certainly a viable option for a statistical pseu-
dorandom generator. While there are slightly more failures in the STS suite than
one would like to see, it is quite conceivable that small adjustments to the Chasm
algorithm can correct this. Simply mixing more values per output may be adequate.
Beyond cryptography, it may be worth considering other applications of more or
less bounded FSCA. For instance, are their problems in NC0 which might be modeled
as FSCA computations and examined from a different perspective? What would a
poly(n) bounded FSCA be capable of? Are there applications to problems in PSPACE
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or EXPTIME? It seems there are new questions for the adherents of cellular automata
to tackle.
8 Future Work
There are quite a few open questions raised above. First, it may be interesting to
consider a decision problem related to Proposition 3.2: Given the state vector for a
uniform cyclic CA over any rule, is there a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm to
compute its predecessor state if one exists? We’ve shown that, when certain patterns
exist in the state vector for certain rules, such an algorithm exists. It may be interesting
to consider the possibilities left when those patterns do not exist.
Second, the algorithm in Section 3.2 to improve the bounds on the Meier/Staffelbach
algorithm remains to be fully developed and tested. Such an improvement would
have an impact on much of the literature related to current CA-based cryptosystems.
Related to this are all the open problems discussed in Section 4.3.
With respect to FSCA and Chasm, proofs of forward and backward security would
be greatly beneficial to instill confidence in a new primitive. Also, further study of
the linearity and differential properties of the generator is needed, as well as a more
complete assessment of the potential for weak keys. Finally, applying FSCA to other
cryptographic primitives seems likely to yield interesting results.
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A AES S-Box
The Values of the AES S-Box are provided for reference. See [34] for the full AES
specification.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
0 63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5 30 01 67 2b fe d7 ab 76
10 ca 82 c9 7d fa 59 47 f0 ad d4 a2 af 9c a4 72 c0
20 b7 fd 93 26 36 3f f7 cc 34 a5 e5 f1 71 d8 31 15
30 04 c7 23 c3 18 96 5 9a 07 12 80 e2 eb 27 b2 75
40 09 83 2c 1a 1b 6e 5a a0 52 3b d6 b3 29 e3 2f 84
50 53 d1 00 ed 20 fc b1 5b 6a cb be 39 4a 4c 58 cf
60 d0 ef aa fb 43 4d 33 85 45 f9 02 7f 50 3c 9f a8
70 51 a3 40 8f 92 9d 38 f5 bc b6 da 21 10 ff f3 d2
80 cd 0c 13 ec 5f 97 44 17 c4 a7 7e 3d 64 5d 19 73
90 60 81 4f dc 22 2a 90 88 46 ee b8 14 de 5e 0b db
a0 e0 32 3a 0a 49 06 24 5c c2 d3 ac 62 91 95 e4 79
b0 e7 c8 37 6d 8d d5 4e a9 6c 56 f4 ea 65 7a ae 08
c0 ba 78 25 2e 1c a6 b4 c6 e8 dd 74 1f 4b bd 8b 8a
d0 70 3e b5 66 48 03 f6 0e 61 35 57 b9 86 c1 1d 9e
e0 e1 f8 98 11 69 d9 8e 94 9b 1e 87 e9 ce 55 28 df
f0 8c a1 89 0d bf e6 42 68 41 99 2d 0f b0 54 bb 16
Table 10: Hexadecimal values of the AES S-Box as a lookup table.
B Experiments
The sections in this appendix demonstrate representative experiments showing some
property or other. These experiments were conducted with python 2.7.1 using Numpy
1.6.1. In some cases, actual python interpreter session are captured.
B.1 Effects of Rule Symmetry on Multiple Seeds for a Given
Sequence
The following experiments show that symmetry in the rule set seems to affect the
number of seeds that can generate the same temporal sequence. The function Other-
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MatchingSeeds finds all seeds that produce the same temporal sequence over n steps
as a given seed under a given rule set.
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds([150,150,150,150,90,150,150,150,150], SeedFromStr(’010110110’))
[0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0]
[0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0]
[0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0]
[0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0]
[0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0]
[0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0]
[0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0]
[0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0]
[1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1]
[1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1]
[1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1]
[1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1]
[1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1]
[1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1]
[1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1]
[1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds([150,150,150,150,150,150,150,90,150], SeedFromStr(’110010110’))
[0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1]
[1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds([150,150,150,150,150,150,150,150,90], SeedFromStr(’110010110’))
[1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0]
Severely asymmetrical rules limit the matches severly–one rule 90 at the edge means
there’s a single seed that generates the temporal sequence.
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds([150,150,150,150,150,150,150,150,90], SeedFromStr(’011001011’))
[0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds([150,150,150,150,150,150,150,150,90], SeedFromStr(’101100101’))
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds([150,150,150,150,150,150,150,150,165], SeedFromStr(’101100101’))
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
As long as that mismatched rule is a two-input rule, there’s only one seed. If it’s
changed to a 3-input rule, even complementary, many matching seeds exist.
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds([150,150,150,150,150,150,150,150,105], SeedFromStr(’101100101’))
[0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0]
[0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0]
[0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0]
[0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0]
[0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0]
[0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0]
[0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0]
[0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0]
[1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1]
[1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1]
[1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1]
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[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
[1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1]
[1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1]
[1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1]
[1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds([150,150,150,150,150,150,105,150,150], SeedFromStr(’101100101’))
[0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0]
[0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0]
[0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0]
[0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0]
[0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0]
[0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0]
[0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0]
[0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0]
[1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1]
[1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1]
[1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1]
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
[1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1]
[1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1]
[1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1]
[1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds([150,150,150,150,105,150,105,150,150], SeedFromStr(’101100101’))
[0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0]
[0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0]
[0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0]
[0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0]
[0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0]
[0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0]
[0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0]
[0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0]
[1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1]
[1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1]
[1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1]
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
[1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1]
[1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1]
[1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1]
[1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds([105,150,150,150,105,150,105,150,150], SeedFromStr(’101100101’))
[0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0]
[0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0]
[0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0]
[0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0]
[0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0]
[0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0]
[0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0]
[0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0]
[1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1]
[1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1]
[1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1]
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
[1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1]
[1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1]
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[1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1]
[1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1]
So placing complementary 3-input rules in various asymetric locations appears not
to change the results. Here, different seeds are shown to produce the same temporal
sequence.
>>> TempSeqFromSeed([105,150,150,150,105,150,105,150,150], SeedFromStr(’100001001’), 18)
array([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0], dtype=uint8)
>>> TempSeqFromSeed([105,150,150,150,105,150,105,150,150], SeedFromStr(’101100101’), 18)
array([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0], dtype=uint8)
The location of the asymmetry appears to affect the number of matching seeds. The
following shows how the number of matches drops as we go from perfectly symmetrical
through different asymmetry patterns. Notice that in the extreme cases, the only seed
that matches is the original seed, stored as s1.
>>> s1 = SeedFromStr(’101100101’)
>>> rules = [150, 90, 150, 150, 150, 150, 150, 90, 150]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds(rules, s1)
[0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0]
[0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0]
[0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0]
[0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0]
[0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0]
[0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0]
[0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0]
[0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0]
[1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1]
[1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1]
[1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1]
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
[1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1]
[1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1]
[1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1]
[1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1]
>>> rules = [90, 150, 150, 150, 150, 150, 150, 90, 150]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds(rules, s1)
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
>>> rules = [90, 90, 150, 150, 150, 150, 150, 90, 150]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds(rules, s1)
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
>>> rules = [150, 90, 90, 150, 150, 150, 150, 90, 150]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds(rules, s1)
[0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1]
[0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0]
[1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0]
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
>>> rules = [150, 90, 90, 150, 150, 150, 90, 90, 150]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds(rules, s1)
[0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0]
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[0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0]
[0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0]
[0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0]
[0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0]
[0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0]
[0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0]
[0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0]
[1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1]
[1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1]
[1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1]
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
[1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1]
[1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1]
[1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1]
[1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1]
>>> rules = [150, 90, 90, 150, 150, 150, 90, 150, 150]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds(rules, s1)
[0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1]
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
>>> rules = [150,150,150,150,150,90,150,150,150]
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds(rules, s1)
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]
>>> rules = [150,90,90,150,150,150,90,150,150,90,150,150,150,150,90,150,150]
>>> s3 = SeedFromStr(’00101001110111101’)
>>> OtherMatchingSeeds(rules, s3)
[0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1]
B.2 Solving Temporal Sequences Under Arbitrary Symmet-
rical Rulesets
This experiment examines how local rule differences affect a three-cell neighbor hood
by looking at difference patterns in the output under different rule sets from a
uniform rule 150 CA. The function prints HSti−1:i+1,
HSt−1i−2:i+2 for each predecessor,
and 150St−1i−2:i+2⊕HSt−1i−2:i+2 for all predecessors under a hybrid rule set H. The notation
RSi:j denotes the state vector values from cell i to j under rule set R.
This information shows how to get the same successor values under a different rule
set by changing the predecessor state values. Notice that those rules that differ only
in their complementarity have constant difference patterns for all successor values.
There is no rule set with unique differences in all 8 successor values–4 seems to be the
maximum.
Key:
s_t |-- S_i-2:i+2 at t-1 -| |--xor with preds(150)--|
>>> rs.hybridPredDiffs()
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 90 90 :
000 00000 01010 10101 11111 00000 00111 00011 00100
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001 00001 01011 10100 11110 00000 00111 00011 00100
010 00010 01000 10111 11101 00001 00110 00010 00101
011 00011 01001 10110 11100 00001 00110 00010 00101
100 00101 01111 10000 11010 00011 00100 00000 00111
101 00100 01110 10001 11011 00011 00100 00000 00111
110 00111 01101 10010 11000 00010 00101 00001 00110
111 00110 01100 10011 11001 00010 00101 00001 00110
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 90 150 :
000 00000 01011 10101 11110 00000 00110 00011 00101
001 00001 01010 10100 11111 00000 00110 00011 00101
010 00011 01000 10110 11101 00000 00110 00011 00101
011 00010 01001 10111 11100 00000 00110 00011 00101
100 00101 01110 10000 11011 00011 00101 00000 00110
101 00100 01111 10001 11010 00011 00101 00000 00110
110 00110 01101 10011 11000 00011 00101 00000 00110
111 00111 01100 10010 11001 00011 00101 00000 00110
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 90 105 :
000 00001 01010 10100 11111 00001 00111 00010 00100
001 00000 01011 10101 11110 00001 00111 00010 00100
010 00010 01001 10111 11100 00001 00111 00010 00100
011 00011 01000 10110 11101 00001 00111 00010 00100
100 00100 01111 10001 11010 00010 00100 00001 00111
101 00101 01110 10000 11011 00010 00100 00001 00111
110 00111 01100 10010 11001 00010 00100 00001 00111
111 00110 01101 10011 11000 00010 00100 00001 00111
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 90 165 :
000 00001 01011 10100 11110 00001 00110 00010 00101
001 00000 01010 10101 11111 00001 00110 00010 00101
010 00011 01001 10110 11100 00000 00111 00011 00100
011 00010 01000 10111 11101 00000 00111 00011 00100
100 00100 01110 10001 11011 00010 00101 00001 00110
101 00101 01111 10000 11010 00010 00101 00001 00110
110 00110 01100 10011 11001 00011 00100 00000 00111
111 00111 01101 10010 11000 00011 00100 00000 00111
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 150 90 :
000 00000 01010 10111 11101 00000 00111 00001 00110
001 00001 01011 10110 11100 00000 00111 00001 00110
010 00010 01000 10101 11111 00001 00110 00000 00111
011 00011 01001 10100 11110 00001 00110 00000 00111
100 00111 01101 10000 11010 00001 00110 00000 00111
101 00110 01100 10001 11011 00001 00110 00000 00111
110 00101 01111 10010 11000 00000 00111 00001 00110
111 00100 01110 10011 11001 00000 00111 00001 00110
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 150 150 :
000 00000 01011 10110 11101 00000 00110 00000 00110
001 00001 01010 10111 11100 00000 00110 00000 00110
010 00011 01000 10101 11110 00000 00110 00000 00110
011 00010 01001 10100 11111 00000 00110 00000 00110
100 00110 01101 10000 11011 00000 00110 00000 00110
101 00111 01100 10001 11010 00000 00110 00000 00110
110 00101 01110 10011 11000 00000 00110 00000 00110
111 00100 01111 10010 11001 00000 00110 00000 00110
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 150 105 :
000 00001 01010 10111 11100 00001 00111 00001 00111
78
001 00000 01011 10110 11101 00001 00111 00001 00111
010 00010 01001 10100 11111 00001 00111 00001 00111
011 00011 01000 10101 11110 00001 00111 00001 00111
100 00111 01100 10001 11010 00001 00111 00001 00111
101 00110 01101 10000 11011 00001 00111 00001 00111
110 00100 01111 10010 11001 00001 00111 00001 00111
111 00101 01110 10011 11000 00001 00111 00001 00111
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 150 165 :
000 00001 01011 10110 11100 00001 00110 00000 00111
001 00000 01010 10111 11101 00001 00110 00000 00111
010 00011 01001 10100 11110 00000 00111 00001 00110
011 00010 01000 10101 11111 00000 00111 00001 00110
100 00110 01100 10001 11011 00000 00111 00001 00110
101 00111 01101 10000 11010 00000 00111 00001 00110
110 00100 01110 10011 11001 00001 00110 00000 00111
111 00101 01111 10010 11000 00001 00110 00000 00111
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 105 90 :
000 00010 01000 10101 11111 00010 00101 00011 00100
001 00011 01001 10100 11110 00010 00101 00011 00100
010 00000 01010 10111 11101 00011 00100 00010 00101
011 00001 01011 10110 11100 00011 00100 00010 00101
100 00101 01111 10010 11000 00011 00100 00010 00101
101 00100 01110 10011 11001 00011 00100 00010 00101
110 00111 01101 10000 11010 00010 00101 00011 00100
111 00110 01100 10001 11011 00010 00101 00011 00100
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 105 150 :
000 00011 01000 10101 11110 00011 00101 00011 00101
001 00010 01001 10100 11111 00011 00101 00011 00101
010 00000 01011 10110 11101 00011 00101 00011 00101
011 00001 01010 10111 11100 00011 00101 00011 00101
100 00101 01110 10011 11000 00011 00101 00011 00101
101 00100 01111 10010 11001 00011 00101 00011 00101
110 00110 01101 10000 11011 00011 00101 00011 00101
111 00111 01100 10001 11010 00011 00101 00011 00101
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 105 105 :
000 00010 01001 10100 11111 00010 00100 00010 00100
001 00011 01000 10101 11110 00010 00100 00010 00100
010 00001 01010 10111 11100 00010 00100 00010 00100
011 00000 01011 10110 11101 00010 00100 00010 00100
100 00100 01111 10010 11001 00010 00100 00010 00100
101 00101 01110 10011 11000 00010 00100 00010 00100
110 00111 01100 10001 11010 00010 00100 00010 00100
111 00110 01101 10000 11011 00010 00100 00010 00100
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 105 165 :
000 00011 01001 10100 11110 00011 00100 00010 00101
001 00010 01000 10101 11111 00011 00100 00010 00101
010 00001 01011 10110 11100 00010 00101 00011 00100
011 00000 01010 10111 11101 00010 00101 00011 00100
100 00100 01110 10011 11001 00010 00101 00011 00100
101 00101 01111 10010 11000 00010 00101 00011 00100
110 00110 01100 10001 11011 00011 00100 00010 00101
111 00111 01101 10000 11010 00011 00100 00010 00101
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 165 90 :
000 00010 01000 10111 11101 00010 00101 00001 00110
79
001 00011 01001 10110 11100 00010 00101 00001 00110
010 00000 01010 10101 11111 00011 00100 00000 00111
011 00001 01011 10100 11110 00011 00100 00000 00111
100 00111 01101 10010 11000 00001 00110 00010 00101
101 00110 01100 10011 11001 00001 00110 00010 00101
110 00101 01111 10000 11010 00000 00111 00011 00100
111 00100 01110 10001 11011 00000 00111 00011 00100
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 165 150 :
000 00011 01000 10110 11101 00011 00101 00000 00110
001 00010 01001 10111 11100 00011 00101 00000 00110
010 00000 01011 10101 11110 00011 00101 00000 00110
011 00001 01010 10100 11111 00011 00101 00000 00110
100 00110 01101 10011 11000 00000 00110 00011 00101
101 00111 01100 10010 11001 00000 00110 00011 00101
110 00101 01110 10000 11011 00000 00110 00011 00101
111 00100 01111 10001 11010 00000 00110 00011 00101
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 165 105 :
000 00010 01001 10111 11100 00010 00100 00001 00111
001 00011 01000 10110 11101 00010 00100 00001 00111
010 00001 01010 10100 11111 00010 00100 00001 00111
011 00000 01011 10101 11110 00010 00100 00001 00111
100 00111 01100 10010 11001 00001 00111 00010 00100
101 00110 01101 10011 11000 00001 00111 00010 00100
110 00100 01111 10001 11010 00001 00111 00010 00100
111 00101 01110 10000 11011 00001 00111 00010 00100
Hybrid Diff Rules: 90 165 165 :
000 00011 01001 10110 11100 00011 00100 00000 00111
001 00010 01000 10111 11101 00011 00100 00000 00111
010 00001 01011 10100 11110 00010 00101 00001 00110
011 00000 01010 10101 11111 00010 00101 00001 00110
100 00110 01100 10011 11001 00000 00111 00011 00100
101 00111 01101 10010 11000 00000 00111 00011 00100
110 00100 01110 10001 11011 00001 00110 00010 00101
111 00101 01111 10000 11010 00001 00110 00010 00101
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 90 90 :
000 00000 01111 10101 11010 00000 00010 00011 00001
001 00001 01110 10100 11011 00000 00010 00011 00001
010 00010 01101 10111 11000 00001 00011 00010 00000
011 00011 01100 10110 11001 00001 00011 00010 00000
100 00101 01010 10000 11111 00011 00001 00000 00010
101 00100 01011 10001 11110 00011 00001 00000 00010
110 00111 01000 10010 11101 00010 00000 00001 00011
111 00110 01001 10011 11100 00010 00000 00001 00011
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 90 150 :
000 00000 01110 10101 11011 00000 00011 00011 00000
001 00001 01111 10100 11010 00000 00011 00011 00000
010 00011 01101 10110 11000 00000 00011 00011 00000
011 00010 01100 10111 11001 00000 00011 00011 00000
100 00101 01011 10000 11110 00011 00000 00000 00011
101 00100 01010 10001 11111 00011 00000 00000 00011
110 00110 01000 10011 11101 00011 00000 00000 00011
111 00111 01001 10010 11100 00011 00000 00000 00011
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 90 105 :
000 00001 01111 10100 11010 00001 00010 00010 00001
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001 00000 01110 10101 11011 00001 00010 00010 00001
010 00010 01100 10111 11001 00001 00010 00010 00001
011 00011 01101 10110 11000 00001 00010 00010 00001
100 00100 01010 10001 11111 00010 00001 00001 00010
101 00101 01011 10000 11110 00010 00001 00001 00010
110 00111 01001 10010 11100 00010 00001 00001 00010
111 00110 01000 10011 11101 00010 00001 00001 00010
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 90 165 :
000 00001 01110 10100 11011 00001 00011 00010 00000
001 00000 01111 10101 11010 00001 00011 00010 00000
010 00011 01100 10110 11001 00000 00010 00011 00001
011 00010 01101 10111 11000 00000 00010 00011 00001
100 00100 01011 10001 11110 00010 00000 00001 00011
101 00101 01010 10000 11111 00010 00000 00001 00011
110 00110 01001 10011 11100 00011 00001 00000 00010
111 00111 01000 10010 11101 00011 00001 00000 00010
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 150 90 :
000 00000 01101 10111 11010 00000 00000 00001 00001
001 00001 01100 10110 11011 00000 00000 00001 00001
010 00010 01111 10101 11000 00001 00001 00000 00000
011 00011 01110 10100 11001 00001 00001 00000 00000
100 00111 01010 10000 11101 00001 00001 00000 00000
101 00110 01011 10001 11100 00001 00001 00000 00000
110 00101 01000 10010 11111 00000 00000 00001 00001
111 00100 01001 10011 11110 00000 00000 00001 00001
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 150 150 :
000 00000 01101 10110 11011 00000 00000 00000 00000
001 00001 01100 10111 11010 00000 00000 00000 00000
010 00011 01110 10101 11000 00000 00000 00000 00000
011 00010 01111 10100 11001 00000 00000 00000 00000
100 00110 01011 10000 11101 00000 00000 00000 00000
101 00111 01010 10001 11100 00000 00000 00000 00000
110 00101 01000 10011 11110 00000 00000 00000 00000
111 00100 01001 10010 11111 00000 00000 00000 00000
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 150 105 :
000 00001 01100 10111 11010 00001 00001 00001 00001
001 00000 01101 10110 11011 00001 00001 00001 00001
010 00010 01111 10100 11001 00001 00001 00001 00001
011 00011 01110 10101 11000 00001 00001 00001 00001
100 00111 01010 10001 11100 00001 00001 00001 00001
101 00110 01011 10000 11101 00001 00001 00001 00001
110 00100 01001 10010 11111 00001 00001 00001 00001
111 00101 01000 10011 11110 00001 00001 00001 00001
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 150 165 :
000 00001 01100 10110 11011 00001 00001 00000 00000
001 00000 01101 10111 11010 00001 00001 00000 00000
010 00011 01110 10100 11001 00000 00000 00001 00001
011 00010 01111 10101 11000 00000 00000 00001 00001
100 00110 01011 10001 11100 00000 00000 00001 00001
101 00111 01010 10000 11101 00000 00000 00001 00001
110 00100 01001 10011 11110 00001 00001 00000 00000
111 00101 01000 10010 11111 00001 00001 00000 00000
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 105 90 :
000 00010 01111 10101 11000 00010 00010 00011 00011
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001 00011 01110 10100 11001 00010 00010 00011 00011
010 00000 01101 10111 11010 00011 00011 00010 00010
011 00001 01100 10110 11011 00011 00011 00010 00010
100 00101 01000 10010 11111 00011 00011 00010 00010
101 00100 01001 10011 11110 00011 00011 00010 00010
110 00111 01010 10000 11101 00010 00010 00011 00011
111 00110 01011 10001 11100 00010 00010 00011 00011
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 105 150 :
000 00011 01110 10101 11000 00011 00011 00011 00011
001 00010 01111 10100 11001 00011 00011 00011 00011
010 00000 01101 10110 11011 00011 00011 00011 00011
011 00001 01100 10111 11010 00011 00011 00011 00011
100 00101 01000 10011 11110 00011 00011 00011 00011
101 00100 01001 10010 11111 00011 00011 00011 00011
110 00110 01011 10000 11101 00011 00011 00011 00011
111 00111 01010 10001 11100 00011 00011 00011 00011
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 105 105 :
000 00010 01111 10100 11001 00010 00010 00010 00010
001 00011 01110 10101 11000 00010 00010 00010 00010
010 00001 01100 10111 11010 00010 00010 00010 00010
011 00000 01101 10110 11011 00010 00010 00010 00010
100 00100 01001 10010 11111 00010 00010 00010 00010
101 00101 01000 10011 11110 00010 00010 00010 00010
110 00111 01010 10001 11100 00010 00010 00010 00010
111 00110 01011 10000 11101 00010 00010 00010 00010
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 105 165 :
000 00011 01110 10100 11001 00011 00011 00010 00010
001 00010 01111 10101 11000 00011 00011 00010 00010
010 00001 01100 10110 11011 00010 00010 00011 00011
011 00000 01101 10111 11010 00010 00010 00011 00011
100 00100 01001 10011 11110 00010 00010 00011 00011
101 00101 01000 10010 11111 00010 00010 00011 00011
110 00110 01011 10001 11100 00011 00011 00010 00010
111 00111 01010 10000 11101 00011 00011 00010 00010
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 165 90 :
000 00010 01101 10111 11000 00010 00000 00001 00011
001 00011 01100 10110 11001 00010 00000 00001 00011
010 00000 01111 10101 11010 00011 00001 00000 00010
011 00001 01110 10100 11011 00011 00001 00000 00010
100 00111 01000 10010 11101 00001 00011 00010 00000
101 00110 01001 10011 11100 00001 00011 00010 00000
110 00101 01010 10000 11111 00000 00010 00011 00001
111 00100 01011 10001 11110 00000 00010 00011 00001
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 165 150 :
000 00011 01101 10110 11000 00011 00000 00000 00011
001 00010 01100 10111 11001 00011 00000 00000 00011
010 00000 01110 10101 11011 00011 00000 00000 00011
011 00001 01111 10100 11010 00011 00000 00000 00011
100 00110 01000 10011 11101 00000 00011 00011 00000
101 00111 01001 10010 11100 00000 00011 00011 00000
110 00101 01011 10000 11110 00000 00011 00011 00000
111 00100 01010 10001 11111 00000 00011 00011 00000
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 165 105 :
000 00010 01100 10111 11001 00010 00001 00001 00010
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001 00011 01101 10110 11000 00010 00001 00001 00010
010 00001 01111 10100 11010 00010 00001 00001 00010
011 00000 01110 10101 11011 00010 00001 00001 00010
100 00111 01001 10010 11100 00001 00010 00010 00001
101 00110 01000 10011 11101 00001 00010 00010 00001
110 00100 01010 10001 11111 00001 00010 00010 00001
111 00101 01011 10000 11110 00001 00010 00010 00001
Hybrid Diff Rules: 150 165 165 :
000 00011 01100 10110 11001 00011 00001 00000 00010
001 00010 01101 10111 11000 00011 00001 00000 00010
010 00001 01110 10100 11011 00010 00000 00001 00011
011 00000 01111 10101 11010 00010 00000 00001 00011
100 00110 01001 10011 11100 00000 00010 00011 00001
101 00111 01000 10010 11101 00000 00010 00011 00001
110 00100 01011 10001 11110 00001 00011 00010 00000
111 00101 01010 10000 11111 00001 00011 00010 00000
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 90 90 :
000 00101 01010 10000 11111 00101 00111 00110 00100
001 00100 01011 10001 11110 00101 00111 00110 00100
010 00111 01000 10010 11101 00100 00110 00111 00101
011 00110 01001 10011 11100 00100 00110 00111 00101
100 00000 01111 10101 11010 00110 00100 00101 00111
101 00001 01110 10100 11011 00110 00100 00101 00111
110 00010 01101 10111 11000 00111 00101 00100 00110
111 00011 01100 10110 11001 00111 00101 00100 00110
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 90 150 :
000 00101 01011 10000 11110 00101 00110 00110 00101
001 00100 01010 10001 11111 00101 00110 00110 00101
010 00110 01000 10011 11101 00101 00110 00110 00101
011 00111 01001 10010 11100 00101 00110 00110 00101
100 00000 01110 10101 11011 00110 00101 00101 00110
101 00001 01111 10100 11010 00110 00101 00101 00110
110 00011 01101 10110 11000 00110 00101 00101 00110
111 00010 01100 10111 11001 00110 00101 00101 00110
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 90 105 :
000 00100 01010 10001 11111 00100 00111 00111 00100
001 00101 01011 10000 11110 00100 00111 00111 00100
010 00111 01001 10010 11100 00100 00111 00111 00100
011 00110 01000 10011 11101 00100 00111 00111 00100
100 00001 01111 10100 11010 00111 00100 00100 00111
101 00000 01110 10101 11011 00111 00100 00100 00111
110 00010 01100 10111 11001 00111 00100 00100 00111
111 00011 01101 10110 11000 00111 00100 00100 00111
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 90 165 :
000 00100 01011 10001 11110 00100 00110 00111 00101
001 00101 01010 10000 11111 00100 00110 00111 00101
010 00110 01001 10011 11100 00101 00111 00110 00100
011 00111 01000 10010 11101 00101 00111 00110 00100
100 00001 01110 10100 11011 00111 00101 00100 00110
101 00000 01111 10101 11010 00111 00101 00100 00110
110 00011 01100 10110 11001 00110 00100 00101 00111
111 00010 01101 10111 11000 00110 00100 00101 00111
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 150 90 :
000 00111 01010 10000 11101 00111 00111 00110 00110
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001 00110 01011 10001 11100 00111 00111 00110 00110
010 00101 01000 10010 11111 00110 00110 00111 00111
011 00100 01001 10011 11110 00110 00110 00111 00111
100 00000 01101 10111 11010 00110 00110 00111 00111
101 00001 01100 10110 11011 00110 00110 00111 00111
110 00010 01111 10101 11000 00111 00111 00110 00110
111 00011 01110 10100 11001 00111 00111 00110 00110
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 150 150 :
000 00110 01011 10000 11101 00110 00110 00110 00110
001 00111 01010 10001 11100 00110 00110 00110 00110
010 00101 01000 10011 11110 00110 00110 00110 00110
011 00100 01001 10010 11111 00110 00110 00110 00110
100 00000 01101 10110 11011 00110 00110 00110 00110
101 00001 01100 10111 11010 00110 00110 00110 00110
110 00011 01110 10101 11000 00110 00110 00110 00110
111 00010 01111 10100 11001 00110 00110 00110 00110
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 150 105 :
000 00111 01010 10001 11100 00111 00111 00111 00111
001 00110 01011 10000 11101 00111 00111 00111 00111
010 00100 01001 10010 11111 00111 00111 00111 00111
011 00101 01000 10011 11110 00111 00111 00111 00111
100 00001 01100 10111 11010 00111 00111 00111 00111
101 00000 01101 10110 11011 00111 00111 00111 00111
110 00010 01111 10100 11001 00111 00111 00111 00111
111 00011 01110 10101 11000 00111 00111 00111 00111
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 150 165 :
000 00110 01011 10001 11100 00110 00110 00111 00111
001 00111 01010 10000 11101 00110 00110 00111 00111
010 00100 01001 10011 11110 00111 00111 00110 00110
011 00101 01000 10010 11111 00111 00111 00110 00110
100 00001 01100 10110 11011 00111 00111 00110 00110
101 00000 01101 10111 11010 00111 00111 00110 00110
110 00011 01110 10100 11001 00110 00110 00111 00111
111 00010 01111 10101 11000 00110 00110 00111 00111
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 105 90 :
000 00101 01000 10010 11111 00101 00101 00100 00100
001 00100 01001 10011 11110 00101 00101 00100 00100
010 00111 01010 10000 11101 00100 00100 00101 00101
011 00110 01011 10001 11100 00100 00100 00101 00101
100 00010 01111 10101 11000 00100 00100 00101 00101
101 00011 01110 10100 11001 00100 00100 00101 00101
110 00000 01101 10111 11010 00101 00101 00100 00100
111 00001 01100 10110 11011 00101 00101 00100 00100
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 105 150 :
000 00101 01000 10011 11110 00101 00101 00101 00101
001 00100 01001 10010 11111 00101 00101 00101 00101
010 00110 01011 10000 11101 00101 00101 00101 00101
011 00111 01010 10001 11100 00101 00101 00101 00101
100 00011 01110 10101 11000 00101 00101 00101 00101
101 00010 01111 10100 11001 00101 00101 00101 00101
110 00000 01101 10110 11011 00101 00101 00101 00101
111 00001 01100 10111 11010 00101 00101 00101 00101
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 105 105 :
000 00100 01001 10010 11111 00100 00100 00100 00100
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001 00101 01000 10011 11110 00100 00100 00100 00100
010 00111 01010 10001 11100 00100 00100 00100 00100
011 00110 01011 10000 11101 00100 00100 00100 00100
100 00010 01111 10100 11001 00100 00100 00100 00100
101 00011 01110 10101 11000 00100 00100 00100 00100
110 00001 01100 10111 11010 00100 00100 00100 00100
111 00000 01101 10110 11011 00100 00100 00100 00100
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 105 165 :
000 00100 01001 10011 11110 00100 00100 00101 00101
001 00101 01000 10010 11111 00100 00100 00101 00101
010 00110 01011 10001 11100 00101 00101 00100 00100
011 00111 01010 10000 11101 00101 00101 00100 00100
100 00011 01110 10100 11001 00101 00101 00100 00100
101 00010 01111 10101 11000 00101 00101 00100 00100
110 00001 01100 10110 11011 00100 00100 00101 00101
111 00000 01101 10111 11010 00100 00100 00101 00101
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 165 90 :
000 00111 01000 10010 11101 00111 00101 00100 00110
001 00110 01001 10011 11100 00111 00101 00100 00110
010 00101 01010 10000 11111 00110 00100 00101 00111
011 00100 01011 10001 11110 00110 00100 00101 00111
100 00010 01101 10111 11000 00100 00110 00111 00101
101 00011 01100 10110 11001 00100 00110 00111 00101
110 00000 01111 10101 11010 00101 00111 00110 00100
111 00001 01110 10100 11011 00101 00111 00110 00100
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 165 150 :
000 00110 01000 10011 11101 00110 00101 00101 00110
001 00111 01001 10010 11100 00110 00101 00101 00110
010 00101 01011 10000 11110 00110 00101 00101 00110
011 00100 01010 10001 11111 00110 00101 00101 00110
100 00011 01101 10110 11000 00101 00110 00110 00101
101 00010 01100 10111 11001 00101 00110 00110 00101
110 00000 01110 10101 11011 00101 00110 00110 00101
111 00001 01111 10100 11010 00101 00110 00110 00101
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 165 105 :
000 00111 01001 10010 11100 00111 00100 00100 00111
001 00110 01000 10011 11101 00111 00100 00100 00111
010 00100 01010 10001 11111 00111 00100 00100 00111
011 00101 01011 10000 11110 00111 00100 00100 00111
100 00010 01100 10111 11001 00100 00111 00111 00100
101 00011 01101 10110 11000 00100 00111 00111 00100
110 00001 01111 10100 11010 00100 00111 00111 00100
111 00000 01110 10101 11011 00100 00111 00111 00100
Hybrid Diff Rules: 105 165 165 :
000 00110 01001 10011 11100 00110 00100 00101 00111
001 00111 01000 10010 11101 00110 00100 00101 00111
010 00100 01011 10001 11110 00111 00101 00100 00110
011 00101 01010 10000 11111 00111 00101 00100 00110
100 00011 01100 10110 11001 00101 00111 00110 00100
101 00010 01101 10111 11000 00101 00111 00110 00100
110 00001 01110 10100 11011 00100 00110 00111 00101
111 00000 01111 10101 11010 00100 00110 00111 00101
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 90 90 :
000 00101 01111 10000 11010 00101 00010 00110 00001
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001 00100 01110 10001 11011 00101 00010 00110 00001
010 00111 01101 10010 11000 00100 00011 00111 00000
011 00110 01100 10011 11001 00100 00011 00111 00000
100 00000 01010 10101 11111 00110 00001 00101 00010
101 00001 01011 10100 11110 00110 00001 00101 00010
110 00010 01000 10111 11101 00111 00000 00100 00011
111 00011 01001 10110 11100 00111 00000 00100 00011
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 90 150 :
000 00101 01110 10000 11011 00101 00011 00110 00000
001 00100 01111 10001 11010 00101 00011 00110 00000
010 00110 01101 10011 11000 00101 00011 00110 00000
011 00111 01100 10010 11001 00101 00011 00110 00000
100 00000 01011 10101 11110 00110 00000 00101 00011
101 00001 01010 10100 11111 00110 00000 00101 00011
110 00011 01000 10110 11101 00110 00000 00101 00011
111 00010 01001 10111 11100 00110 00000 00101 00011
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 90 105 :
000 00100 01111 10001 11010 00100 00010 00111 00001
001 00101 01110 10000 11011 00100 00010 00111 00001
010 00111 01100 10010 11001 00100 00010 00111 00001
011 00110 01101 10011 11000 00100 00010 00111 00001
100 00001 01010 10100 11111 00111 00001 00100 00010
101 00000 01011 10101 11110 00111 00001 00100 00010
110 00010 01001 10111 11100 00111 00001 00100 00010
111 00011 01000 10110 11101 00111 00001 00100 00010
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 90 165 :
000 00100 01110 10001 11011 00100 00011 00111 00000
001 00101 01111 10000 11010 00100 00011 00111 00000
010 00110 01100 10011 11001 00101 00010 00110 00001
011 00111 01101 10010 11000 00101 00010 00110 00001
100 00001 01011 10100 11110 00111 00000 00100 00011
101 00000 01010 10101 11111 00111 00000 00100 00011
110 00011 01001 10110 11100 00110 00001 00101 00010
111 00010 01000 10111 11101 00110 00001 00101 00010
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 150 90 :
000 00111 01101 10000 11010 00111 00000 00110 00001
001 00110 01100 10001 11011 00111 00000 00110 00001
010 00101 01111 10010 11000 00110 00001 00111 00000
011 00100 01110 10011 11001 00110 00001 00111 00000
100 00000 01010 10111 11101 00110 00001 00111 00000
101 00001 01011 10110 11100 00110 00001 00111 00000
110 00010 01000 10101 11111 00111 00000 00110 00001
111 00011 01001 10100 11110 00111 00000 00110 00001
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 150 150 :
000 00110 01101 10000 11011 00110 00000 00110 00000
001 00111 01100 10001 11010 00110 00000 00110 00000
010 00101 01110 10011 11000 00110 00000 00110 00000
011 00100 01111 10010 11001 00110 00000 00110 00000
100 00000 01011 10110 11101 00110 00000 00110 00000
101 00001 01010 10111 11100 00110 00000 00110 00000
110 00011 01000 10101 11110 00110 00000 00110 00000
111 00010 01001 10100 11111 00110 00000 00110 00000
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 150 105 :
000 00111 01100 10001 11010 00111 00001 00111 00001
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001 00110 01101 10000 11011 00111 00001 00111 00001
010 00100 01111 10010 11001 00111 00001 00111 00001
011 00101 01110 10011 11000 00111 00001 00111 00001
100 00001 01010 10111 11100 00111 00001 00111 00001
101 00000 01011 10110 11101 00111 00001 00111 00001
110 00010 01001 10100 11111 00111 00001 00111 00001
111 00011 01000 10101 11110 00111 00001 00111 00001
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 150 165 :
000 00110 01100 10001 11011 00110 00001 00111 00000
001 00111 01101 10000 11010 00110 00001 00111 00000
010 00100 01110 10011 11001 00111 00000 00110 00001
011 00101 01111 10010 11000 00111 00000 00110 00001
100 00001 01011 10110 11100 00111 00000 00110 00001
101 00000 01010 10111 11101 00111 00000 00110 00001
110 00011 01001 10100 11110 00110 00001 00111 00000
111 00010 01000 10101 11111 00110 00001 00111 00000
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 105 90 :
000 00101 01111 10010 11000 00101 00010 00100 00011
001 00100 01110 10011 11001 00101 00010 00100 00011
010 00111 01101 10000 11010 00100 00011 00101 00010
011 00110 01100 10001 11011 00100 00011 00101 00010
100 00010 01000 10101 11111 00100 00011 00101 00010
101 00011 01001 10100 11110 00100 00011 00101 00010
110 00000 01010 10111 11101 00101 00010 00100 00011
111 00001 01011 10110 11100 00101 00010 00100 00011
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 105 150 :
000 00101 01110 10011 11000 00101 00011 00101 00011
001 00100 01111 10010 11001 00101 00011 00101 00011
010 00110 01101 10000 11011 00101 00011 00101 00011
011 00111 01100 10001 11010 00101 00011 00101 00011
100 00011 01000 10101 11110 00101 00011 00101 00011
101 00010 01001 10100 11111 00101 00011 00101 00011
110 00000 01011 10110 11101 00101 00011 00101 00011
111 00001 01010 10111 11100 00101 00011 00101 00011
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 105 105 :
000 00100 01111 10010 11001 00100 00010 00100 00010
001 00101 01110 10011 11000 00100 00010 00100 00010
010 00111 01100 10001 11010 00100 00010 00100 00010
011 00110 01101 10000 11011 00100 00010 00100 00010
100 00010 01001 10100 11111 00100 00010 00100 00010
101 00011 01000 10101 11110 00100 00010 00100 00010
110 00001 01010 10111 11100 00100 00010 00100 00010
111 00000 01011 10110 11101 00100 00010 00100 00010
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 105 165 :
000 00100 01110 10011 11001 00100 00011 00101 00010
001 00101 01111 10010 11000 00100 00011 00101 00010
010 00110 01100 10001 11011 00101 00010 00100 00011
011 00111 01101 10000 11010 00101 00010 00100 00011
100 00011 01001 10100 11110 00101 00010 00100 00011
101 00010 01000 10101 11111 00101 00010 00100 00011
110 00001 01011 10110 11100 00100 00011 00101 00010
111 00000 01010 10111 11101 00100 00011 00101 00010
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 165 90 :
000 00111 01101 10010 11000 00111 00000 00100 00011
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001 00110 01100 10011 11001 00111 00000 00100 00011
010 00101 01111 10000 11010 00110 00001 00101 00010
011 00100 01110 10001 11011 00110 00001 00101 00010
100 00010 01000 10111 11101 00100 00011 00111 00000
101 00011 01001 10110 11100 00100 00011 00111 00000
110 00000 01010 10101 11111 00101 00010 00110 00001
111 00001 01011 10100 11110 00101 00010 00110 00001
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 165 150 :
000 00110 01101 10011 11000 00110 00000 00101 00011
001 00111 01100 10010 11001 00110 00000 00101 00011
010 00101 01110 10000 11011 00110 00000 00101 00011
011 00100 01111 10001 11010 00110 00000 00101 00011
100 00011 01000 10110 11101 00101 00011 00110 00000
101 00010 01001 10111 11100 00101 00011 00110 00000
110 00000 01011 10101 11110 00101 00011 00110 00000
111 00001 01010 10100 11111 00101 00011 00110 00000
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 165 105 :
000 00111 01100 10010 11001 00111 00001 00100 00010
001 00110 01101 10011 11000 00111 00001 00100 00010
010 00100 01111 10001 11010 00111 00001 00100 00010
011 00101 01110 10000 11011 00111 00001 00100 00010
100 00010 01001 10111 11100 00100 00010 00111 00001
101 00011 01000 10110 11101 00100 00010 00111 00001
110 00001 01010 10100 11111 00100 00010 00111 00001
111 00000 01011 10101 11110 00100 00010 00111 00001
Hybrid Diff Rules: 165 165 165 :
000 00110 01100 10011 11001 00110 00001 00101 00010
001 00111 01101 10010 11000 00110 00001 00101 00010
010 00100 01110 10001 11011 00111 00000 00100 00011
011 00101 01111 10000 11010 00111 00000 00100 00011
100 00011 01001 10110 11100 00101 00010 00110 00001
101 00010 01000 10111 11101 00101 00010 00110 00001
110 00001 01011 10100 11110 00100 00011 00111 00000
111 00000 01010 10101 11111 00100 00011 00111 00000
B.3 Correlation of Sequences to Seeds
These experiments show the relationship between seeds and the sequences they generate
under various rule configurations. The SeedDiffFromTemp function below creates a
dictionary with all possible sequences as keys and a list of the seeds that generate
them as values. Numbers here are often stored as native integers for performance
reasons; results showing decimal numbers are meant to be interpreted as the binary
equivalent of that number.
This first experiment shows that rule sets having rules of the same arity in each
position generate the same temporal sequences with only a constant factor added into
the seed to account for rules that differ only in their complimentarity. Rulesets having
different arity in corresponding rules generate the same sequences only from seeds
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with no constant relationship across the rule sets. Indeed, depending on the difference
in rules, the same sequence may not even be possible in another rule set.
>>> hr1 = [90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 150]
>>> hr2 = [90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 105]
>>> hr3 = [90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 150, 90, 150]
>>> d1 = hca.SeedDiffFromTemp(hr1, 9)
>>> d2 = hca.SeedDiffFromTemp(hr2, 9)
>>> d3 = hca.SeedDiffFromTemp(hr3, 9)
>>> len(d3)
511
>>> len(d2)
511
>>> len(d1)
511
>>> for i in range(1, 10):
print ’d1 ^ d2:’,
pb(d1[i][0] ^ d2[i][0], 9)
print ’d2 ^ d3:’,
pb(d2[i][0] ^ d3[i][0], 9)
print ’d1 ^ d3:’,
pb(d1[i][0] ^ d3[i][0], 9)
d1 ^ d2: 101101101
d1 ^ d2: 101101101
d1 ^ d2: 101101101
d1 ^ d2: 101101101
d1 ^ d2: 101101101
d1 ^ d2: 101101101
d1 ^ d2: 101101101
d1 ^ d2: 101101101
d1 ^ d2: 101101101
d2 ^ d3: 111101111
d2 ^ d3: 000000000
d2 ^ d3: 010000010
d2 ^ d3: 000101001
d2 ^ d3: 010101011
d2 ^ d3: 101000100
d2 ^ d3: 111000110
d2 ^ d3: 101101110
d2 ^ d3: 111101100
d1 ^ d3: 010000010
d1 ^ d3: 101101101
d1 ^ d3: 111101111
d1 ^ d3: 101000100
d1 ^ d3: 111000110
d1 ^ d3: 000101001
d1 ^ d3: 010101011
d1 ^ d3: 000000011
d1 ^ d3: 010000001
This holds regardless of mixing arity or complimentarity, as shown by the following
rule sets.
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>>> hr4 = [90] * 8 + [105]
>>> d4 = SeedDiffFromTemp(hr4, 9)
>>> hr5 = [165] * 8 + [150]
>>> d5 = SeedDiffFromTemp(hr5, 9)
>>> hr1 = [90] * 8 + [150]
>>> for j, d in enumerate([d1, d4, d5]):
for k, e in enumerate([d1, d4, d5]):
if d != e:
print ’d[’+str(j)+’] ^ e[’+str(k)+’]’
for i in range(1, 10):
if i in d and i in e:
pb(d[i][0] ^ e[i][0], 9)
elif i in d:
print ’right does not have’,
pb(i, 9)
else:
print ’left does not have’,
pb(i,9)
d[0] ^ e[1]
101101101
101101101
101101101
101101101
101101101
101101101
101101101
101101101
101101101
d[0] ^ e[2]
001001001
001001001
001001001
001001001
001001001
001001001
001001001
001001001
001001001
d[1] ^ e[0]
<...>
d[1] ^ e[2]
100100100
100100100
100100100
100100100
100100100
100100100
100100100
100100100
100100100
d[2] ^ e[0]
<...>
001001001
d[2] ^ e[1]
90
<...>
100100100
It is possible for two rule sets to generate the same sequence up to t = n, then diverge.
This can happen when one rule set “dead-ends” (i.e. zero’s out) or has a different
period than another. Continuing the environment from above, we see both of these
conditions in two rule sets:
>>> hr2 = [90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 105]
>>> hr3 = [90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 150, 90, 150]
>>> d2[141]
[417]
>>> d3[141]
[137]
>>> t2 = hca.TempSeqFromSeed(hr2, hca.SeedFromInt(417,9),18)
>>> t3 = hca.TempSeqFromSeed(hr3, hca.SeedFromInt(137,9),18)
>>> t2
array([0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0], dtype=int8)
>>> t3
array([0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], dtype=int8)
The next experiment examines the hamming distance between seeds in two asymmetric
CA which generate the same temporal sequence. Here, the sequence is printed in
decimal next to the difference in seeds for that sequence between the two rule sets.
Some editing of the results has been done to gather similar results. In the resulting
table below, all decimal sequences in each row share the same low 6 bits. The top two
sequences of each group of four in a column share the same upper 3 bits, and again
for the bottom two of four. The middle two of each group of four have the same last 3
bits, and the outer two have the same last 4 bits.
The fact that these are groups of four seems to be related to the rule set at play.
For rule set hr1 (same as below) and hr2 = {90}6 + {150, 90, 150} , the groups have 8
members of the same hamming distance. hr2 has an eventual period of 0, hr1 of 28.
Both have unique seeds for all sequences.
>>> hr1 = [90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 150]
>>> (p,d) = MaxPeriod(hr1); print p
28
>>> len(d1)
511
>>> hr3 = [150] * 5 + [90] * 4
>>> (p,d) = MaxPeriod(hr3); print p
30
>>> d3 = SeedDiffFromTemp(hr3, 9)
>>> len(d3)
511
>>> for i in range(1,len(d1)):
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if d1[i] == d3[i]:
print i,
59 195 248
>>> for i in range(1,len(d1)):
print i, pb(d1[i][0] ^ d3[i][0])
0 000000000 64 011101010 256 001001100 320 010100110
59 000000000 123 011101010 315 001001100 379 010100110
195 000000000 131 011101010 451 001001100 387 010100110
258 000000000 184 011101010 504 001001100 440 010100110
1 011101110 65 000000100 257 010100010 321 001001000
58 011101110 122 000000100 314 010100010 378 001001000
194 011101110 130 000000100 450 010100010 386 001001000
249 011101110 185 000000100 505 010100010 441 001001000
2 110000101 66 101101111 258 111001001 322 100100011
57 110000101 121 101101111 313 111001001 377 100100011
193 110000101 129 101101111 449 111001001 385 100100011
250 110000101 186 101101111 506 111001001 442 100100011
3 101101011 67 110000001 259 100100111 323 111001101
56 101101011 120 110000001 312 100100111 376 111001101
192 101101011 128 110000001 448 100100111 384 111001101
251 101101011 187 110000001 507 100100111 443 111001101
4 111000111 68 100101101 260 110001011 324 101100001
63 111000111 127 100101101 319 110001011 383 101100001
199 111000111 135 100101101 455 110001011 391 101100001
252 111000111 188 100101101 508 110001011 444 101100001
5 100101001 69 111000011 261 101100101 325 110001111
62 100101001 126 111000011 318 101100101 382 110001111
198 100101001 134 111000011 454 101100101 390 110001111
253 100101001 189 111000011 509 101100101 445 110001111
6 001000010 70 010101000 262 000001110 326 011100100
61 001000010 125 010101000 317 000001110 381 011100100
197 001000010 133 010101000 453 000001110 389 011100100
254 001000010 190 010101000 510 000001110 446 011100100
7 010101100 71 001000110 263 011100000 327 000001010
60 010101100 124 001000110 316 011100000 380 000001010
196 010101100 132 001000110 452 011100000 388 000001010
255 010101100 191 001000110 ?_511 011100000_? 447 000001010
8 110000010 72 101101000 264 111001110 328 100100100
51 110000010 115 101101000 307 111001110 371 100100100
203 110000010 139 101101000 459 111001110 395 100100100
240 110000010 176 101101000 496 111001110 432 100100100
9 101101100 73 110000110 265 100100000 329 111001010
50 101101100 114 110000110 306 100100000 370 111001010
202 101101100 138 110000110 458 100100000 394 111001010
241 101101100 177 110000110 497 100100000 433 111001010
92
10 000000111 74 011101101 266 001001011 330 010100001
49 000000111 113 011101101 305 001001011 369 010100001
201 000000111 137 011101101 457 001001011 393 010100001
242 000000111 178 011101101 498 001001011 434 010100001
11 011101001 75 000000011 267 010100101 331 001001111
48 011101001 112 000000011 304 010100101 368 001001111
200 011101001 136 000000011 456 010100101 392 001001111
243 011101001 179 000000011 499 010100101 435 001001111
12 001000101 76 010101111 268 000001001 332 011100011
55 001000101 119 010101111 311 000001001 375 011100011
207 001000101 143 010101111 463 000001001 399 011100011
244 001000101 180 010101111 500 000001001 436 011100011
13 010101011 77 001000001 269 011100111 333 000001101
54 010101011 118 001000001 310 011100111 374 000001101
206 010101011 142 001000001 462 011100111 398 000001101
245 010101011 181 001000001 501 011100111 437 000001101
14 111000000 78 100101010 270 110001100 334 101100110
53 111000000 117 100101010 309 110001100 373 101100110
205 111000000 141 100101010 461 110001100 397 101100110
246 111000000 182 100101010 502 110001100 438 101100110
15 100101110 79 111000100 271 101100010 335 110001000
52 100101110 116 111000100 308 101100010 372 110001000
204 100101110 140 111000100 460 101100010 396 110001000
247 100101110 183 111000100 503 101100010 439 110001000
16 110101101 80 101000111 272 111100001 336 100001011
43 110101101 107 101000111 299 111100001 363 100001011
211 110101101 147 101000111 467 111100001 403 100001011
232 110101101 168 101000111 488 111100001 424 100001011
17 101000011 81 110101001 273 100001111 337 111100101
42 101000011 106 110101001 298 100001111 362 111100101
210 101000011 146 110101001 466 100001111 402 111100101
233 101000011 169 110101001 489 100001111 425 111100101
18 000101000 82 011000010 274 001100100 338 010001110
41 000101000 105 011000010 297 001100100 361 010001110
209 000101000 145 011000010 465 001100100 401 010001110
234 000101000 170 011000010 490 001100100 426 010001110
19 011000110 83 000101100 275 010001010 339 001100000
40 011000110 104 000101100 296 010001010 360 001100000
208 011000110 144 000101100 464 010001010 400 001100000
235 011000110 171 000101100 491 010001010 427 001100000
20 001101010 84 010000000 276 000100110 340 011001100
47 001101010 111 010000000 303 000100110 367 011001100
215 001101010 151 010000000 471 000100110 407 011001100
93
236 001101010 172 010000000 492 000100110 428 011001100
21 010000100 85 001101110 277 011001000 341 000100010
46 010000100 110 001101110 302 011001000 366 000100010
214 010000100 150 001101110 470 011001000 406 000100010
237 010000100 173 001101110 493 011001000 429 000100010
22 111101111 86 100000101 278 110100011 342 101001001
45 111101111 109 100000101 301 110100011 365 101001001
213 111101111 149 100000101 469 110100011 405 101001001
238 111101111 174 100000101 494 110100011 430 101001001
23 100000001 87 111101011 279 101001101 343 110100111
44 100000001 108 111101011 300 101001101 364 110100111
212 100000001 148 111101011 468 101001101 404 110100111
239 100000001 175 111101011 495 101001101 431 110100111
24 000101111 88 011000101 280 001100011 344 010001001
35 000101111 99 011000101 291 001100011 355 010001001
219 000101111 155 011000101 475 001100011 411 010001001
224 000101111 160 011000101 480 001100011 416 010001001
25 011000001 89 000101011 281 010001101 345 001100111
34 011000001 98 000101011 290 010001101 354 001100111
218 011000001 154 000101011 474 010001101 410 001100111
225 011000001 161 000101011 481 010001101 417 001100111
26 110101010 90 101000000 282 111100110 346 100001100
33 110101010 97 101000000 289 111100110 353 100001100
217 110101010 153 101000000 473 111100110 409 100001100
226 110101010 162 101000000 482 111100110 418 100001100
27 101000100 91 110101110 283 100001000 347 111100010
32 101000100 96 110101110 288 100001000 352 111100010
216 101000100 152 110101110 472 100001000 408 111100010
227 101000100 163 110101110 483 100001000 419 111100010
28 111101000 92 100000010 284 110100100 348 101001110
39 111101000 103 100000010 295 110100100 359 101001110
223 111101000 159 100000010 479 110100100 415 101001110
228 111101000 164 100000010 484 110100100 420 101001110
29 100000110 93 111101100 285 101001010 349 110100000
38 100000110 102 111101100 294 101001010 358 110100000
222 100000110 158 111101100 478 101001010 414 110100000
229 100000110 165 111101100 485 101001010 421 110100000
30 001101101 94 010000111 286 000100001 350 011001011
37 001101101 101 010000111 293 000100001 357 011001011
221 001101101 157 010000111 477 000100001 413 011001011
230 001101101 166 010000111 486 000100001 422 011001011
31 010000011 95 001101001 287 011001111 351 000100101
36 010000011 100 001101001 292 011001111 356 000100101
94
220 010000011 156 001101001 476 011001111 412 000100101
231 010000011 167 001101001 487 011001111 423 000100101
B.4 Mapping Seeds from Symmetric to Asymmetric Rulesets
These experiments investigate the possibility of using information about a sequence
under a symmetric rule set to learn something about the seed or the rule set that
originally produced it.
First, we go through all sequences produced by a uniform rule 150 CA, and find
the hamming distance from each seed that produces that sequence to the seed under
an asymmetric CA which produces the same sequence.
>>> hr3 = [90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 150, 90, 105]
>>> d3 = SeedDiffFromTemp(hr3, 9)
>>> hr5 = [150] * 9
>>> d5 = SeedDiffFromTemp(hr5, 9)
>>> intersect = []
>>> for k in d5.keys():
if k == 0:
continue
vl = d5[k]
intersect.append(k)
print k,
for v in vl:
print pb(v ^ d3[k][0]),
print
256 110101011 110000011 111101111 111000111 100101001 100000001 101101101 101000101
010101010 010000010 011101110 011000110 000101000 000000000 001101100 001000100
278 001000100 001101100 000000000 000101000 011000110 011101110 010000010 010101010
101000101 101101101 100000001 100101001 111000111 111101111 110000011 110101011
300 101000101 101101101 100000001 100101001 111000111 111101111 110000011 110101011
001000100 001101100 000000000 000101000 011000110 011101110 010000010 010101010
395 110000011 110101011 111000111 111101111 100000001 100101001 101000101 101101101
010000010 010101010 011000110 011101110 000000000 000101000 001000100 001101100
344 011000110 011101110 010000010 010101010 001000100 001101100 000000000 000101000
111000111 111101111 110000011 110101011 101000101 101101101 100000001 100101001
22 111101111 111000111 110101011 110000011 101101101 101000101 100101001 100000001
011101110 011000110 010101010 010000010 001101100 001000100 000101000 000000000
413 001101100 001000100 000101000 000000000 011101110 011000110 010101010 010000010
101101101 101000101 100101001 100000001 111101111 111000111 110101011 110000011
453 100000001 100101001 101000101 101101101 110000011 110101011 111000111 111101111
000000000 000101000 001000100 001101100 010000010 010101010 011000110 011101110
167 011000110 011101110 010000010 010101010 001000100 001101100 000000000 000101000
111000111 111101111 110000011 110101011 101000101 101101101 100000001 100101001
44 011101110 011000110 010101010 010000010 001101100 001000100 000101000 000000000
111101111 111000111 110101011 110000011 101101101 101000101 100101001 100000001
157 111000111 111101111 110000011 110101011 101000101 101101101 100000001 100101001
011000110 011101110 010000010 010101010 001000100 001101100 000000000 000101000
177 100101001 100000001 101101101 101000101 110101011 110000011 111101111 111000111
000101000 000000000 001101100 001000100 010101010 010000010 011101110 011000110
95
372 000101000 000000000 001101100 001000100 010101010 010000010 011101110 011000110
100101001 100000001 101101101 101000101 110101011 110000011 111101111 111000111
58 100000001 100101001 101000101 101101101 110000011 110101011 111000111 111101111
000000000 000101000 001000100 001101100 010000010 010101010 011000110 011101110
139 000101000 000000000 001101100 001000100 010101010 010000010 011101110 011000110
100101001 100000001 101101101 101000101 110101011 110000011 111101111 111000111
197 010101010 010000010 011101110 011000110 000101000 000000000 001101100 001000100
110101011 110000011 111101111 111000111 100101001 100000001 101101101 101000101
354 111000111 111101111 110000011 110101011 101000101 101101101 100000001 100101001
011000110 011101110 010000010 010101010 001000100 001101100 000000000 000101000
78 010000010 010101010 011000110 011101110 000000000 000101000 001000100 001101100
110000011 110101011 111000111 111101111 100000001 100101001 101000101 101101101
433 010000010 010101010 011000110 011101110 000000000 000101000 001000100 001101100
110000011 110101011 111000111 111101111 100000001 100101001 101000101 101101101
467 011101110 011000110 010101010 010000010 001101100 001000100 000101000 000000000
111101111 111000111 110101011 110000011 101101101 101000101 100101001 100000001
334 100101001 100000001 101101101 101000101 110101011 110000011 111101111 111000111
000101000 000000000 001101100 001000100 010101010 010000010 011101110 011000110
88 101101101 101000101 100101001 100000001 111101111 111000111 110101011 110000011
001101100 001000100 000101000 000000000 011101110 011000110 010101010 010000010
314 010101010 010000010 011101110 011000110 000101000 000000000 001101100 001000100
110101011 110000011 111101111 111000111 100101001 100000001 101101101 101000101
98 001101100 001000100 000101000 000000000 011101110 011000110 010101010 010000010
101101101 101000101 100101001 100000001 111101111 111000111 110101011 110000011
233 001000100 001101100 000000000 000101000 011000110 011101110 010000010 010101010
101000101 101101101 100000001 100101001 111000111 111101111 110000011 110101011
423 101101101 101000101 100101001 100000001 111101111 111000111 110101011 110000011
001101100 001000100 000101000 000000000 011101110 011000110 010101010 010000010
211 101000101 101101101 100000001 100101001 111000111 111101111 110000011 110101011
001000100 001101100 000000000 000101000 011000110 011101110 010000010 010101010
116 110000011 110101011 111000111 111101111 100000001 100101001 101000101 101101101
010000010 010101010 011000110 011101110 000000000 000101000 001000100 001101100
489 111101111 111000111 110101011 110000011 101101101 101000101 100101001 100000001
011101110 011000110 010101010 010000010 001101100 001000100 000101000 000000000
255 110101011 110000011 111101111 111000111 100101001 100000001 101101101 101000101
010101010 010000010 011101110 011000110 000101000 000000000 001101100 001000100
511 000000000 000101000 001000100 001101100 010000010 010101010 011000110 011101110
100000001 100101001 101000101 101101101 110000011 110101011 111000111 111101111
>>> len(intersect)
31
>>> pb(22)
’000010110’
>>> pb(489)
’111101001’
>>> pb(255)
’011111111’
>>> pb(256)
’100000000’
Notice that complimentary sequences have the same pattern of differences. Seed
differences for 22 and 489 above both start with 111101111, sequences for 255 and 256
start with 110101011, etc.
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B.5 Mapping Sequences from Symmetric to Asymmetric CAs
In the following experiment, continuing the above environment, all seeds for all
sequences from a 9-cell uniform rule 150 CA are looked up in the reverse dictionary
(where the key is the seed and the resulting sequence is the value) of an asymmetric
CA. The differences between the two sequences are shown. The interesting observation
is that there are only differences in the last four bits. This pattern is dependent on
the two rules (or more likely, just the asymmetric CA rule set) at play. Other CA
pairs show differences in earlier bit positions of the temporal sequence, but those cases
have a more predictable arrangement of differences across seed in the symmetric CA.
Again, we note that complementary sequences have the same pattern of differences
between symmetric and asymmetric CAs. See sequences 010001011 and 101110100
below.
>>> hr3 = [90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 150, 90, 105]
>>> d3 = SeedDiffFromTemp(hr3, 9)
>>> hr5 = [150] * 9
>>> d5 = SeedDiffFromTemp(hr5, 9)
>>> d3r = {}
>>> for k in d3:
d6r[d6[k][0]] = k
>>> for t in d5:
print ’sym seq=’ + pb(t) + ’:’
for j, i in enumerate(d5[t]):
print ’[’ + pb(i) + ’:’ + pb(d3r[i]) + ’:’ + pb(d3r[i]^t) + ’]’,
if j & 1:
print
key: [ Ssym : Tasym : T ^ Tasym] where
T = temporal sequence generated by symmetrical CA,
Ssym = seed of symmetrical CA that generates T
Tasym = temporal sequence of asymmetrical CA on seed Ssym
sym seq=100000000:
[000011101:100001000:000001000] [000110101:100001001:000001001]
[001011001:100001011:000001011] [001110001:100001010:000001010]
[010011111:100001101:000001101] [010110111:100001100:000001100]
[011011011:100001110:000001110] [011110011:100001111:000001111]
[100011100:100000100:000000100] [100110100:100000101:000000101]
[101011000:100000111:000000111] [101110000:100000110:000000110]
[110011110:100000001:000000001] [110110110:100000000:000000000]
[111011010:100000010:000000010] [111110010:100000011:000000011]
sym seq=000000000:
[000101000:000000001:000000001] [001000100:000000011:000000011]
[001101100:000000010:000000010] [010000010:000000101:000000101]
[010101010:000000100:000000100] [011000110:000000110:000000110]
[011101110:000000111:000000111] [100000001:000001100:000001100]
[100101001:000001101:000001101] [101000101:000001111:000001111]
[101101101:000001110:000001110] [110000011:000001001:000001001]
[110101011:000001000:000001000] [111000111:000001010:000001010]
[111101111:000001011:000001011]
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sym seq=100010110:
[000011100:100010101:000000011] [000110100:100010100:000000010]
[001011000:100010110:000000000] [001110000:100010111:000000001]
[010011110:100010000:000000110] [010110110:100010001:000000111]
[011011010:100010011:000000101] [011110010:100010010:000000100]
[100011101:100011001:000001111] [100110101:100011000:000001110]
[101011001:100011010:000001100] [101110001:100011011:000001101]
[110011111:100011100:000001010] [110110111:100011101:000001011]
[111011011:100011111:000001001] [111110011:100011110:000001000]
sym seq=100101100:
[000011111:100100011:000001111] [000110111:100100010:000001110]
[001011011:100100000:000001100] [001110011:100100001:000001101]
[010011101:100100110:000001010] [010110101:100100111:000001011]
[011011001:100100101:000001001] [011110001:100100100:000001000]
[100011110:100101111:000000011] [100110110:100101110:000000010]
[101011010:100101100:000000000] [101110010:100101101:000000001]
[110011100:100101010:000000110] [110110100:100101011:000000111]
[111011000:100101001:000000101] [111110000:100101000:000000100]
sym seq=110001011:
[000010101:110000010:000001001] [000111101:110000011:000001000]
[001010001:110000001:000001010] [001111001:110000000:000001011]
[010010111:110000111:000001100] [010111111:110000110:000001101]
[011010011:110000100:000001111] [011111011:110000101:000001110]
[100010100:110001110:000000101] [100111100:110001111:000000100]
[101010000:110001101:000000110] [101111000:110001100:000000111]
[110010110:110001011:000000000] [110111110:110001010:000000001]
[111010010:110001000:000000011] [111111010:110001001:000000010]
sym seq=101011000:
[000011010:101011110:000000110] [000110010:101011111:000000111]
[001011110:101011101:000000101] [001110110:101011100:000000100]
[010011000:101011011:000000011] [010110000:101011010:000000010]
[011011100:101011000:000000000] [011110100:101011001:000000001]
[100011011:101010010:000001010] [100110011:101010011:000001011]
[101011111:101010001:000001001] [101110111:101010000:000001000]
[110011001:101010111:000001111] [110110001:101010110:000001110]
[111011101:101010100:000001100] [111110101:101010101:000001101]
sym seq=000010110:
[000000001:000011101:000001011] [000101001:000011100:000001010]
[001000101:000011110:000001000] [001101101:000011111:000001001]
[010000011:000011000:000001110] [010101011:000011001:000001111]
[011000111:000011011:000001101] [011101111:000011010:000001100]
[100000000:000010001:000000111] [100101000:000010000:000000110]
[101000100:000010010:000000100] [101101100:000010011:000000101]
[110000010:000010100:000000010] [110101010:000010101:000000011]
[111000110:000010111:000000001] [111101110:000010110:000000000]
sym seq=110011101:
[000010100:110011111:000000010] [000111100:110011110:000000011]
[001010000:110011100:000000001] [001111000:110011101:000000000]
[010010110:110011010:000000111] [010111110:110011011:000000110]
[011010010:110011001:000000100] [011111010:110011000:000000101]
[100010101:110010011:000001110] [100111101:110010010:000001111]
[101010001:110010000:000001101] [101111001:110010001:000001100]
[110010111:110010110:000001011] [110111111:110010111:000001010]
[111010011:110010101:000001000] [111111011:110010100:000001001]
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sym seq=111000101:
[000010011:111001001:000001100] [000111011:111001000:000001101]
[001010111:111001010:000001111] [001111111:111001011:000001110]
[010010001:111001100:000001001] [010111001:111001101:000001000]
[011010101:111001111:000001010] [011111101:111001110:000001011]
[100010010:111000101:000000000] [100111010:111000100:000000001]
[101010110:111000110:000000011] [101111110:111000111:000000010]
[110010000:111000000:000000101] [110111000:111000001:000000100]
[111010100:111000011:000000110] [111111100:111000010:000000111]
sym seq=010100111:
[000001010:010100001:000000110] [000100010:010100000:000000111]
[001001110:010100010:000000101] [001100110:010100011:000000100]
[010001000:010100100:000000011] [010100000:010100101:000000010]
[011001100:010100111:000000000] [011100100:010100110:000000001]
[100001011:010101101:000001010] [100100011:010101100:000001011]
[101001111:010101110:000001001] [101100111:010101111:000001000]
[110001001:010101000:000001111] [110100001:010101001:000001110]
[111001101:010101011:000001100] [111100101:010101010:000001101]
sym seq=000101100:
[000000010:000101011:000000111] [000101010:000101010:000000110]
[001000110:000101000:000000100] [001101110:000101001:000000101]
[010000000:000101110:000000010] [010101000:000101111:000000011]
[011000100:000101101:000000001] [011101100:000101100:000000000]
[100000011:000100111:000001011] [100101011:000100110:000001010]
[101000111:000100100:000001000] [101101111:000100101:000001001]
[110000001:000100010:000001110] [110101001:000100011:000001111]
[111000101:000100001:000001101] [111101101:000100000:000001100]
sym seq=010011101:
[000001001:010010111:000001010] [000100001:010010110:000001011]
[001001101:010010100:000001001] [001100101:010010101:000001000]
[010001011:010010010:000001111] [010100011:010010011:000001110]
[011001111:010010001:000001100] [011100111:010010000:000001101]
[100001000:010011011:000000110] [100100000:010011010:000000111]
[101001100:010011000:000000101] [101100100:010011001:000000100]
[110001010:010011110:000000011] [110100010:010011111:000000010]
[111001110:010011101:000000000] [111100110:010011100:000000001]
sym seq=010110001:
[000001011:010111100:000001101] [000100011:010111101:000001100]
[001001111:010111111:000001110] [001100111:010111110:000001111]
[010001001:010111001:000001000] [010100001:010111000:000001001]
[011001101:010111010:000001011] [011100101:010111011:000001010]
[100001010:010110000:000000001] [100100010:010110001:000000000]
[101001110:010110011:000000010] [101100110:010110010:000000011]
[110001000:010110101:000000100] [110100000:010110100:000000101]
[111001100:010110110:000000111] [111100100:010110111:000000110]
sym seq=101110100:
[000011000:101110101:000000001] [000110000:101110100:000000000]
[001011100:101110110:000000010] [001110100:101110111:000000011]
[010011010:101110000:000000100] [010110010:101110001:000000101]
[011011110:101110011:000000111] [011110110:101110010:000000110]
[100011001:101111001:000001101] [100110001:101111000:000001100]
[101011101:101111010:000001110] [101110101:101111011:000001111]
[110011011:101111100:000001000] [110110011:101111101:000001001]
[111011111:101111111:000001011] [111110111:101111110:000001010]
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sym seq=000111010:
[000000011:000110110:000001100] [000101011:000110111:000001101]
[001000111:000110101:000001111] [001101111:000110100:000001110]
[010000001:000110011:000001001] [010101001:000110010:000001000]
[011000101:000110000:000001010] [011101101:000110001:000001011]
[100000010:000111010:000000000] [100101010:000111011:000000001]
[101000110:000111001:000000011] [101101110:000111000:000000010]
[110000000:000111111:000000101] [110101000:000111110:000000100]
[111000100:000111100:000000110] [111101100:000111101:000000111]
sym seq=010001011:
[000001000:010001010:000000001] [000100000:010001011:000000000]
[001001100:010001001:000000010] [001100100:010001000:000000011]
[010001010:010001111:000000100] [010100010:010001110:000000101]
[011001110:010001100:000000111] [011100110:010001101:000000110]
[100001001:010000110:000001101] [100100001:010000111:000001100]
[101001101:010000101:000001110] [101100101:010000100:000001111]
[110001011:010000011:000001000] [110100011:010000010:000001001]
[111001111:010000000:000001011] [111100111:010000001:000001010]
sym seq=011000101:
[000001110:011000001:000000100] [000100110:011000000:000000101]
[001001010:011000010:000000111] [001100010:011000011:000000110]
[010001100:011000100:000000001] [010100100:011000101:000000000]
[011001000:011000111:000000010] [011100000:011000110:000000011]
[100001111:011001101:000001000] [100100111:011001100:000001001]
[101001011:011001110:000001011] [101100011:011001111:000001010]
[110001101:011001000:000001101] [110100101:011001001:000001100]
[111001001:011001011:000001110] [111100001:011001010:000001111]
sym seq=101100010:
[000011001:101101000:000001010] [000110001:101101001:000001011]
[001011101:101101011:000001001] [001110101:101101010:000001000]
[010011011:101101101:000001111] [010110011:101101100:000001110]
[011011111:101101110:000001100] [011110111:101101111:000001101]
[100011000:101100100:000000110] [100110000:101100101:000000111]
[101011100:101100111:000000101] [101110100:101100110:000000100]
[110011010:101100001:000000011] [110110010:101100000:000000010]
[111011110:101100010:000000000] [111110110:101100011:000000001]
sym seq=001001110:
[000000110:001001011:000000101] [000101110:001001010:000000100]
[001000010:001001000:000000110] [001101010:001001001:000000111]
[010000100:001001110:000000000] [010101100:001001111:000000001]
[011000000:001001101:000000011] [011101000:001001100:000000010]
[100000111:001000111:000001001] [100101111:001000110:000001000]
[101000011:001000100:000001010] [101101011:001000101:000001011]
[110000101:001000010:000001100] [110101101:001000011:000001101]
[111000001:001000001:000001111] [111101001:001000000:000001110]
sym seq=110110001:
[000010110:110110100:000000101] [000111110:110110101:000000100]
[001010010:110110111:000000110] [001111010:110110110:000000111]
[010010100:110110001:000000000] [010111100:110110000:000000001]
[011010000:110110010:000000011] [011111000:110110011:000000010]
[100010111:110111000:000001001] [100111111:110111001:000001000]
[101010011:110111011:000001010] [101111011:110111010:000001011]
[110010101:110111101:000001100] [110111101:110111100:000001101]
[111010001:110111110:000001111] [111111001:110111111:000001110]
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sym seq=111010011:
[000010010:111010100:000000111] [000111010:111010101:000000110]
[001010110:111010111:000000100] [001111110:111010110:000000101]
[010010000:111010001:000000010] [010111000:111010000:000000011]
[011010100:111010010:000000001] [011111100:111010011:000000000]
[100010011:111011000:000001011] [100111011:111011001:000001010]
[101010111:111011011:000001000] [101111111:111011010:000001001]
[110010001:111011101:000001110] [110111001:111011100:000001111]
[111010101:111011110:000001101] [111111101:111011111:000001100]
sym seq=101001110:
[000011011:101000011:000001101] [000110011:101000010:000001100]
[001011111:101000000:000001110] [001110111:101000001:000001111]
[010011001:101000110:000001000] [010110001:101000111:000001001]
[011011101:101000101:000001011] [011110101:101000100:000001010]
[100011010:101001111:000000001] [100110010:101001110:000000000]
[101011110:101001100:000000010] [101110110:101001101:000000011]
[110011000:101001010:000000100] [110110000:101001011:000000101]
[111011100:101001001:000000111] [111110100:101001000:000000110]
sym seq=001011000:
[000000111:001010110:000001110] [000101111:001010111:000001111]
[001000011:001010101:000001101] [001101011:001010100:000001100]
[010000101:001010011:000001011] [010101101:001010010:000001010]
[011000001:001010000:000001000] [011101001:001010001:000001001]
[100000110:001011010:000000010] [100101110:001011011:000000011]
[101000010:001011001:000000001] [101101010:001011000:000000000]
[110000100:001011111:000000111] [110101100:001011110:000000110]
[111000000:001011100:000000100] [111101000:001011101:000000101]
sym seq=100111010:
[000011110:100111110:000000100] [000110110:100111111:000000101]
[001011010:100111101:000000111] [001110010:100111100:000000110]
[010011100:100111011:000000001] [010110100:100111010:000000000]
[011011000:100111000:000000010] [011110000:100111001:000000011]
[100011111:100110010:000001000] [100110111:100110011:000001001]
[101011011:100110001:000001011] [101110011:100110000:000001010]
[110011101:100110111:000001101] [110110101:100110110:000001100]
[111011001:100110100:000001110] [111110001:100110101:000001111]
sym seq=001100010:
[000000100:001100000:000000010] [000101100:001100001:000000011]
[001000000:001100011:000000001] [001101000:001100010:000000000]
[010000110:001100101:000000111] [010101110:001100100:000000110]
[011000010:001100110:000000100] [011101010:001100111:000000101]
[100000101:001101100:000001110] [100101101:001101101:000001111]
[101000001:001101111:000001101] [101101001:001101110:000001100]
[110000111:001101001:000001011] [110101111:001101000:000001010]
[111000011:001101010:000001000] [111101011:001101011:000001001]
sym seq=011101001:
[000001100:011101010:000000011] [000100100:011101011:000000010]
[001001000:011101001:000000000] [001100000:011101000:000000001]
[010001110:011101111:000000110] [010100110:011101110:000000111]
[011001010:011101100:000000101] [011100010:011101101:000000100]
[100001101:011100110:000001111] [100100101:011100111:000001110]
[101001001:011100101:000001100] [101100001:011100100:000001101]
[110001111:011100011:000001010] [110100111:011100010:000001011]
[111001011:011100000:000001001] [111100011:011100001:000001000]
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sym seq=110100111:
[000010111:110101001:000001110] [000111111:110101000:000001111]
[001010011:110101010:000001101] [001111011:110101011:000001100]
[010010101:110101100:000001011] [010111101:110101101:000001010]
[011010001:110101111:000001000] [011111001:110101110:000001001]
[100010110:110100101:000000010] [100111110:110100100:000000011]
[101010010:110100110:000000001] [101111010:110100111:000000000]
[110010100:110100000:000000111] [110111100:110100001:000000110]
[111010000:110100011:000000100] [111111000:110100010:000000101]
sym seq=011010011:
[000001111:011011100:000001111] [000100111:011011101:000001110]
[001001011:011011111:000001100] [001100011:011011110:000001101]
[010001101:011011001:000001010] [010100101:011011000:000001011]
[011001001:011011010:000001001] [011100001:011011011:000001000]
[100001110:011010000:000000011] [100100110:011010001:000000010]
[101001010:011010011:000000000] [101100010:011010010:000000001]
[110001100:011010101:000000110] [110100100:011010100:000000111]
[111001000:011010110:000000101] [111100000:011010111:000000100]
sym seq=001110100:
[000000101:001111101:000001001] [000101101:001111100:000001000]
[001000001:001111110:000001010] [001101001:001111111:000001011]
[010000111:001111000:000001100] [010101111:001111001:000001101]
[011000011:001111011:000001111] [011101011:001111010:000001110]
[100000100:001110001:000000101] [100101100:001110000:000000100]
[101000000:001110010:000000110] [101101000:001110011:000000111]
[110000110:001110100:000000000] [110101110:001110101:000000001]
[111000010:001110111:000000011] [111101010:001110110:000000010]
sym seq=111101001:
[000010001:111100010:000001011] [000111001:111100011:000001010]
[001010101:111100001:000001000] [001111101:111100000:000001001]
[010010011:111100111:000001110] [010111011:111100110:000001111]
[011010111:111100100:000001101] [011111111:111100101:000001100]
[100010000:111101110:000000111] [100111000:111101111:000000110]
[101010100:111101101:000000100] [101111100:111101100:000000101]
[110010010:111101011:000000010] [110111010:111101010:000000011]
[111010110:111101000:000000001] [111111110:111101001:000000000]
sym seq=011111111:
[000001101:011110111:000001000] [000100101:011110110:000001001]
[001001001:011110100:000001011] [001100001:011110101:000001010]
[010001111:011110010:000001101] [010100111:011110011:000001100]
[011001011:011110001:000001110] [011100011:011110000:000001111]
[100001100:011111011:000000100] [100100100:011111010:000000101]
[101001000:011111000:000000111] [101100000:011111001:000000110]
[110001110:011111110:000000001] [110100110:011111111:000000000]
[111001010:011111101:000000010] [111100010:011111100:000000011]
sym seq=111111111:
[000010000:111111111:000000000] [000111000:111111110:000000001]
[001010100:111111100:000000011] [001111100:111111101:000000010]
[010010010:111111010:000000101] [010111010:111111011:000000100]
[011010110:111111001:000000110] [011111110:111111000:000000111]
[100010001:111110011:000001100] [100111001:111110010:000001101]
[101010101:111110000:000001111] [101111101:111110001:000001110]
[110010011:111110110:000001001] [110111011:111110111:000001000]
[111010111:111110101:000001010] [111111111:111110100:000001011]
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B.6 Number of Periods and Unique Sequences of 9-cell CAs
103
Ruleset Period Sequences Ruleset Period Sequences Ruleset Period Sequences
110111101 30 511 110001100 14 511 110001110 10 256
110100101 30 511 110010111 14 511 *110000011 10 32
110110000 30 511 110011000 14 511 *110010011 10 32
111000011 30 511 110100111 14 256 110101000 8 256
111001000 30 511 111001011 14 256 111100011 8 256
111011110 30 511 111111101 14 256 111110001 8 256
111101010 30 511 110101100 14 128 110001111 8 256
111101110 30 511 110010100 14 128 110010000 8 256
111110000 30 511 110011010 14 128 111111000 8 128
110000110 30 511 111110010 14 64 110000100 8 128
110000111 30 511 *111101111 14 32 110001010 8 128
110001001 30 511 111001110 12 511 *111000111 8 32
111000100 30 256 111001111 12 511 *111111111 7 32
111010010 30 256 111011100 12 511 110010010 6 511
111010101 30 256 111100111 12 511 111000101 6 256
111011101 30 256 111111001 12 511 111010001 6 256
111100001 30 256 110001000 12 511 111101000 6 128
110010001 30 256 110011101 12 511 110100011 6 64
*110111011 30 32 110110111 12 256 111100010 6 64
*110101011 30 32 110111001 12 256 110001011 6 64
110100000 28 511 110111110 12 256 110100100 6 32
111001100 28 511 110100001 12 256 110101001 4 256
110000010 28 511 111000010 12 256 111001101 4 256
110011001 28 511 111011011 12 256 111010100 4 256
110011100 28 511 111101101 12 256 111011001 4 256
110110010 24 511 111110011 12 256 111101100 4 256
110010110 24 511 111111100 12 256 110011110 4 256
110100110 24 64 110000000 12 256 110111100 4 128
110110100 24 32 110011111 12 256 110110011 4 64
110101111 16 511 111010000 12 128 111001010 4 64
111101011 16 511 111110110 12 32 110011011 4 64
111110101 16 511 110000101 12 32 111100110 4 32
111111010 16 511 110100010 10 511 110010101 4 32
*111010111 16 32 110101010 10 511 110110110 3 64
110111111 14 511 111000110 10 511 110000001 1 256
111010011 14 511 111011000 10 511 111000000 1 128
111011111 14 511 111100000 10 511 110110101 0 511
111100101 14 511 111100100 10 511 110111010 0 511
111101001 14 511 110001101 10 511 110101101 0 511
111110100 14 511 110110001 10 256 111010110 0 511
111110111 14 511 110111000 10 256 110101110 0 256
111111011 14 511 111000001 10 256 111011010 0 64
111111110 14 511 111001001 10 256
Table 11: Raw data for number of periods and sequences of various 9-cell CA. Rulesets
have a 1 for rule 150 cells, 0 for rule 90 cells. Rulesets marked with ’*’ are symmetric.
104
